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Abstract
This thesis is about the design and analysis of smart markets for selling com-
modities and resources. Examples include combinatorial auctions, markets
for selling resources, and markets for selling cloud services. The objective
here is to maximize the revenue for the market designer. This problem is dif-
ficult because the information required for a smart market to function well
is usually dispersed and privately held by the participating agents who act
strategically.
The first part of the thesis is on Bayesian revenue optimal combinatorial
auctions. We first quantify a trade-off between the two most commonly
used objectives in auction theory: revenue maximization and social welfare
maximization. Next, we identify a revenue optimal auction for a benchmark
class of package bidding problems, in which each buyer is interested only
in a specific bundle and has a value for it, both of which are his private
information. Finally, we apply the theory of revenue optimal auctions to
analyze two simple pricing schemes – fixed price and an auction based price
– for selling cloud computing instances.
The second part of the thesis is on designing a market for selling a resource
such as a spectrum license or mineral rights. The winning buyer in turn
develops this resource to generate profit. We propose a two-stage payment
rule where the winning buyer makes an initial payment according to the rules
of an auction and also pays a part of the realized profit from the resource
according to a prespecified profit-sharing contract (PSC). For the second
price auction and the English auction, we show that the two-stage payment
offers greater expected revenue to the seller than one-time payment. Further,
we show that suitable PSCs provide higher expected total revenue than a
one-time payment even when the incentives of the winning buyer to develop
the resource must be addressed by the seller. Finally, we consider auctions
where bids are in the form of securities whose values to the seller are tied to
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the eventual realized value of the resource. We obtain ranking of different
families of securities in terms of the expected revenue for the seller.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
“Find a truly original idea. It is the only way I will ever distinguish
myself. It is the only way I will ever matter.”
– John Nash, A Beautiful Mind (2001)
The advent of the Internet and a multifold increase in computing power
over the last few decades have allowed the creation of smart markets. The
Internet has provided an irreplaceable platform to instantly connect multiple
buyers and sellers. With high computation power, sophisticated algorithms
for clearing markets can be implemented. Thus, in contrast to traditional
market forms, smart markets allow buyers and sellers to dynamically express
their preferences over various combinations of commodities that are being
traded. Smart markets are expected to provide a much better match between
the interests of buyers and sellers. For example, the FCC uses ascending price
auctions to sell the rights to use wireless spectrum, search engines use the
generalized second price auction to sell the advertisements slots, Amazon
EC2 spot instances use an auction based pricing scheme for selling cloud
services, and Iowa Electronic Markets creates markets for accumulating the
information dispersed among individuals by allowing the individuals to place
monetary bets on the outcomes of certain events.
A key question is: How to design a smart market with desirable prop-
erties? The difficulty arises because the information required for a smart
market to function well is usually dispersed and privately held by the par-
ticipating agents. For example, a wireless service provider such as AT&T
has a fairly accurate estimate of the demand for the services it plans to offer
and can compute the value of a particular bundle of licenses for it; the FCC,
however, can only have a rough estimate of the same. Private information
combined with strategic behavior of the agents makes it hard to analyze the
resulting trading activities and their equilibrium consequences in such mar-
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kets, thereby precluding any meaningful guarantees on market performance.
Furthermore, the number of possible combinations of commodity bundles can
be extremely large; buyers and sellers can have complicated preferences over
different bundles. This results in high communication overhead and imple-
mentation complexity. Addressing these challenges is necessary to harness
the full economic potential of smart markets.
This thesis is about the design and analysis of smart markets for selling
commodities and resources. Examples include combinatorial auctions, mar-
kets for selling cloud services, and markets for selling resources. The objective
here is to maximize the revenue for the market designer. The contributions
of this thesis can be broadly grouped into two parts. The first part is on
the design and analysis of Bayesian revenue optimal auctions, and on the
application of the theory of revenue optimal auctions to analyze two simple
pricing schemes currently in use for selling cloud services. The second part
is on designing markets for selling a resource such as a spectrum license or
mineral rights.
1.1 Bayesian Revenue Optimal Auctions
Consider a set of buyers competing for a set of items, such as advertisement
slots in a sponsored search, offered by a seller. A buyer has a value for each
bundle of items that he is interested in. This is the maximum price that he
is willing to pay for the bundle and is known accurately only to him. The
seller’s objective is often to design an auction mechanism that maximizes his
expected revenue, or that maximizes the social welfare generated through the
allocation of the items.1 Combinatorial auctions (henceforth, CAs) provide a
common tool to solve many such problems related to allocation and pricing.
CAs allow buyers to compete for any bundle of items for sale; allocation and
payments are based on the competition among the buyers.
The understanding of revenue optimal CAs, however, is still limited. It
suffers from the joint problem of characterization and tractability. Most of
the literature on CAs is on social welfare maximization; theoretical results
on revenue maximization apply only under simple settings. The most gen-
1The realized social welfare is defined as the total value generated through the allocation
of the items.
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eral characterization of revenue optimal auctions is for the single-parameter
environment.2 Furthermore, the allocation in a CA requires solving a hard
optimization problem. The underlying cause is the complementarity among
the items for sale: a buyer can have a higher value for a bundle as a whole
than the sum of values of the parts of the bundle. For example, a wireless
carrier like AT&T would prefer a bundle of geographically co-located spec-
trum licenses over multiple small bundles of spectrum licenses scattered over
a wide area.
Restricting ourselves to the single-parameter environment, we first quan-
tify a trade-off between the objectives of revenue maximization and social
welfare maximization. Our metric is the worst case normalized difference
between the maximum possible social welfare and the social welfare real-
ized by a revenue optimal auction. The normalization is with respect to the
maximum possible social welfare. The worst case is taken over all possible
probability distributions on buyers’ valuations. We refer to this as the worst
case efficiency loss ratio (henceforth, ELR).3 This ratio quantifies how much
the goal of revenue maximization can be in conflict with the social goal of
welfare maximization. We obtain bounds on the worst case ELR as a func-
tion of some basic parameters such as the number of buyers, the ratio of
maximum to minimum possible values that the buyers can have for a bundle
of items, and the number of different bids that they can place. These bounds
show that for certain cases the welfare properties of a revenue maximizing
auction can be arbitrarily bad.
Next, we study the problem of characterizing revenue optimal CAs for
environments outside the single-parameter environment. One such special
class of CAs is where buyers are single minded. Single-minded buyers are
an extreme case of complementarity. Here, each buyer is interested only in
a specific bundle and has a value for the same. Both the bundle that a
buyer is interested in and his value for the bundle are known only to him but
not to others. No general result on revenue maximization is known for this
extreme case either. Studying CAs with single-minded buyers is an initial
benchmark step towards understanding general CAs. It is intuitive to expect
that if there are two bundles of items, where one contains the other, then the
2Single-parameter environment is described in Section 2.1.
3The auction that maximizes the realized social welfare is referred to as an efficient
auction.
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larger of the two bundles is likely to have higher value for a buyer. Under
this very intuitive assumption, we characterize a revenue maximizing auction
and describe an algorithm for computing the allocation of the items and their
prices. The resulting algorithm has a simple structure: it involves solving
a well studied maximum weight independent set problem and also admits a
polynomial time approximation.
Finally, we apply techniques from the theory of revenue maximizing auc-
tions to address a question on pricing cloud services. Two commonly used
pricing mechanisms for selling cloud instances are: (i) pay as you go (hence-
forth, PAYG), where a user is charged a fixed price per unit time per instance;
and (ii) spot market where users bid the maximum amount they are willing
to pay for using the cloud services. For example, Windows Azure uses PAYG
while Amazon EC2 uses both PAYG and the spot market. We examine the
trade-offs for a provider deliberating whether or not to operate a spot market
in conjunction with PAYG. We model a cloud computing service as a queuing
system described by a waiting time function. We characterize the equilib-
rium if an arriving user can choose between the spot market and PAYG.
Using this equilibrium characterization, we provide theoretical and simula-
tion based evidence suggesting that operating PAYG in isolation generates a
higher expected revenue for the cloud service provider than operating PAYG
and the spot market simultaneously.
1.2 Markets for Selling a Resource
Consider the problem of selling a resource such as a spectrum license or
mineral rights. The winning buyer in turn develops this resource to generate
profit. A commonly used method for sale is to use an auction. Two forms
of payment can be used: (i) the winning buyer makes a one-time payment
at the end of the auction stage; or (ii) the winning buyer makes an initial
payment at the end of the auction stage and also pays a part of the realized
profit from the resource according to a prespecified profit-sharing contract
(henceforth, PSC). For example, the FCC spectrum auctions are of the first
type, while the 3G spectrum auctions in India require that the winners of an
auction also pay an additional spectrum usage charge.
We investigate whether or not there are economic reasons to prefer auctions
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with a PSC over auctions with only a one-time payment. The solution to
this problem is nontrivial because strategic buyers adjust their bids in the
auction stage in response to the payment they are required to make according
to the PSC. For the second price auction and the English auction, we show
that the seller’s expected total revenue from the auction where he also takes
a fraction of the positive profit is higher than the expected revenue from the
auction with only a one-time payment. Moreover, the seller can generate
an even higher expected total revenue if, in addition to taking a fraction
of the positive profit, he also takes the same fraction of any loss incurred
from developing the resource. Moving beyond simple PSCs, we show that
the auction with a PSC from a very general class generates higher expected
total revenue than the auction with only a one-time payment. Finally, we
show that suitable PSCs provide higher expected total revenue than a one-
time payment even when the incentives of the winning buyer to develop the
resource must be addressed by the seller.
Next, we consider auctions where bids are in the form of securities whose
values to the seller are tied to the eventual realized value of the resource. For
example, as an alternative to simply soliciting cash bids for the resource, a
seller may require buyers to compete in terms of the equity share that the
seller retains of the profits from the resource. The paper by DeMarzo et al.
[1] develops a general theory of bidding with securities in the first price and
the second price auctions. The paper defines a notion of relative steepness
of families of securities and shows that a steeper family provides a higher
expected revenue to the seller. Two key assumptions are: (i) the buyers are
risk-neutral; (ii) the random variables through which values and signals of
the buyers are realized are affiliated. We study the role of these assumptions
and the consequences of relaxing them in the case of the second price auction.
We show that the revenue ranking of families of securities of [1] holds for risk
averse buyers. However, this ranking is not preserved if affiliation is relaxed
to a less restrictive form of positive dependence among values and signals,
namely, first order stochastic dominance. We then define the relative strong
steepness of families of securities and show that a strongly steeper family
generates a higher expected revenue for the seller in the case of this more
general form of positive dependence.
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1.3 Thesis Outline
The goal of this thesis is to gain fundamental insights into how markets
should be designed and analyzed in the presence of strategic agents with
privately held and dispersed information. The contributions of this thesis
summarized in Section 1.1 are described in detail in Chapters 2, 3, and
4; the contributions summarized in Section 1.2 are described in detail in
Chapters 5 and 6. Each of the chapter introductions contains a literature
survey on earlier work related to ours, with the focus on highlighting our
innovation over the earlier work.
Chapter 2 starts with preliminaries on Bayesian revenue optimal CAs and
introduces the single-parameter model. It then formally defines the worst
case ELR problem and presents bounds on the same. Chapter 3 moves be-
yond the single-parameter model and introduces the single-minded buyers
model. It then characterizes a revenue optimal auction for single-minded
buyers. Chapter 4 applies the theory of revenue optimal auctions to analyze
two simple pricing schemes currently in use for selling cloud computing in-
stances. Chapter 2 provides necessary background for Chapters 3 and 4 and
should be read first. Portions of the content of Chapters 2, 3, and 4 appear
in our papers [2], [3], [4], respectively.
Chapter 5 investigates how a market should be designed to sell a resource.
It introduces the idea of PSCs and establishes the revenue superiority of
auctions followed by a PSC over auctions with only a one-time payment.
Chapter 6 considers auctions where bids are in the form of securities. It
obtains a pair-wise revenue ranking of different family of securities. We
suggest reading Chapter 5 before Chapter 6. Chapters 5 and 6 can be read
independently of Chapters 2, 3, and 4. Portions of the content of Chapters 5
and 6 will appear in [5] and [6], respectively.
Chapter 7 concludes the thesis with a summary of the main contributions,
and a discussion of open issues and questions raised by the thesis.
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Chapter 2
Revenue and Efficiency Trade-off in Auctions
The two prevalent themes in auction theory are revenue maximization for the
seller, referred to as optimality, and social welfare maximization, referred to
as efficiency. For example, VCG [7, 8, 9] is the most widely studied efficient
auction, while a Bayesian revenue optimal single item auction for indepen-
dent private value model was first characterized by Myerson in his seminal
work [10]. VCG has been generalized for CAs (see [11] for a description);
Myerson’s revenue optimal auction framework has been extended to a more
general single-parameter environment (see [12] for a description). These two
objectives, however, are not well aligned.
An allocation of items among buyers generates value for the items. The
realized social welfare (henceforth, RSW) is defined as the total generated
value. This is an upper bound on the revenue that the seller can extract.1
Thus, an allocation that creates a large social welfare might appear as a
precursor to extracting large revenue: the seller can extract more revenue
by first creating a large total value for the items and then collecting a part
of it as payments from the buyers. However, in general, a revenue optimal
allocation is not efficient and vice versa. For example, as shown in [10], in
revenue optimal single item auctions where buyers’ private valuations are
drawn independently from the same distribution (referred to as same priors
from here on), the seller sets a common reserve price and does not sell the
item if the values reported by all buyers are below the reserve price. When
buyers’ private values are realized from different distributions (referred to as
different priors from here on), then not only can the reserve prices be different
for different buyers, the seller need not always sell the item to the buyer with
the highest reported value. An efficient auction like VCG, however, will
award the item to the buyer who values it the most in all such scenarios.
Moreover, as we show later in Section 2.3, in multiple item auctions with
1This follows from the individual rationality assumption defined in Section 2.2.
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single-parameter buyers, a revenue optimal allocation need not be efficient,
even if the buyers have the same priors and there are no reserve prices.
We study how much a revenue optimal auction loses in efficiency when
compared with an efficient auction. Our metric is the worst case normalized
difference in the maximum social welfare (henceforth, MSW) that can be
realized (by an efficient auction) and the RSW by the most efficient revenue
optimal auction; the normalization is with respect to the MSW. The worst
case is taken over all possible probability distributions on buyers’ valuations.
We refer to this as the worst case efficiency loss ratio (ELR). This ratio
quantifies how much the goal of revenue maximization can be in conflict
with the social goal of welfare maximization.
This chapter makes the following two main contributions:
(i) For binary valued single-parameter buyers with different priors, we show
that the worst case ELR is no worse than it is with only one buyer; in
particular, it is at most 1/2. A tighter bound is obtained for auctions
with identical items and buyers with same priors.
(ii) Moving beyond the case of binary valuations but restricting to single
item revenue optimal auctions where buyers have same priors, we reduce
the problem of finding the worst case ELR into a relatively simple
optimization problem involving only the common probability vector of
buyers. This simplification allows us to obtain lower and upper bounds
on the worst case ELR as a function of r – the ratio of the maximum to
the minimum possible value of the item for the buyer; K – the number
of discrete values that the buyer can have for the item; and N – the
number of buyers. These bounds are tight asymptotically as K goes to
infinity. We obtain tighter bounds for some special cases.
Two previous works that also study the trade-off between optimality and
efficiency are [13] and [14]. However, the metrics used by [13] and [14] are
the number of extra buyers required by an efficient auction to match a rev-
enue optimal auction in revenue, and the number of extra buyers required
by a revenue optimal auction to match an efficient auction in the RSW, re-
spectively. This is fundamentally different from the problem we study here.
Correa and Figueroa [15] find bounds on the informational cost introduced
by the presence of private information (see Section 2.4 for its relationship
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with the ELR) for a class of resource allocation problems, but for continuous
probability distributions on the cost of resources, and under some restrictive
assumptions on the probability distributions.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.1 describes the
single-parameter model, and introduces our notation and definitions. Sec-
tion 2.2 provides preliminaries on revenue optimal auctions and their char-
acterization. We formally define the worst case ELR problem in Section 2.3
and obtain bounds on the same. Section 2.4 provides some comments and
describes some extensions; in particular, it investigates the ELR for single
item auctions but with buyers having different priors. Section 2.5 summaries
the chapter. Proofs of some propositions and intermediate lemmas appear
in Section 2.6.
2.1 The Single-Parameter Model
Consider N buyers competing for a set of items that a seller wants to sell.
The set of buyers is denoted by N , {1, 2, . . . , N}. A buyer is said to be
a winner if he gets any one of his desired bundles of items. We restrict to
single-parameter buyers: a buyer n gets a positive value v∗n if he is a winner,
irrespective of the bundle he gets; otherwise, he gets zero value. The bundles
desired by the buyers are publicly known. The value v∗n is referred to as the
type of buyer n. The type of a buyer is known only to him and constitutes
his private information. Notice that the private type of each buyer is one-
dimensional.
For each buyer n, the seller and the other buyers have imperfect informa-
tion about his true type v∗n; they model it by a discrete random variable Xn.
The probability distribution of Xn is common knowledge. Xn is assumed
to take values from a set Xn , {x1n, x2n, . . . , xKnn } of cardinality Kn, where
0 ≤ x1n < x2n < . . . < xKnn . The probability that Xn is equal to xin is denoted
by pin. We assume that p
i
n > 0 for all n ∈ N and 1 ≤ i ≤ Kn. Thus, the
type v∗n can be interpreted as a specific realization of the random variable
Xn, known only to buyer n. Random variables [Xn]n∈N are assumed to be
independent.2
2This is referred to as the independent private value assumption – a fairly standard
assumption in auction theory.
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In general, the structure of the problem restricts the possible sets of win-
ners. Such constraints are captured by defining a set A to be the collection
of all possible sets of winners; i.e., A ∈ A if A ⊆ N and all buyers in A can
win simultaneously. We assume that ∅ ∈ A, and A is downward closed ; i.e.,
if A ∈ A and B ⊆ A, then B ∈ A. Also, assume that for each buyer n, there
is a set A ∈ A such that n ∈ A.
The single-parameter model is rich enough to capture many scenarios of
interest. In a single item auction, a buyer gets a certain positive value if
he wins the item and zero otherwise. Here, A consists of all singletons {n},
n ∈ N (and empty set ∅). In an auction of S identical items, each buyer
wants any one of the S items and has the same value for any one of them.
Here, A is any subset of buyers of size at most S. Similarly, in auctions with
single-minded buyers with known bundles,3 each buyer n is interested only
in a specific (known) bundle b∗n of items and has a value v
∗
n for any bundle
bn such that bn contains the bundle b
∗
n, while he has zero value for any other
bundle. Here, A is collections of buyers with disjoint bundles.
Denote a typical reported type (henceforth, referred to as a bid) of a buyer n
by vn, where vn ∈ Xn, and let v , (v1, v2, . . . , vN) be the vector of bids of
everyone. Define X , (X1, X2, . . . , XN) and X , X1 × X2 × . . . × XN .
We use the standard notation of v−n , (v1, . . . , vn−1, vn+1, . . . , vN) and v ,
(vn,v−n). Similar interpretations are used for X−n and X−n. Henceforth, in
any further usage, vn, v−n, and v are always in the sets Xn, X−n, and X
respectively. Let xn , (x1n, x2n, . . . , xKnn ), x1:N , (x1,x2, . . . ,xN), and define
pn and p1:N similarly.
2.2 Preliminaries on Revenue Optimal Auctions
In this section, we formally describe the optimal auction problem, formulate
the objective and the constraints explicitly, and provide an optimal algorithm
for solving the problem. We will be focusing only on the auction mechanisms
where buyers are asked to report their types directly (referred to as direct
mechanism). By the revelation principle [10], the restriction to direct mech-
3For single-minded buyers, both the desired bundle of items and its value for a buyer
are his private information. However, if the bundles are known then this reduces to single-
parameter model; see Chapter 3 for further details.
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anisms is without any loss of optimality.4 The presentation in this section is
based on [16] which extends Myerson’s characterization [10] to the case where
buyers’ valuation sets are finite. We adapt the treatment in [16], which is for
single item auctions, to single-parameter model.
2.2.1 Optimal auction problem
A direct auction mechanism for single-parameter buyers is specified by an
allocation rule pi : X 7→ [0, 1]|A|, and a payment rule M : X 7→ RN . Given
a bid vector v, the allocation rule pi(v) , [piA(v)]A∈A is a probability dis-
tribution over the collection A of possible sets of winners. For each A ∈ A,
piA(v) is the probability that the set of buyers A win simultaneously. The
payment rule is defined as M , (M1,M2, . . . ,MN), where Mn(v) is the pay-
ment (expected payment in case of random allocation) that buyer n makes
to the seller when the bid vector is v. Let Qn(v) be the probability that
buyer n wins in the auction when the bid vector is v; i.e.,
Qn(v) ,
∑
A∈A:n∈A
piA(v). (2.1)
Buyers are assumed to be risk neutral and have quasilinear payoffs (a
standard assumption in auction theory). Given that the value of buyer n is
v∗n, and the bid vector is v, the payoff (expected payoff in case of random
allocation) of buyer n is:
σn(v; v
∗
n) , Qn(v)v∗n −Mn(v). (2.2)
The mechanism (pi,M) and the payoff functions [σn]n∈N induce a game of
incomplete information among the buyers. The seller’s goal is to design an
auction mechanism (pi,M) to maximize his expected revenue at a Bayes-
Nash equilibrium (henceforth, BNE) of the induced game.5 Again, using the
revelation principle, the seller can restrict only to the auctions where truth-
telling is a BNE (referred to as incentive compatibility) without any loss of
4The revelation principle says that, given a mechanism and a Bayes-Nash equilibrium
(BNE) for that mechanism, there exists a direct mechanism in which truth-telling is a
BNE, and allocation and payment outcomes are same as in the given BNE of the original
mechanism.
5See [17] for preliminaries on Game Theory.
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optimality.
For the above revenue maximization problem to be well defined, assume
that the seller cannot force the buyers to participate in an auction and impose
arbitrarily high payments on them. Thus, a buyer will voluntarily participate
in an auction only if his payoff from participation is nonnegative (referred
to as individual rationality). The seller is assumed to have free disposal of
items and may decide not to sell some or all items for certain bid vectors.
The idea now, as in [10], is to express incentive compatibility and indi-
vidual rationality as mathematical constraints, and formulate the revenue
maximization objective as an optimization problem under these constraints.
To this end, for each n ∈ N , define the following functions:
qn(vn) , E [Qn(vn,X−n)] , (2.3)
mn(vn) , E [Mn(vn,X−n)] . (2.4)
Here, qn(vn) is the expected probability that buyer n wins given that he
reports his type as vn while everyone else is truthful. The expectation is over
the types of everyone else, i.e., over X−n. Similarly, mn(vn) is the expected
payment that buyer n makes to the seller. The incentive compatibility and
individual rationality constraints can be expressed mathematically as follows:
1. Incentive compatibility (IC): For any n ∈ N , and 1 ≤ i, j ≤ Kn,
qn(x
i
n)x
i
n −mn(xin) ≥ qn(xjn)xin −mn(xjn). (2.5)
Notice that, given Xn = x
i
n, the left side of (2.5) is the payoff of buyer
n from reporting his type truthfully (assuming everyone else is also
truthful), while the right side is the payoff from misreporting his type
to xjn.
2. Individual rationality (IR):6 For any n ∈ N , and 1 ≤ i ≤ Kn,
qn(x
i
n)x
i
n −mn(xin) ≥ 0. (2.6)
Under IC, all buyers report their true types. Hence, the expected revenue
6Strictly speaking, this is interim individual rationality. To compute his expected
payoff, a buyer uses his true value, but takes expectation over the possible values of
others.
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that the seller gets is E
[∑N
n=1 Mn(X)
]
. The expectation here is over the
random vector X. The optimal auction problem is:
maximize
pi,M
E
[
N∑
n=1
Mn(X)
]
,
subject to IC and IR constraints.
(2.7)
The optimal auction problem given by (2.7) requires solving jointly for
the allocation rule pi and the payment rule M. It can be simplified to a
problem that requires solving only for the allocation rule pi. This is achieved
by relating the expected payments to the allocation probabilities, as shown
by the lemmas below:
Lemma 2.2.1. Under the IC constraint, qn(x
i
n) ≤ qn(xi+1n ) for all n ∈ N
and 1 ≤ i ≤ Kn − 1.
Proof. The proof follows easily from (2.5) by considering the case where the
type buyer n is xin but he reports x
i+1
n instead, and the case where his type
is xi+1n but he reports x
i
n instead.
Lemma 2.2.2. The IC constraint is equivalent to qn’s satisfying Lemma
2.2.1 and
(
qn(x
i+1
n )−qn(xin)
)
xin ≤ mn(xi+1n )−mn(xin) ≤
(
qn(x
i+1
n )−qn(xin)
)
xi+1n , (2.8)
for all n ∈ N , bn, and 1 ≤ i ≤ Kn − 1.
Proof. Trivially, the IC constraint (2.5) implies (2.8). To show that (2.8)
implies (2.5), first consider the case j > i. Using (2.8),
(
qn(x
j
n)− qn(xin)
)
xin ≤
j−1∑
k=i
[(
qn(x
k+1
n )− qn(xkn)
)
xkn
]
≤
j−1∑
k=i
[
mn(x
k+1
n )−mn(xkn)
]
= mn(x
j
n)−mn(xin),
where the first inequality follows from Lemma 2.2.1 and xkn < x
k+1
n . Thus,
(2.5) holds for j < i. Similarly, starting with the left inequality of (2.8),
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it can easily be shown that (2.8) implies (2.5) for j < i, and the proof is
complete.
Define the virtual-valuation function wn of buyer n as:
wn(x
i
n) , xin − (xi+1n − xin)
(∑Kn
j=i+1 p
j
n
)
pin
, (2.9)
where we use the notational convention of xKn+1n , 0 and
∑Kn
j=Kn+1
(.) , 0.
Definition 2.2.1. The virtual-valuation function wn is said to be regular if
wn(x
i
n) ≤ wn(xi+1n ) for 1 ≤ i ≤ Kn − 1.
Lemma 2.2.3. Under the IC and IR constraints, for all n ∈ N , the following
holds:
E [mn(Xn)] ≤ E [qn(Xn)wn(Xn)] . (2.10)
Moreover, (2.10) holds with equality for mn(x
i
n) satisfying:
mn(x
i
n) =
i∑
j=1
[(
qn(x
j
n)− qn(xj−1n )
)
xjn
]
, (2.11)
where we use the notational convention qn(x
0
n) , 0.
Proof. Lemma 2.2.2 and the IR constraint mn(x
1
n) ≤ qn(x1n)x1n easily imply:
mn(x
i
n) ≤
i∑
j=1
[(
qn(x
j
n)− qn(xj−1n )
)
xjn
]
, (2.12)
where qn(x
0
n) , 0. Using (2.12),
E [mn(Xn)] =
Kn∑
i=1
pinmn(x
i
n)
≤
Kn∑
i=1
i∑
j=1
[(
qn(x
j
n)− qn(xj−1n )
)
xjnp
i
n
]
=
Kn∑
j=1
Kn∑
i=j
[(
qn(x
j
n)− qn(xj−1n )
)
xjnp
i
n
]
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=
Kn∑
j=1
[(
qn(x
j
n)− qn(xj−1n )
)( Kn∑
i=j
pin
)
xjn
]
=
Kn∑
j=1
pjnqn(x
j
n)wn(x
j
n) = E [qn(Xn)wn(Xn)] ,
where the second last equality is obtained by rearranging the terms and using
(2.9). It is straightforward to verify that the above holds with equality for
mn(x
i
n) given by (2.11). The final step is show that this particular choice of
mn satisfies the IC and IR constraints. The IC constraint is trivially satisfied
using Lemma 2.2.2. The IR constraint is satisfied since:
mn(x
i
n) =
i∑
j=1
(qn(x
j
n)− qn(xj−1n ))xjn
≤
i∑
j=1
(
qn(x
j
n)− qn(xj−1n )
)
xin = qn(x
i
n)x
i
n.
Notice that the last part of the proof of Lemma 2.2.3 shows that the
condition qn(x
i
n) ≤ qn(xi+1n ) for 1 ≤ i ≤ Kn − 1, is also sufficient for the
existence of a payment rule satisfying the relaxed IC and the IR constraint.
Combining Lemmas 2.2.1-2.2.3, we have the following proposition:
Proposition 2.2.1 (from [10] and [16]). Let pi be an allocation rule and
[Qn]n∈N and [qn]n∈N be obtained from pi by (2.1) and (2.3). A payment rule
satisfying the IC and IR constraints exists for pi if and only if qn(x
i
n) ≤
qn(x
i+1
n ) for all n ∈ N and 1 ≤ i ≤ Kn − 1. Given such pi and a payment
rule M satisfying the IC and IR constraints, the seller’s revenue satisfies:
E
[
N∑
n=1
Mn(X)
]
≤ E
[
N∑
n=1
Qn(X)wn(Xn)
]
.
Moreover, a payment rule M achieving this bound exists, and any such M
satisfies:
mn(x
i
n) =
i∑
j=1
(qn(x
j
n)− qn(xj−1n ))xjn,
for all n ∈ N and 1 ≤ i ≤ Kn, where we use the notational convention
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qn(x
0
n) , 0.
Proposition 2.2.1 shows how payments can be chosen optimally for a given
allocation rule. Hence, the optimal auction problem can now be simplified
to a problem that requires solving only for the allocation rule pi.
2.2.2 Optimal auction solution
Given pi satisfying the conditions of Proposition 2.2.1, let R(pi) denote the
maximum revenue to the seller under the IC and IR constraints. From Propo-
sition 2.2.1 and (2.1),
R(pi) = E
[
N∑
n=1
Qn(X)wn(Xn)
]
= E
[∑
A∈A
piA(X)
(∑
n∈A
wn(Xn)
)]
. (2.13)
The above suggests that an optimal auction can be found by selecting the
allocation rule pi (and in turn [Qn]n∈N and [qn]n∈N ) that assigns nonzero
probabilities only to the feasible sets of winners with the maximum total
virtual valuations for each bid vector v. If all wn’s are regular, then it can
be verified that such an allocation rule satisfies the monotonicity condition
on the qn’s needed by Proposition 2.2.1. However, if the wn’s are not reg-
ular, the resulting allocation rule would not necessarily satisfy the required
monotonicity condition on the qn’s. This problem can be remedied by us-
ing another function, wn, called the monotone virtual valuation (henceforth
MVV), constructed graphically as follows.
Let (g0n, h
0
n) , (0,−x1n), (gin, hin) ,
(∑i
j=1 p
j
n,−xi+1n (
∑Kn
j=i+1 p
j
n)
)
for 1 ≤
i ≤ Kn − 1, and (gKnn , hKnn ) , (1, 0). Then, wn(xin) is the slope of the line
joining the point (gi−1n , h
i−1
n ) to the point (g
i
n, h
i
n); i.e.,
wn(x
i
n) =
hin − hi−1n
gin − gi−1n
. (2.14)
Find the convex hull of points [(gin, h
i
n)]0≤i≤Kn , and let h
i
n be the point on
this convex hull corresponding to gin. Then, wn(x
i
n) is the slope of the line
joining the point (gi−1n , h
i−1
n ) to the point (g
i
n, h
i
n); i.e,
wn(x
i
n) =
h
i
n − h
i−1
n
gin − gi−1n
. (2.15)
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The following lemma that is a straightforward consequence of the construc-
tion of wn as the slopes of a convex function:
Lemma 2.2.4. wn(x
i
n) ≤ wn(xi+1n ) for all n ∈ N and 1 ≤ i ≤ Kn− 1. If wn
is regular then wn is equal to wn.
p1 p2 p3 p4
(1,0)
(0 0)
−x1
,
)( 1xw
)( 1xw
−x 2
)()( 44 xwxw =
)( 2xw
_
_
)( 2xw
)()( 33 xwxw = _
_
−x 3
−x 4 w
wslopes are virtual valuations,
slopes are monotone virtual valuations, 
_
Figure 2.1: Virtual valuations and monotone virtual valuations as the slopes of
the graph.
The process of finding virtual valuations and monotone virtual valuations
can be explained using Figure 2.1. Since the virtual-valuation function of
a buyer depends only on the probability distribution of his type, we de-
scribe the scheme for a typical random variable X, where we have dropped
the subscript. Suppose that X takes four different values {x1, x2, x3, x4}
with corresponding probabilities {p1, p2, p3, p4}. Draw vertical lines sepa-
rated from each other by distances p1, p2, p3, and p4 as shown in the figure.
For each 1 ≤ i ≤ 4, join the point −xi on the y-axis to the x-axis at 1
(sum of probabilities). Call such line as line i. Then, (g0, h0) = (0,−x1) and
(g4, h4) = (1, 0). The intersection of line 2 with the first vertical line is the
point (g1, h1). Similarly, the intersection of line 3 with the second vertical
line is the point (g2, h2) and so on. Virtual-valuation function w is given by
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the slopes of the lines connecting these points. For the case shown in the
figure, w(x1) > w(x2) and hence virtual-valuation function is not regular.
Here, the lower convex hull of the points (gi, hi)’s is taken. The slopes of
individual segments of this convex hull give the monotone virtual valuation
w(xi). This is equivalent to replacing w(x1) and w(x2) by their weighted
mean, i.e., w(x1) = w(x2) = (p1w(x1) + p2w(x2))/(p1 + p2).
The following proposition establishes the optimality of the allocation rule
obtained by using wn.
Proposition 2.2.2 (from [10] and [16]). Let pi be any allocation rule satis-
fying the conditions of Proposition 2.2.1 and [Qn]n∈N be obtained from pi by
(2.1). Then,
E
[
N∑
n=1
Qn(X)wn(Xn)
]
≤ E
[
N∑
n=1
Qn(X)wn(Xn)
]
. (2.16)
Moreover, for any allocation rule pi that maximizes
∑N
n=1 Qn(v)wn(vn) for
each bid vector v, (2.16) holds with equality.
Proof. The proof is a straightforward adaptation of a result from [16]. To
establish (2.16), it is sufficient to show that:
E [qn(Xn)wn(Xn)] ≤ E [qn(Xn)wn(Xn)] . (2.17)
Notice that:
E [qn(Xn)wn(Xn)] =
Kn∑
i=1
pinqn(x
i
n)wn(x
i
n) =
Kn∑
i=1
qn(x
i
n)(h
i
n − hi−1n )
= hKnn qn(x
Kn
n )− h0nqn(x1n)−
Kn−1∑
i=1
hin(qn(x
i+1
n )− qn(xin)), (2.18)
where the second equality is from (2.14). Similarly, from (2.15),
E [qn(Xn)wn(Xn)]
= h
Kn
n qn(x
Kn
n )− h
0
nqn(x
1
n)−
Kn−1∑
i=1
h
i
n(qn(x
i+1
n )− qn(xin)). (2.19)
h
i
n is the point corresponding to g
i
n on the convex hull of [(g
i
n, h
i
n)]1≤i≤Kn .
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Hence, we must have h0n = h
0
n, h
Kn
n = h
Kn
n , and h
i
n ≥ h
i
n. This, along with
qn(x
i+1
n ) ≥ qn(xin), and (2.18)-(2.19), gives:
E [qn(Xn)wn(Xn)− qn(Xn)wn(Xn)]
= −
Kn−1∑
i=1
(hin − h
i
n)(qn(x
i+1
n )− qn(xin)) ≤ 0,
hence proving (2.17), and in turn, the inequality (2.16). This proves the first
part of the claim.
Let pi be the allocation rule that maximizes
∑N
n=1 Qn(v)wn(vn) for each
bid vector v. If 0 ≤ i < j ≤ Kn are such that hin = h
i
n, h
k
n > h
k
n for
i+ 1 ≤ k ≤ j− 1, and hjn = h
j
n (recall that h
i
n ≥ h
i
n), then h
k
n lies on the line
joining (gin, h
i
n) and (g
j
n, h
j
n). Hence, wn(x
l
n) = wn(x
l+1
n ) for i + 1 ≤ l ≤ j;
i.e., wn is constant in this interval. This in turn implies that given v−n, if
n ∈ A then piA(xln,v−n) is constant in the interval i+ 1 ≤ l ≤ j. Let Qn and
qn be obtained from pi by (2.1) and (2.3). Then qn(x
l
n) is also constant in
the interval i+ 1 ≤ l ≤ j. Moreover, by the construction of wn,
j∑
l=i+1
plnwn(x
l
n) =
j∑
l=i+1
plnwn(x
l
n),
⇒
j∑
l=i+1
plnwn(x
l
n)qn(x
l
n) =
j∑
l=i+1
plnwn(x
l
n)qn(x
l
n).
Thus, for all n ∈ N , we have:
E [wn(Xn)qn(Xn)] = E [wn(Xn)qn(Xn)] . (2.20)
This proves the second part of the claim.
An optimal auction, which uses the MVVs defined above, is the maximum
weight algorithm shown as Algorithm 1. The set W(v) is the collection of
all feasible subsets of buyers with maximum total MVVs for the given bid
vector v. In step 3 of Algorithm 1, for each xin ≤ vn, Qn(xin,v−n) is computed
recursively by treating (xin,v−n) as the input bid vector and repeating steps
1− 2. Since A is downward closed and ∅ ∈ A, no buyer n with wn(vn) < 0 is
included in the set of winners W (v). Depending on the tie-breaking rule, a
buyer n with wn(vn) = 0 may or may not be included in the set of winners.
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Assume that only buyers with wn(vn) > 0 are considered. Since wn(x
i
n) ≤
wn(x
i+1
n ), the seller equivalently sets a reserve price for each buyer n. A buyer
whose bid is below his reserve price never wins. If x∗n is the reserve price for
buyer n then wn(x
i
n) ≤ 0 for xin < x∗n. Since wn(xi)’s are the slopes of the
lines joining the points (gin, h
i
n)’s, h
∗
n = min0≤i≤Kn h
i
n. From the property
of convex hull, min0≤i≤Kn h
i
n = min0≤i≤Kn h
i
n. Thus, using the definition of
hin’s, an equivalent formulation of the reserve price is:
x∗n = max
{
vn : vn ∈ argmax
v̂n∈Xn
v̂nP [Xn ≥ v̂n]
}
. (2.21)
In the example given in Figure 2.1, this corresponds to the y-intercept of the
line through the lowermost point of the graph and the point (1, 0), which is
x3.
Algorithm 1 Maximum weight algorithm
Given a bid vector v:
1. Compute wn(vn) for each n ∈ N .
2. Take pi(v) to be any probability distribution on the collection W(v)
defined as:
W(v) , argmax
A∈A
∑
n∈A
wn(vn).
Obtain the set of winners W (v) by sampling from W(v) according to
pi(v).
3. Collect payments given by:
Mn(v) =
∑
i:xin≤vn
(
Qn(x
i
n,v−n)−Qn(xi−1n ,v−n)
)
xin,
where Qn is given by (2.1), and Qn(x
0
n,v−n) , 0.
Proposition 2.2.3. Algorithm 1 gives a solution of the optimal auction prob-
lem (2.7).
Proof. Let (pio,Mo) be the solution given by Algorithm 1 and let [Qon]n∈N
and [qon]n∈N be obtained from pi
o by (2.1) and (2.3).
From Lemma 2.2.4, wn(x
i
n) ≤ wn(xi+1n ). Hence, for any v−n, if A ∈
20
W(xin,v−n) and n ∈ A, then from step 2 of Algorithm 1, A ∈ W(xi+1n ,v−n).7
This in turn implies Qon(x
i
n,v−n) ≤ Qon(xi+1n ,v−n) and qon(xin) ≤ qon(xi+1n ).
Thus, monotonicity condition of Proposition 2.2.1 is satisfied and Mo is op-
timal given pio.
Using (2.1), for all vn, we have:
N∑
n=1
Qon(v)wn(vn) =
∑
A∈A
pioA(v)
(∑
n∈A
wn(vn)
)
.
Thus, pio maximizes
∑N
n=1Qn(v)wn(vn) for each bid vector v. Proposition
2.2.2 then completes the proof.
2.3 Revenue versus Efficiency
Given any incentive compatible auction mechanism (pi,M), the RSW by the
allocation rule pi is E
[∑N
n=1 Qn(X)Xn
]
. From the IR constraint, this is at
least R(pi). An efficient auction maximizes the RSW. Since
N∑
n=1
Qn(X)Xn =
∑
A∈A
piA(X)
(∑
n∈A
Xn
)
, (2.22)
an efficient allocation rule pie(v) is any probability distribution over the set
argmaxA∈A
(∑
n∈A vn
)
. It is easy to verify that pie satisfies the monotonicity
condition needed by Proposition 2.2.1. The corresponding MSW is given by:
MSW(x1:N ,p1:N ;A) = E
[
max
A∈A
(∑
n∈A
Xn
)]
, (2.23)
where x1:N and p1:N are as defined in Section 2.1.
By contrast, an optimal auction, described in Section 2.2, involves maxi-
mizing the sum of MVVs instead of the sum of true valuations. Consequently,
it differs from an efficient auction in three ways. First, the buyers with neg-
ative MVVs do not win (equivalently, their bids are below their respective
reserve prices). Second, even if the bid of one buyer is higher than that of
7The allocation rule pio must be consistent in the following sense: let vn and vˆn be
such that vn < vˆn, but wn(vn) = wn(vˆn), then P [n ∈W (vn,v−n)] ≤ P [n ∈W (vˆn,v−n)]
for any v−n.
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another, their corresponding MVVs can be in a different order. Hence, in
single item optimal auctions, the winner is not necessarily the buyer with
the highest valuation for the item. Finally, for a multiple item auction with
single-parameter buyers, the allocation that maximizes the sum of the MVVs
might be different from the one that maximizes the sum of the true valua-
tions. These three differences are highlighted by the following examples:
Example 2.3.1. Consider two i.i.d. buyers competing for one item. Their
possible values for the item are {1, 2} with probabilities {1/3, 2/3} respec-
tively. An efficient auction, like VCG, will award the item to the highest
bidder and charge him the price equal to the second highest bid. Hence,
the revenue generated by VCG is 2 ∗ (2/3)2 + 1 − (2/3)2 < 1.45. However,
the optimal auction sets the reserve price equal to 2 (since wn(1) < 0), and
awards the item to any buyer with value 2. The revenue collected by the
optimal auction is 2 ∗ (1− (1/3)2) > 1.77. Notice that unlike VCG, the item
is not sold when both the buyers have their values equal to 1. Hence, the
optimal auction loses in efficiency.
Example 2.3.2. Consider two buyers competing for one item. Buyer 1
takes values {5, 10}, each with probability 0.5. Buyer 2 takes values {1, 2},
independent of buyer 1, each with probability 0.5. An efficient auction will
always award the item to buyer 1. Any incentive compatible auction that
always awards the item to buyer 1 cannot charge him more than 5, otherwise
buyer 1 will misreport his value. Now consider another auction that gives the
item to buyer 1 only if he bids 10 and charges him 10, otherwise, the item is
given to buyer 1 at the price 1. It is easy to see that this auction is incentive
compatible. The revenue that this auction generates is 0.5∗10+0.5∗1 = 5.5.
Since the optimal auction must extract at least this much revenue, it cannot
always award the item to buyer 1. In fact, it can be verified that the second
auction is indeed optimal. By not awarding the item to the buyer with the
highest value for it, the optimal auction again loses in efficiency.
Example 2.3.3. Consider three single-minded buyers with known bundles
competing for four items. Buyer 1 wants the items (A,B), buyer 2 wants
the items (B,C), and buyer 3 wants the items (C,D). Thus, buyers (1, 3)
and buyer 2 cannot get their respective bundles simultaneously. Buyers are
i.i.d. with values {1, 8/5}, each with probability 0.5. Suppose that their true
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values are (1, 8/5, 1) respectively. An efficient auction, like VCG, will select
buyer 1 and buyer 3 as winners because this maximizes the total value of the
allocation. However, since 2 ∗wn(1) = 2 ∗ 2/5 < wn(8/5) = 8/5, the optimal
auction will select buyer 2 as the winner. Again, there is a loss in efficiency
because the optimal allocation is not necessarily the efficient one.
The RSW by an optimal allocation cannot be more than the MSW. We
quantify how much an optimal allocation loses in the RSW when compared
with the MSW. We normalize this loss in the realized welfare by the MSW.
Let pio be an optimal allocation rule given by Algorithm 1, and let [Qon]n∈N
be obtained from pio by (2.1). Given a random vector X denoting valuations
of buyers, we define efficiency loss ratio (ELR) as:
ELR(pio,x1:N ,p1:N ;A) ,
MSW(x1:N ,p1:N ;A)− E
[∑N
n=1Q
o
n(X)Xn
]
MSW(x1:N ,p1:N ;A) .
(2.24)
Recalling step 2 of Algorithm 1, any optimal allocation rule pio is a proba-
bility distribution onW(v). Different probability distributions onW(v) cor-
respond to different tie-breaking rules for selecting a set of winners W (v) ∈
W(v).8 They result in the same expected revenue but different RSW. We
are interested in finding how much the most efficient allocation among the
class of optimal allocations loses in the RSW when compared with the MSW.
Denote the most efficient allocation among the class of optimal allocations
by p˜io.
Definition 2.3.1. Given r > 1 and a positive integer K, define Dr,K as the
set of (x1:N ,p1:N) satisfying the following properties:
1. For each n ∈ N , 0 < x1n < x2n < . . . < xKnn , and pn is a valid probability
vector of dimension Kn, where Kn ≤ K,
2. (maxn∈N xKnn )/(minn∈N x
1
n) ≤ r,
3. For all n ∈ N and 1 ≤ i ≤ Kn, pin > 0.
8The tie-breaking rule must be consistent in the following sense: let vn and v̂n be such
that vn < v̂n, but wn(vn) = wn(v̂n), then P [n ∈W (vn,v−n)] ≤ P [n ∈W (v̂n,v−n)] for
any v−n.
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The worst case ELR, denoted by η(r,K;A), is defined as:
η(r,K;A) , sup
(x1:N ,p1:N )∈Dr,K
ELR(p˜io,x1:N ,p1:N ;A). (2.25)
The MSW is continuous in x1:N and p1:N . A slight perturbation in x
i
n’s
or in pin’s can make the MVVs that are zero negative, but still very close
to zero, while causing a very small change in the MSW. Hence, even if we
restrict to optimal allocations that only include the buyers with positive
MVVs, the supremum in (2.25) remains unchanged. Consequently, in the
subsequent treatment, for the ease of analysis, we will confine to an efficient
allocation within the set of optimal allocations that only includes the buyers
with positive MVVs. For notational convenience, we drop x1:N , p1:N , and A
from the arguments of the MSW and ELR functions defined by (2.23) and
(2.24) whenever the underlying x1:N , p1:N , and A are clear from the context.
2.3.1 Auctions with binary valued single-parameter buyers
We first bound the worst case ELR for optimal auctions with binary valued
single-parameter buyers. Assume that each random variable Xn takes only
two values, Hn and Ln, with probabilities pn and 1 − pn respectively. Here,
Hn > Ln > 0. The virtual-valuation function wn is given by wn(Hn) = Hn
and wn(Ln) = (Ln − pnHn)/(1− pn). Clearly, wn(Ln) < wn(Hn), and hence,
wn = wn. The reserve price x
∗
n for buyer n is Hn if pnHn ≥ Ln, otherwise it
is equal to Ln.
Example 2.3.4. Suppose there is only one buyer. We drop the subscript n
because n ≡ 1. The buyer’s value for winning, X, is H with probability p
and L otherwise, where 0 < L < H. Here, A = {∅, {1}}. If pH < L, then
buyer 1 always wins under the optimal allocation, irrespective of the value of
X. This is also the efficient allocation. However, if pH ≥ L, then w(L) ≤ 0
and buyer 1 wins only if he bids H. This is not efficient because the buyer
is not a winner if X = L. The RSW is pH while the MSW = pH + (1− p)L.
Therefore ELR(pio) = (1−p)L/(pH+(1−p)L) = (1−p)/(pr+1−p), where
H/L = r. Since pr ≥ 1, ELR is maximized by setting p = 1/r. For this
choice of p, we get ELR(pio) = (r−1)/(2r−1). As r →∞ (so p = 1/r → 0),
ELR(pio)→ 1/2.
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Our main proposition of this section shows that the worst case ELR for
multiple binary valued single-parameter buyers is no worse than it is for the
one buyer example given above.
Proposition 2.3.1. Given any r > 1, the worst case ELR for binary valued
single-parameter buyers, denoted by η(r, 2;A), satisfies:
η(r, 2;A) ≤ r − 1
2r − 1 ≤
1
2
. (2.26)
Proof. We will prove a somewhat stronger result. Namely, that if Hn/Ln ≤ r
for all n ∈ N , then ELR(pio) ≤ (r − 1)/(2r − 1) for any optimal allocation
rule pio. The RSW for any allocation rule pi satisfying the conditions of
Proposition 2.2.1 is at least R(pi). Thus, it suffices to show that R(pio) ≥
rMSW/(2r − 1). By the optimality of pio, R(pio) ≥ R(p̂i) for any other
allocation rule p̂i satisfying the conditions of Proposition 2.2.1. Thus, it
suffices to produce an allocation rule p̂i satisfying R(p̂i) ≥ rMSW/(2r − 1).
We construct p̂i by starting with some efficient allocation rule pie, and
modifying it. Specifically, p̂i produces the same set of winners as pie, except
that any buyer n with Xn = Ln and wn(Ln) ≤ 0 is not a winner under p̂i.
The allocation rule p̂i satisfies the conditions of Proposition 2.2.1, just as pie
does. Since
R(p̂i) =
N∑
n=1
(
pnq
e
n(Hn)Hn + (1− pn)qen(Ln) [wn(Ln)]+
)
,
and MSW =
∑N
n=1 (pnq
e
n(Hn)Hn + (1− pn)qen(Ln)Ln), it suffices to show
that:
pnq
e
n(Hn)Hn + (1− pn)qen(Ln) [wn(Ln)]+
≥ r
2r − 1 (pnq
e
n(Hn)Hn + (1− pn)qen(Ln)Ln) ,
for all n ∈ N . Since qen(Hn) ≥ qen(Ln) and r/(2r − 1) < 1, it is sufficient to
prove:
pnq
e
n(Ln)Hn + (1− pn)qen(Ln) [wn(Ln)]+
≥ r
2r − 1 (pnq
e
n(Ln)Hn + (1− pn)qen(Ln)Ln) ,
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or, equivalently,
pnHn + (1− pn) [wn(Ln)]+ ≥ r
2r − 1 (pnHn + (1− pn)Ln) . (2.27)
Define rn , Hn/Ln ≤ r. We prove the inequality (2.27) by considering the
following two cases.
First assume that pnrn ≥ 1. Then w(Ln) ≤ 0, and proving inequality
(2.27) simplifies to showing that:
1− pn
pnrn + 1− pn ≤
1− r
2r − 1 .
However, the above follows easily from Example 2.3.4 and by noticing that:
1− rn
2rn − 1 ≤
1− r
2r − 1 .
Next, assume that pnrn < 1. Then, w(L) > 0, and
pnHn + (1− pn) [wn(Ln)]+ = Ln.
Proving inequality (2.27) then requires showing that:
pn(rn − 1) ≤ 1− 1
r
.
Since pnrn < 1, the left side of above is less than or equal to 1−1/rn ≤ 1−1/r.
This completes the proof.
Notice that the upper bound in Proposition 2.3.1 holds for any tie-breaking
rule, any values of r and N , and any A. The bound η(r, 2;A) ≤ 1/2, which
holds uniformly over all r, can be improved further by putting some con-
straints on the structure of A and on Xn’s. The following result on auction
of S identical items, where buyers are binary valued and have same priors,
describes one such case. The proof is in Section 2.6.1.
Proposition 2.3.2. Let Xn’s be i.i.d. random variables taking values H
and L, where H > L > 0, with probabilities p and 1 − p respectively. Let
A = {A : A ⊆ N , |A| ≤ S}, where S ≤ N . Then, the worst case ELR
satisfies: η(r, 2;A) ≤ S/(S+N), and in particular, η(∞, 2;A) = S/(S+N).
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We conjecture that the bound S/(S + N) on the worst case ELR holds
uniformly over all r even for any collections of binary valued single-parameter
i.i.d. buyers such that the cardinality of any possible set of winners is at most
S (but not necessarily containing all subsets of N of cardinality at most S);
i.e., if A ∈ A then |A| ≤ S. We have the following preliminary result, proof
of which is in Section 2.6.2:9
Proposition 2.3.3. Let Xn’s be i.i.d. random variables taking values H and
L, where H > L > 0, with probabilities p and 1 − p respectively. Let A be
such that if A ∈ A then |A| ≤ S, and pi be any optimal allocation rule. Then,
lim
p→∞
(
sup
H,L: pH≥L
ELR(pio) =
S
S +N
)
.
2.3.2 Single item auctions with i.i.d. buyers
We now consider single item auctions where Xn’s are i.i.d. Each Xn takes
K discrete values {x1, x2, . . . , xK}, where 0 < x1 < x2 < . . . < xK and
P
[
Xn = x
i
]
= pi > 0 for all 1 ≤ i ≤ K. Here, A consists of singletons (and
empty set ∅) only. An efficient allocation simply awards the item to a buyer
with the highest valuation for it. The corresponding MSW is E [maxn∈N Xn].
Define zi as:
zi , P
[
max
n∈N
Xn = x
i
]
=
( i∑
j=1
pj
)N
−
( i−1∑
j=1
pj
)N
, (2.28)
with the notational convention of
∑j=0
j=1(.) = 0. With this, the MSW is equal
to
∑K
i=1 z
ixi.
An optimal allocation awards the item to a buyer with the highest positive
MVV. The MVVs are nondecreasing in the true values but need not be
strictly increasing. Tie is broken is the favor of a buyer with the highest value
for the item. This maximizes the RSW within the set of optimal allocations.
Since Xn’s are i.i.d., the reserve prices are same for everyone. Hence, the
optimal allocation rule p˜io sets a common reserve price for everyone and
9Proposition 2.3.3 restricts to probability distributions such that the reserve price is
H. It is expected that loss in efficiency in the case of reserve price equal to H will be
higher than that with reserve price equal to L. Simulations on randomly generated A are
consistent with the conjecture.
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awards the item to the buyer with the highest valuation for it. The loss in
efficiency is only because of not selling the item if the maximum bid of all
the buyers is below the common reserve price.
Let p , (p1, p2, . . . , pK) and x , (x1, x2, . . . , xK). Let the reserve price be
xt(x,p), where t(x,p) is the index corresponding to the reserve price. From
(2.21),
t(x,p) =
{
max i : i ∈ argmax
k:1≤k≤K
xk(
K∑
j=k
pj)
}
. (2.29)
The RSW by the optimal allocation is
∑K
i=t(x,p) z
ixi. Hence, the ELR for
single item auctions as a function of x and p is given by:
ELR(x,p, N) =
∑t(x,p)−1
i=1 z
ixi∑K
i=1 z
ixi
, (2.30)
where we use ELR(x,p, N) to denote the ELR function defined by (2.24).
This is because xn and pn are same for all n ∈ N , A contains only singletons,
and p˜io is kept fixed in the subsequent discussion.
The worst-case ELR is given by the following optimization problem:
maximize
x,p
ELR(x,p, N), (2.31)
subject to: pi > 0 for 1 ≤ i ≤ K, ∑Ki=1 pi = 1,
0 < x1 < x2 < . . . < xK , xK ≤ rx1. (2.32)
The optimum value of the above problem is denoted by η(r,K,N). The
main result of this section, Proposition 2.3.4, shows that the optimization
problem defined by (2.31) and (2.32) can be reduced to a relatively simpler
optimization problem involving only the common probability vector of the
buyers.
Proposition 2.3.4. Let γ∗(r,K,N) be the value of the optimization problem
given below.
maximize
p
K−1∑
i=1
(
zi∑K
j=i p
j
)
,
subject to: pK =
1
r
,
K∑
i=1
pi = 1, pi > 0, 1 ≤ i ≤ K. (2.33)
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Then the worst case ELR for single item auctions is:
η(r,K,N) =
γ∗(r,K,N)
rN−(r−1)N
rN−1 + γ
∗(r,K,N)
.
Proof. The proof follows in multiple steps:
Step 1. Given any (x,p) satisfying the constraints (2.32), if t(x,p) < K then
there exists vectors (x̂, p̂), each of length t(x,p), that satisfy the constraints
(2.32) and ELR(x̂, p̂, N) > ELR(x,p, N).
Let t(x,p) < K. Construct (x̂, p̂) by removing {xi : i > t(x,p)} from
x and by assigning the probability of the removed xi’s to xt(x,p). Let ẑ be
obtained from p̂ by (2.28). Then,
(x̂i, p̂i, ẑi) =
 (x
i, pi, zi) if i < t(x,p),(
xt(x,p),
∑K
i=t(x,p) p
i, 1−
(∑t(x,p)−1
i=1 p
i
)N)
if i = t(x,p).
(2.34)
Using (2.29), for any i < t(x,p), we have xt(x,p)(
∑K
j=t(x,p) p
j) ≥ xi(∑Kj=i pj).
Hence, t(x̂, p̂) = t(x,p) implying that the reserve price for (x̂, p̂) is same as
the original reserve price. Thus,
ELR(x̂, p̂, N) =
∑t(x,p)−1
i=1 z
ixi∑t(x,p)−1
i=1 z
ixi + ẑt(x,p)xt(x,p)
.
The constraints given by (2.32), together with (2.28) and (2.34), imply:
K∑
i=t(x,p)
zixi >
( K∑
i=t(x,p)
zi
)
xt(x,p) =
(
1−
( t(x,p)−1∑
i=1
pi
)N)
xt(x,p) = ẑt(x,p)x̂t(x,p).
Hence ELR(x̂, p̂, N) > ELR(x,p, N), and Step 1 is complete.
We later establish that the worst case ELR obtained by confining only to
those (x,p) such that, t(x,p) = K, is nondecreasing in K for a fixed r and
N . This, along with Step 1, imply that t(x,p) = K can be imposed as an
additional constraint in the optimization problem (2.31)-(2.32) with no loss
of optimality.
Step 2. Let zi’s be given by (2.28) and γ(r,K,N) be the value of the opti-
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mization problem given below.
maximize
p
pK
zK
(
K−1∑
i=1
(
zi∑K
j=i p
j
))
, (2.35)
subject to: rpK ≥ 1,
K∑
i=1
pi = 1, pi > 0, 1 ≤ i ≤ K. (2.36)
Then the worst case ELR, η(r,K,N), defined by (2.31)-(2.32), is equal to
γ(r,K,N)/(1 + γ(r,K,N)).
From (2.29), we have the following equivalence:
t(x,p) = K ⇔ xi ≤ p
KxK∑K
j=i p
j
, 1 ≤ i ≤ K − 1. (2.37)
Since the ELR is invariant to scaling of x, we can fix xK = r. The constraint
xK/x1 ≤ r then reduces to x1 ≥ 1, and hence we must have rpK ≥ 1.
Fixing p (and hence fixing z), and setting xK = r, we see from (2.30) that
ELR(x,p, N) is increasing in each xi, 1 ≤ i ≤ K − 1. Hence, set xi =
(rpK)/(
∑K
j=i p
j). Also, maximizing ELR(x,p, N) is equivalent to maximizing
(
∑K−1
i=1 z
ixi)/(zKxK). Step 2 easily follows from these observations.
Step 3. γ(r,K,N) defined in Step 2 is nondecreasing in K for fixed r and
N .
Let p be any vector of dimension K satisfying the constraints given by
(2.36). Construct p̂ of dimension K + 1 as p̂ = (, p1 − , p2, . . . , pK), where
0 <  < p1. Clearly, p̂ satisfies the K+1 dimension version of the constraints
given by (2.36). Let ẑ be obtained from p̂ using (2.28). Thus,
p̂K+1
ẑK+1
(
K∑
i=1
(
ẑi∑K+1
j=i p̂
j
))
≤ γ(r,K + 1, N).
The above inequality holds for all  ∈ (0, p1) and all p satisfying the con-
straints given by (2.36). The left side of it can be made equal to γ(r,K,N)
by letting  ↓ 0 followed by taking supremum over all p satisfying (2.36).
This proves γ(r,K,N) ≤ γ(r,K + 1, N).
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Step 4. The constraint rpK ≥ 1 for the optimization problem defined in
Step 2 can be made tight.
Consider any p satisfying (2.36) with rpK > 1. Define a vector p̂ as follows:
p̂i = (1 + )pi for 1 ≤ i ≤ K − 1, and p̂K = pK − (1 − pK), where  > 0
is such that pK − (1 − pK) ≥ 1/r. Clearly, p̂ satisfies (2.36). Let z and
ẑ be obtained from p and p̂ respectively using (2.28). For 1 ≤ i ≤ K − 1,
ẑi = (1 + )Kzi.
Define the function f(p) as:
f(p) , p
K
zK
(
K−1∑
i=1
(
zi∑K
j=i p
j
))
.
Then,
f(p̂) =
p̂K
ẑK
(
K−1∑
i=1
(
ẑi∑K
j=i p̂
j
))
=
(1 + )N p̂K
ẑK
(
K−1∑
i=1
(
zi∑K−1
j=i (1 + )p
j + pK − (1− pK)
))
=
(1 + )N p̂K
ẑK
(
K−1∑
i=1
(
zi∑K
j=i p
j − (1−∑Kj=i pj)
))
.
Also,
(1 + )N p̂K
ẑK
=
(1 + )N p̂K
1− (1− p̂K)N
=
(1 + )N
1 + (1− p̂K) + . . .+ (1− p̂K)N−1
=
(1 + )N
1 + (1 + )(1− pK) + . . .+ (1 + )N−1(1− pK)N−1
=
(
1
(1 + )N
+
(1− pK)
(1 + )N−1
+ . . .+
(1− pK)N−1
(1 + )
)−1
,
which is an increasing function of . Since 1 −∑Kj=i pj ≥ 0, f(p̂) is also an
increasing function of  and hence f(p̂) > f(p). Thus, we can set  to the
maximum possible value at which pK − (1 − pK) = 1/r. This completes
Step 4.
Step 5. Completing the proof.
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The proof of Proposition 2.3.4 follows from Steps 1-4.
As a consequence of Proposition 2.3.4, we obtain a closed form expression
for the worst case ELR for single buyer case, and lower and upper bounds
on the worst case ELR for multiple buyers. The proofs are in Sections 2.6.3
and 2.6.4, respectively.
Proposition 2.3.5. The following holds for the case of single item auction
with only one buyer:
(i) The solution to the optimization problem defined in Proposition 2.3.4
is given by:
γ∗(r,K, 1) = (K − 1)
(
1− r −1K−1
)
. (2.38)
Consequently, the worst case ELR, denoted by η(r,K, 1), is
η(r,K, 1) = γ∗(r,K, 1)/(1 + γ∗(r,K, 1)). (2.39)
(ii) For a fixed K, η(r,K, 1) < 1 − 1/K, uniformly over all r > 1, and
limr→∞ η(r,K, 1) = 1− 1/K.
(iii) For a fixed r, η(r,K, 1) ≤ ln(r)/(1 + ln(r)), uniformly over all positive
integers K, and limK→∞ η(r,K, 1) = ln(r)/(1 + ln(r)).
Proposition 2.3.6. The following holds for the case of single item auction
with N i.i.d. buyers:
(i) For binary valued buyers, the worst case ELR, denoted by η(r, 2, N), is:
η(r, 2, N) =
1∑N
i=0
(
r
r−1
)i < 1N + 1 . (2.40)
The equality is achieved by letting r →∞.
(ii) Define γ∗1(r,K,N) and γ
∗
2(r,K,N) as following:
γ∗1(r,K,N) , N
[ ∞∑
i=N
1
i
(
1− 1
r
)i(
1− 1
K − 1
)i]
, (2.41)
γ∗2(r,K,N) , N
[ ∞∑
i=N
1
i
(
1− 1
r
)i]
. (2.42)
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Then for K > 2, the worst case ELR, denoted by η(r,K,N), satisfies:
γ∗1(r,K,N)
rN−(r−1)N
rN−1 + γ
∗
1(r,K,N)
≤ η(r,K,N) ≤ γ
∗
2(r,K,N)
rN−(r−1)N
rN−1 + γ
∗
2(r,K,N)
.
(2.43)
(iii) Bounds given in (2.43) are tight asymptotically as K →∞. Moreover,
limN→∞ η(r,K,N) = 0 and limr→∞ (limK→∞ η(r,K,N)) = 1. Also,
keeping r and K fixed, the worst case ELR goes to zero as N goes to
infinity at the rate O
(
(1− 1/r)N).
2.4 Discussion
This section describes some extensions of the results of the previous sections
and related comments.
(a) Single item auctions with different priors : As described earlier, if priors
are different, the seller might set different reserve prices for different
buyers. In addition, he need not always award the item to the buyer
with the highest reported value for the item. Proposition 2.4.1 obtains a
lower bound on the worst case ELR that is almost the same as the worst
case ELR with only one buyer. The proof is in Section 2.6.5.
Proposition 2.4.1. For single item auctions with multiple buyers with
different priors, the worst case ELR, denoted by η(r,K,N) (2.25), sat-
isfy:
η(r,K,N) ≥ γ
∗(r,K, 1)− (1− 1
r
)
1 + γ∗(r,K, 1)
,
where γ∗ is as defined in Proposition 2.3.5.
For large values of r and K, the lower bound of Proposition 2.4.1 is close
to the worst case ELR for the single buyer case given by Proposition
2.3.5. Moreover, it is independent of N and shows that the ELR does
not go below this lower bound even if there are large number of buyers.
The following example shows the worst ELR computation for a special
case of single item auctions with binary valued buyers.
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Example 2.4.1. Consider N binary valued buyers competing for one
item. Let the value of the item for a buyer n be denoted by the random
variable Xn taking values (L,Hn) with probabilities (1− pn, pn) respec-
tively. Buyers are numbered such that L < H1 < H2 < . . .HN . For
any buyer n, the virtual-valuation function satisfies wn(Hn) = Hn and
wn(L) < L. Hence, if there is at least one buyer with value greater
than L, the optimal auction will allocate the item to the buyer with the
highest value. If all buyers have their values equal to L, but there is
at least one buyer m such that his virtual valuation at L is positive,
i.e., wm(L) > 0, then the welfare generated by an optimal auction will
be L (irrespective of who gets the item). Thus, loss in efficiency occurs
only when Xn = L and wn(L) ≤ 0 for all n. Notice that, wn(L) ≤ 0 is
equivalent to pnHn ≥ L. The MSW in this case is:
MSW = E
[
max
1≤n≤N
Xn
]
= pNHN +
N−1∑
n=1
(
N∏
m=n+1
(1− pm)pnHn
)
+
N∏
n=1
(1− pn)L,
while the loss in the RSW is
∏N
n=1(1 − pn)L. Hence, the ELR is given
by:
ELR =
∏N
n=1(1− pn)L
pNHN +
∑N−1
n=1
(∏N
m=n+1(1− pm)pnHn
)
+
∏N
n=1(1− pn)L
≤
∏N
n=1(1− pn)L
L+
∑N−1
n=1
(∏N
m=n+1(1− pm)L
)
+
∏N
n=1(1− pn)L
=
1
1 +
∑N
n=1 (
∏n
m=1(1− pm)−1)
≤ 1
N + 1
,
where the first inequality follows from pnHn ≥ L for all n.
(b) On tie breaking : Although we have set up the worst case ELR problem
under breaking ties in the favor of the most efficient allocation among the
set of optimal allocations, we can also define the worst case ELR where
ties are broken in the favor of the least efficient allocation among the set
of optimal allocations. The results of Section 2.3.1 still hold true. Also,
the lower bound on the ELR of Section 2.3.2 for single item auctions
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with multiple buyers is still a valid lower bound under this tie breaking.
(c) Bounds on information rent : The expected difference between the rev-
enue that the seller could have extracted if he exactly knew the buyers’
type (same as the MSW) and the revenue collected by an optimal auc-
tion under private types is called information rent. Because of the IR
constraint, the optimal revenue cannot be larger than the RSW. Hence,
the ELR is less than or equal to the ratio of information rent and the
MSW. Also, notice that the proof of Proposition 2.3.1 bounds the worst
case ELR by finding an upper bound on the ratio of information rent
and the MSW.
2.5 Chapter Summary
In this chapter, we highlighted the differences between the objectives of rev-
enue maximization and social welfare maximization. We quantified this as
the loss in efficiency in optimal auctions and obtained bounds on the same
for various cases. A summary of the results is presented in Table 2.1.
Table 2.1: Efficiency loss in revenue optimal auctions - summary of the results.
Case ELR bounds
N binary valued single-parameter buyers ELR ≤ r − 1
2r − 1 ≤
1
2
N binary valued single-parameter i.i.d.. buyers,
ELR ≤ min
{
S
S +N
,
r − 1
2r − 1
}
auction of S identical items, S ≤ N
Single item auction, 1 buyer, K discrete values ELR =
γ∗
1 + γ∗
, γ∗ = (K − 1)
(
1− r −1K−1
)
Single item auction, N i.i.d. buyers, K = 2 ELR =
[∑N
i=0
(
r
r−1
)i]−1 ≤ 1N+1
Single item auction, N i.i.d. buyers, K > 2
γ1
1 + γ1
≤ ELR ≤ γ2
1 + γ2
,
γ1 = N
[∑∞
i=N
1
i
(
1− 1r
)i (
1− 1K−1
)i]
,
γ2 = N
[∑∞
i=N
1
i
(
1− 1r
)i]
An interesting extension would be to show that even if the private valua-
tions (or types) of buyers can take more than two values, for optimal auctions
with single-parameter buyers with independent (not necessarily identically
35
distributed) private values, the worst case loss in efficiency is no worse than
that with only one buyer. Another possible extension would be to establish
the conjecture that the ELR bound S/(S + N) holds for optimal auctions
with binary valued single-parameter i.i.d. buyers, where any possible set of
winners has cardinality at most S, but not any set of buyers with cardinality
at most S can win simultaneously.
2.6 Proofs of Some Propositions
2.6.1 Proof of Proposition 2.3.2
Because Xn’s are i.i.d. random variables, the virtual-valuation functions wn’s
are same for all n, we drop the subscript n and denote them by w. Given
any bid vector v, let Ae(v) denote any efficient allocation and Ao(v) de-
note any optimal allocation. Thus, Ae(v) ∈ argmaxA∈A
(∑
n∈A vn
)
, while
Ao(v) ∈ argmaxA∈A
(∑
n∈Aw(vn)
)
. Since A contains all subsets of N of
size less than or equal to S, and H = w(H) > L > w(L), we must
have
∑
n∈Ae(v) 1{vn=H} =
∑
n∈Ao(v) 1{vn=H}. If w(L) > 0, then clearly,∑
n∈Ae(v) 1{vn=L} =
∑
n∈Ao(v) 1{vn=L}. Hence, an optimal allocation is effi-
cient if w(L) > 0. Assuming w(L) ≤ 0, an efficient allocation selects the
buyers corresponding to the top S bids, while an optimal allocation selects
only the buyers who bid H and no more than S such buyers. Thus, an opti-
mal allocation is not efficient if w(L) ≤ 0, and if there are less than S buyers
with type H. So, for the remainder of the proof, we assume that w(L) ≤ 0,
or equivalently, pH ≥ L.
Let Y =
∑N
n=1 1{Xn=H} be the random variable denoting the number of
buyers with value H. Clearly, Y ∼ Binomial(N, p). Also, since the ELR is
invariant to scaling of H and L, we can set L = 1 and pH ≥ 1. With this,
the MSW is simply E [(S ∧ Y )H + S − S ∧ Y ] while the loss in the RSW by
an optimal auction, when compared with the MSW, is E [S − S ∧ Y ], where
∧ is the min operator. The ELR only depends on H, p, and A. Since A is
same throughout the proof, we use ELR(H, p) to denote the ELR function
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defined by (2.24). Hence,
ELR(H, p) =
E [S − S ∧ Y ]
E [(S ∧ Y )H + S − S ∧ Y ]
≤ E [S − S ∧ Y ]
E
[
S∧Y
p
+ S − S ∧ Y
] = ELR(1
p
, p
)
, (2.44)
where the inequality is because of pH ≥ 1. It is easily verified that:
E [S − S ∧ Y ]
E
[
S∧Y
p
+ S − S ∧ Y
] ≤ S
S +N
⇔ E [S ∧ Y ] ≥ E [Y ]S
E [Y ] + S
, (2.45)
where E [Y ] = Np. Thus, it is sufficient to prove
E [S ∧ Y ] ≥ E [Y ]S
E [Y ] + S
.
We use the following result:
Lemma 2.6.1 (Hoeffding [18]). Let T =
∑N
j=1 Ij, where I1, I2, . . . , IN are
independent Bernoulli random variables with parameters p1, p2, . . . , pN . If
E [T ] = Np and f : R 7→ R is a function satisfying:
f(j + 2)− 2f(j + 1) + f(j) ≥ 0, j = 0, 1, . . . , N − 2,
then,
E [f(T )] ≤
N∑
j=0
f(j)
(
N
j
)
pj(1− p)N−j.
Take f(j) = −(S ∧ j). Consider independent Bernoulli random variables
I1, I2, . . . , IN+L where Ij is Bernoulli(p) for j ≤ N , and is equal to 0 for
j > N . Define T˜ =
∑N+L
j=1 Ij and let T
′
be a random variable distributed as
Binomial
(
N + L,Np/(N + L)
)
. Using the above proposition, E
[
S ∧ T˜
]
≥
E
[
S ∧ T ′]. But, E [S ∧ T˜] = E [S ∧ Y ], since Ij = 0 for j > N . This
implies E [S ∧ Y ] ≥ E [S ∧ T ′]. As L → ∞, T ′ → Z in distribution, where
Z ∼ Poisson(Np). Thus, E [S ∧ Y ] ≥ E [S ∧ Z]. Hence, it remains to show
that
E [S ∧ Z] ≥ E [Z]S
E [Z] + S
=
E [Y ]S
E [Y ] + S
.
Equivalent forms of the desired inequality are given as follows:
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E [S ∧ Z] ≥ E [Z]S
E [Z] + S
,
⇔ S − E [S ∧ Z] ≤ S
2
S + E [Z]
,
⇔ S2 ≥ (Np+ S)(S − E [S ∧ Z]),
⇔ S2eλ ≥ (λ+ S)
S−1∑
j=0
(S − j)λj
j!
where λ = Np. (2.46)
To prove (2.46), we compare the coefficients of λj on left and right sides.
We only need to check for 0 ≤ j ≤ S. For j = 0, coefficients on both the
left and the right sides are S2. For j = S, since S2/S! ≥ 1/(S − 1)!, the left
coefficient is greater than the right one. For 1 ≤ j ≤ S−1, the left coefficient
is greater than the right coefficient if:
S2
j!
≥ S(S − j)
j!
+
S − j + 1
(j − 1)! ,
⇔ S2 ≥ S(S − j) + j(S − j + 1) = S2 − j2 − 1,
which is true. Hence,
E [S ∧ Y ] ≥ E [S ∧ Z] ≥ E [Z]S
E [Z] + S
=
E [Y ]S
E [Y ] + S
.
This along with (2.44) and (2.45) implies:
ELR(H, p) ≤ ELR
(
1
p
, p
)
≤ S
S +N
.
To show that the bound is approachable, notice that:
lim
p→0
ELR
(
1
p
, p
)
= lim
p→0
 E [S − S ∧ Y ]
E
[
S∧Y
p
+ S − S ∧ Y
]
 = S
S +N
,
since limp→0 E [S ∧ Y ] /p = N and limp→0 E [S ∧ Y ] = 0. The proof is com-
plete.
38
2.6.2 Proof of Proposition 2.3.3
Notice that here A is any collection of all possible sets of winners such that
if A ∈ A then |A| ≤ S. In particular, A contains all singletons {n}, n ∈ N .
Similar to the proof of Proposition 2.3.2, we take L = 1 and pH ≥ 1, use w
for the common virtual-valuation function. Then [w(L)]+ = 0 (reserve price
is equal to H) and w(H) = H.
Given a bid vector v, define the functions fH and fL as:
fH(A,v) ,
∑
n∈A
1{vn=H}, (2.47)
fL(A,v) ,
∑
n∈A
1{Xn=L}, (2.48)
where A ⊆ N . Then, an optimal allocation rule selects a winner set from
argmaxA∈A fH(A,v) and the RSW is E [maxA∈A fH(A,X)H]. The MSW is
E [maxA∈A [fH(A,X)H + fL(A,X)]]. The ELR only depends on H, p, and
A. Since A is same throughout the proof, we use ELR(H, p) to denote the
ELR function defined by (2.24). Then,
ELR(H, p) =
E
[
max
A∈A
[fH(A,X)H + fL(A,X)]
]
− E
[
max
A∈A
fH(A,X)H
]
E
[
max
A∈A
[fH(A,X)H + fL(A,X)]
]
≤
E
[
max
A∈A
[fH(A,X) + pfL(A,X)]
]
− E
[
max
A∈A
fH(A,X)
]
E
[
max
A∈A
[fH(A,X) + pfL(A,X)]
]
= ELR
(
1
p
, p
)
, (2.49)
where the inequality follows since pH ≥ 1. Hence,
sup
H,L:pH≥L
ELR(H, p) = ELR
(
1
p
, p
)
. (2.50)
Since S = maxA∈A |A|, if S = N , then by the downward closed property,
A would contain all subsets of N . The result then follows from Proposition
2.3.2. Hence, assume 1 ≤ S < N . Also, without loss of generality, assume
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that the set with cardinality S in A is B = {1, 2, . . . , S}. Define
A1 , {A : A ⊆ B, or A = {n} for S + 1 ≤ n ≤ N} ,
A2 , {A : A ⊆ N , |A| ≤ S}.
As A1 ⊆ A ⊆ A2, we get:
E
[
max
A∈A1
fH(A,X)
]
≤ E
[
max
A∈A
fH(A,X)
]
≤ E
[
max
A∈A2
fH(A,X)
]
, (2.51)
and
E
[
max
A∈A1
[fH(A,X) + pfL(A,X)]
]
≤ E
[
max
A∈A
[fH(A,X) + pfL(A,X)]
]
≤ E
[
max
A∈A2
[fH(A,X) + pfL(A,X)]
]
. (2.52)
From (2.49), (2.51), and (2.52), we get:
E [maxA∈A1 [fH(A,X) + pfL(A,X)]]− E [maxA∈A2 fH(A,X)]
E [maxA∈A1 [fH(A,X) + pfL(A,X)]]
≤ ELR
(
1
p
, p
)
≤ E [maxA∈A2 [fH(A,X) + pfL(A,X)]]− E [maxA∈A1 fH(A,X)]
E [maxA∈A2 [fH(A,X) + pfL(A,X)]]
. (2.53)
Define Y ,
∑N
n=1 1{Xn=H} and φ(S,X) , maxn:S+1≤n≤N Xn. Then, Y ∼
Binomial(N, p). Since we are interested in limp→0 ELR(1/p, p), we can take
pS < 1. With these we get:
E
[
max
A∈A1
fH(A,X)
]
= E
[
fH(B,X) + 1{fH(B,X)=0, φ(S,X)=H}
]
= Sp+ (1− p)S [1− (1− p)N−S]
= Sp+ (1− p)S − (1− p)N , (2.54)
and,
E
[
max
A∈A2
fH(A,X)
]
= E [Y ∧ S] . (2.55)
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Similarly,
E
[
max
A∈A1
[fH(A,X) + pfL(A,X)]
]
= E
[
(fH(B,X) + pfL(B,X)) 1{fH(B,X)≥1} + 1{fH(B,X)=0, φ(S,X)=H}
+Sp1{fH(B,X)=0, φ(S,X)=L}
]
= E
[
fH(B,X) + pfL(B,X) + (1− Sp)1{fH(B,X)=0, φ(S,X)=H}
]
= pS + p(1− p)S + (1− p)S [1− (1− p)N−S] (1− Sp)
= pS(2− p) + [(1− p)S − (1− p)N] (1− Sp), (2.56)
where the first equality uses the fact that pS < 1. Hence, when Xn =
L, ∀n ∈ B, but Xn = H for some S + 1 ≤ n ≤ N , then B cannot be an
efficient allocation. Also,
E
[
max
A∈A2
[fH(A,X) + pfL(A,X)]
]
= E [S ∧ Y + p(S − S ∧ Y )]
= pS + (1− p)E [S ∧ Y ] . (2.57)
Using (2.53), (2.55), and (2.56), we get:
ELR
(
1
p
, p
)
≥ pS(2− p) +
[
(1− p)S − (1− p)N] (1− Sp)− E [Y ∧ S]
pS(2− p) + [(1− p)S − (1− p)N ] (1− Sp) ,
⇒ lim inf
p→0
ELR
(
1
p
, p
)
≥ 2S +N − S −N
2S +N − S =
S
S +N
, (2.58)
where limit in the right side is obtained by dividing both numerator and
denominator by p, and noticing that limp→0 E [S ∧ Y ] /p = N . Similarly,
using (2.53), (2.54), and (2.57), we get:
ELR
(
1
p
, p
)
≤ pS + (1− p)E [S ∧ Y ]−
(
Sp+ (1− p)S − (1− p)N)
pS + (1− p)E [S ∧ Y ] ,
⇒ lim sup
p→0
ELR
(
1
p
, p
)
≤ S
S +N
, (2.59)
where limit in the right side is obtained by dividing both numerator and
denominator by p, and noticing that limp→0 E [S ∧ Y ] /p = N .
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Finally, from (2.58) and (2.58), we get:
lim
p→0
sup
H,L:pH≥L
ELR(H, p) = lim
p→0
ELR
(
1
p
, p
)
=
S
S +N
,
which completes the proof.
2.6.3 Proof of Proposition 2.3.5
For N = 1, the objective function in the optimization problem defined in
Proposition 2.3.4 simplifies to
∑K−1
i=1
(
pi/(
∑K
j=i p
j)
)
with pK = 1/r. Con-
struct the Lagrangian L(p, λ) as:
L(p, λ) =
K−1∑
i=1
(
pi∑K
j=i p
j
)
− λ
(
K∑
i=1
pi − 1
)
,
where the constraints pi > 0 is ignored for a while. We will later verify that
pi’s obtained this way indeed satisfy pi > 0. For 1 ≤ i ≤ K − 1, we have:
∂L(p, λ)
∂pi
= −
i−1∑
j=1
pj(∑K
l=j p
l
)2 + 1∑K
l=i p
l
− p
i(∑K
l=i p
l
)2 − λ. (2.60)
Set
∂L(p, λ)
∂pi
= 0 for all 1 ≤ i ≤ K−1, and ∂L(p, λ)
∂λ
= 0. The latter implies∑K
i=1 p
i = 1, and (2.60) simplifies to:
−
i−1∑
j=1
pj(
1−∑j−1l=1 pl)2 +
1−∑il=1 pl(
1−∑i−1l=1 pl)2 = λ. (2.61)
For i = 1, this gives p1 = 1− λ. For i = 2, we get −p1 + (1− p1 − p2)/(1−
p1)2 = λ, implying p2 = λ(1 − λ). Using induction argument, we show
that pi = λi−1(1 − λ) for 1 ≤ i ≤ K − 1. Assume that pj = λj−1(1 − λ) for
1 ≤ j ≤ i−1.Then, 1−∑jl=1 pl = 1−(1−λ)−λ(1−λ)−. . .−λj−1(1−λ) = λj.
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From (2.61),
−
i−1∑
j=1
(
λj−1(1− λ)
λ2j−2
)
+
λi−1 − pi
λ2i−2
= λ,
⇔ −(1− λ)
i−1∑
j=1
(
1
λj−1
)
+
λi−1 − pi
λ2i−2
= λ,
⇔ pi = λi−1(1− λ),
hence proving the induction claim. Since
∑K−1
i=1 p
i = 1 − 1/r ⇔ 1/r =
1−∑K−1i=1 pi = λK−1. This gives λ = r −1K−1 . Thus, the optimum value of the
optimization problem defined in Proposition 2.3.4 is:
K−1∑
i=1
(
pi∑K
j=i p
j
)
=
K−1∑
i=1
(
pi
1−∑i−1j=1 pj
)
=
K−1∑
i=1
(
λi−1(1− λ)
λi−1
)
= (K − 1)(1− λ).
Hence, γ∗(r,K, 1) = (K−1)
(
1− r −1K−1
)
, and the proof of claim (i) of Propo-
sition 2.3.5 is complete.
Claim (ii) of Proposition 2.3.5 follows easily by observing that η(r,K, 1)
is an increasing function of r and by letting r → ∞. To prove claim (iii) of
Proposition 2.3.5, notice that for any a ≥ 0,(
1− r−a
a
)
=
(
1− e−a ln(r)
a
)
≤
(
a ln(r)
a
)
= ln(r).
Also, notice that, lima→0(1 − r−a)/a = ln(r). Taking a = 1/(K − 1) gives
the result.
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2.6.4 Proof of Proposition 2.3.6
We first prove claim (i) of Proposition 2.3.6. From Proposition 2.3.4 and
(2.28), γ∗(r, 2, N) = (1− 1/r)N . Thus,
η(r, 2, N) =
γ∗(r, 2, N)
rN−(r−1)N
rN−1 + γ
∗(r, 2, N)
=
(r − 1)N
r (rN − (r − 1)N) + (r − 1)N
=
(r − 1)N
rN+1 − (r − 1)N+1 =
1∑N
i=0
(
r
r−1
)i .
Since r/(r − 1) > 1, η(r, 2, N) < 1/(N + 1). The second part of claim (i) is
easy to verify.
Next, we prove claim (ii) of Proposition 2.3.6. Let θi ,
∑i
j=1 p
j. Then
zi = θNi − θNi−1, and
zi∑K
j=i p
j
=
θNi − θNi−1
1−∑i−1j=1 pj =
∫ θi
θi−1
(
NθN−1
1− θi−1
)
dθ ≤
∫ θi
θi−1
(
NθN−1
1− θ
)
dθ,
⇒
K−1∑
i=1
(
zi∑K
j=i p
j
)
≤
∫ 1− 1
r
0
(
NθN−1
1− θ
)
dθ. (2.62)
For any a ∈ (0, 1),∫ a
0
(
NθN−1
1− θ
)
dθ = N
∫ a
0
(
− (1 + θ + . . .+ θN−2)+ 1
1− θ
)
dq
= −N
(
ln(1− a) +
N−1∑
i=1
ai
i
)
= N
∞∑
i=N
ai
i
. (2.63)
From (2.62) and (2.63), we get:
γ∗(r,K,N) ≤ N
[ ∞∑
i=N
1
i
(
1− 1
r
)i]
= γ∗2(r,K,N). (2.64)
To obtain a lower bound, we take pi = (r − 1)/(r(K − 1)) for all 1 ≤ i ≤
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K − 1. Assuming K > 2,
zi∑K
j=i p
j
=
θNi − θNi−1
1−∑i−1j=1 pj =
∫ θi
θi−1
(
NθN−1
1− θi−1
)
dθ ≥
∫ θi−1
θi−2
(
NθN−1
1− θ
)
dθ,
⇒
K−1∑
i=1
(
zi∑K
j=i p
j
)
≥
∫ θK−2
0
(
NθN−1
1− θ
)
dθ, (2.65)
where the first inequality follows because the length of the interval θi − θi−1
is same for all i and NθN−1/(1 − θ) is an increasing function of θ. Also,
θK−2 = 1− pK − pK−1 = (1− 1/r)
(
1− 1/(K − 1)). From (2.63) and (2.65),
γ∗(r,K,N) ≥ N
[ ∞∑
i=N
1
i
(
1− 1
r
)i(
1− 1
K − 1
)i]
= γ∗1(r,K,N). (2.66)
The required result follows from (2.64), (2.66), and by observing that:
η(r,K,N) =
γ∗(r,K,N)
rN−(r−1)N
rN−1 + γ
∗(r,K,N)
.
Finally, we prove claim (iii) of Proposition 2.3.6. The first part follows
from the observation that limK→∞ γ∗1(r,K,N) = γ
∗
2(r,K,N). The third part
follows since limr→∞ γ∗2(r,K,N) = ∞. For the second part, notice that for
any 0 < a < 1,
N
∞∑
i=N
ai
i
<
∞∑
i=N
ai =
aN
1− a → 0 as N →∞.
From the above, γ∗2(r,K,N) ≤ (r − 1)N/rN−1. Hence, η(r,K,N) ≤ (1 −
1/r)N , and the proof is complete.
2.6.5 Proof of Proposition 2.4.1
Consider N buyers competing for one item. The types of buyers 1 to N − 1
are in the range [1, 1 + ). Let the type of buyer N can take K discrete
values, denoted by the vector xN , and let pN be the corresponding probability
vector. We construct (xN ,pN) on the lines of the proof of Proposition 2.3.5
in Section 2.6.3. Let λ be such that λK−1 = (1 + )/r. Set piN = λ
i−1(1− λ)
for 1 ≤ i ≤ K − 1, and pKN = (1 + )/r. It is easy to verify that pN is a
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valid probability vector. Let xiN = (1 + )/(
∑K
j=i p
j) for 1 ≤ i ≤ K. Clearly,
1 +  = x1N < x
2
N < . . . < x
K
N = r. The virtual-valuation function, wn, of
buyer N satisfies wN(x
i
N) = 0 for 1 ≤ i ≤ K − 1. Buyer N dominates over
the other buyers and the MSW is
∑K
i=1 p
ixi. However, the seller does not sell
to buyer N except when his type is xK . If buyer N is not the winner, the
RSW cannot be more than 1 + . Hence, the loss in the RSW by an optimal
auction is at least
∑K−1
i=1 p
i
Nx
i
N − (1 + )(1−pKN ). Let η(r,K,N) be the worst
case ELR defined by (2.25). Then,
η(r,K,N) ≥
∑K−1
i=1 p
i
Nx
i
N − (1 + )(1− pKN )∑K
i=1 p
i
Nx
i
N
=
∑K−1
i=1
piN∑K
j=i p
j
N
− (1− pKN )∑K
i=1
piN∑K
j=i p
j
N
=
(K − 1)(1− λ)− (1− 1+
r
)
1 + (K − 1)(1− λ)
=
γ∗
(
r
1+
, K, 1
)− (1− 1+
r
)
1 + γ∗
(
r
1+
, K, 1
) ,
where γ∗ is as defined in Proposition 2.3.5. In particular, taking limit as
→ 0, we get:
η(r,K,N) ≥ γ
∗(r,K, 1)− (1− 1
r
)
1 + γ∗(r,K, 1)
.
This completes the proof.
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Chapter 3
Optimal Auctions for Single-Minded Buyers
Most of the existing literature on revenue optimal auctions studies problems
with one-dimensional private information, e.g., the single-parameter environ-
ment described in Section 2.1. Characterizing revenue optimal combinatorial
auctions (CAs) in full generality with multiple buyers, multiple items, and
different values for the different bundles still remains a challenging open prob-
lem. It suffers from the joint problem of characterization and tractability.
Theoretical results on characterization of revenue optimal auctions for prob-
lems with multidimensional private information are known only for some very
special cases, e.g., [19]. Furthermore, allocation of items in a CA requires
solving a hard combinatorial optimization problem. The underlying cause is
complementarities among the items: a buyer can have a higher value for a
bundle as a whole than the sum of values of the parts of the bundle. Different
buyers may have different forms of complementarity. A naive allocation can
lead to the exposure problem for the winners: a winner might end up getting
only a part of his desired bundle, while still paying a high price for it.
This chapter focuses on a special class of CAs where buyers are single
minded [20]. Single-minded buyers are an extreme case of complementarity.
Here, each buyer is interested only in a specific bundle and has a value for the
same. Any allocation of items to a buyer that does not contain his desired
bundle has zero value for him. Unlike the single-parameter environment,
here both the bundle that a buyer is interested in and its value are his
private information. While the single-minded buyers model is a simplifying
assumption, no general result on revenue maximization is known even for
this extreme case. The single-minded buyer model can therefore be thought
of as an initial step towards solving the general CA problems.1
One may argue that since a single-minded buyer has a nonzero value only
for the bundles that contain his desired bundle, and because reporting a larger
1Also, see [20] for some real examples where buyers are single minded.
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bundle puts him in conflict with more buyers and increases competition, a
single-minded buyer does not have an incentive to misreport his bundle; if
so then the single-minded buyers problem is an instance of single-parameter
buyers described in Section 2.1 for which we have the characterization of
revenue optimal auction (Section 2.2). This intuition, however, is cursory:
the first contribution of this chapter is to show by an example that the
revenue optimal auction of Section 2.2 is not incentive compatible for single-
minded buyers. We then find a sufficient condition under which a revenue
optimal auction can be characterized for single-minded buyers. This sufficient
condition is the monotonicity of the conditional distribution of any buyer’s
valuation, in the hazard rate ordering, as a function of the bundle the buyer
is interested in. An interpretation of this condition is as follows: if there are
two bundles where one contains the other, then the larger bundle is likely
to have a higher value. Such a monotonicity property is intuitive for single-
minded buyers. The resulting revenue optimal auction has a simple structure:
it involves solving a well studied maximum weight independent set problem
and also admits a polynomial time approximation.
One of the earliest works on single-minded buyers is [20]. The paper stud-
ies approximately efficient auctions for single-minded buyers with tractable
winner determination rule and dominant strategy truthfulness. Ledyard [21]
characterizes a revenue optimal auction for single-minded buyers but with
known bundles which is an instance of the single-parameter buyers. The
hazard rate ordering condition similar to ours appears in [22] in the context
of dynamic knapsack problem. However, [22] as well as [21] assume that
the distributions also satisfy a nonintuitive regularity assumption: the prob-
ability distributions are such that the resulting virtual-valuation are already
monotone and a transformation is not needed (see Definition 2.2.1 and Sec-
tion 2.2.2). An important contribution of this chapter is to show that such
assumption is unnecessary.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.1 describes the
single-minded buyers model, and introduces our definitions and notation.
Section 3.2 characterizes an optimal auction for single-minded buyers. Sec-
tion 3.3 describes some of the important properties of the resulting revenue
optimal auction and its extensions; in particular, a polynomial time approx-
imation of the optimal auction is described. Section 3.4 summarizes the
chapter.
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3.1 Single-Minded Buyers Model
We augment the model of Section 2.1 to take into account the additional
dimension in the buyers’ private information: the bundles that the buyer are
interested in. Each buyer n is assumed to be interested only in a specific
bundle b∗n and has a value v
∗
n for any bundle bn such that bn ⊇ b∗n. The type
of a buyer n, (b∗n, v
∗
n), is now two-dimensional.
The bundle that buyer n is interested in is a realization of a random set Bn
and its value is a realization of a discrete random variable Xn. The random
set Bn takes values from the collection Bn ⊆ 2S , where Bn is the collection
of all bundles that buyer n can possibly be interested in. The random vari-
able Xn is assumed to take values from the set Xn , {x1n, x2n, . . . , xKnn } of
cardinality Kn, where 0 ≤ x1n < x2n < . . . < xKnn . The joint probability distri-
bution of Bn and Xn is common knowledge. The probability that Bn = bn is
denoted by p(bn); conditioned on Bn = bn, the probability that Xn is equal
to xin is denoted by p(x
i
n|bn). Assume that p(bn) > 0 and p(xin|bn) > 0 for all
n ∈ N , bn ∈ Bn, and 1 ≤ i ≤ Kn. Note that (b∗n, v∗n) can be interpreted as a
specific realization of the random variables (Bn, Xn). Let Yn , (Bn, Xn) be
the random vector describing the type of buyer n. Random vectors [Yn]n∈N
are assumed to be independent.
Denote a typical bid (reported type) of a buyer n by (bn, vn), where bn ∈ Bn
and vn ∈ Xn. Define the vector of bids as (b,v), where b , (b1, b2, . . . , bN)
is the vector of reported bundles, and v , (v1, v2, . . . , vN) is the vector of
reported values. The seller can only allocate the items to a set of buyers
whose reported bundles are disjoint. Given a vector of bundles b, define
A(b) as follows:
A(b) , {A ⊆ N : ∀n,m ∈ A, n 6= m, bn ∩ bm = ∅}. (3.1)
This is the collection of all feasible allocations, i.e., the collection of all sub-
sets of buyers who can be allocated their respective bundles simultaneously.
Trivially, ∅ ∈ A(b) and A(b) is downward closed; i.e., if A ∈ A(b) and
B ⊆ A, then B ∈ A(b).
Let B , (B1, B2, . . . , BN). Define random vectors X and Y similarly.
We use Y and (B,X) interchangeably. Let B , B1 × B2 × . . . × BN and
X , X1 × X2 × . . . × XN . We use the standard game theoretic notation of
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v−n , (v1, . . . , vn−1, vn+1, . . . , vN) and v , (vn,v−n). Similar interpretations
are used for b−n, B−n, X−n, Y−n, B−n, and X−n. Henceforth, in any further
usage, bn, b−n, and b are always in the sets Bn, B−n, and B respectively;
and vn, v−n, and v are always in the sets Xn, X−n, and X respectively.
3.2 Revenue Optimal Auction Characterization
In this section, we formally describe the optimal auction problem, formulate
the objective and the constraints explicitly, and provide an optimal algorithm
for solving the problem. As in Section 2.2, we will be focusing only on direct
mechanisms.
3.2.1 Optimal Auction Problem
A direct auction mechanism for single-minded buyers is specified by an allo-
cation rule pi : B × X 7→ [0, 1]2N , and a payment rule M : B × X 7→ RN .
Given a bid vector (b,v), the allocation rule pi(b,v) , [piA(b,v)]A∈2N is
a probability distribution over the power set 2N of N . For each A ∈ 2N ,
piA(b,v) is the probability that the set of buyers A get their reported bun-
dles simultaneously. The payment rule is defined as M , (M1,M2, . . . ,MN),
where Mn(b,v) is the payment (expected payment in case of random allo-
cation) that buyer n makes to the seller when the bid vector is (b,v). Let
Qn(b,v) be the probability that buyer n gets his reported bundle bn when
the bid vector is (b,v); i.e.,
Qn(b,v) ,
∑
A∈2N :n∈A
piA(b,v). (3.2)
Given that the type of a buyer n is (b∗n, v
∗
n), and the bid vector is (b,v),
the payoff (expected payoff in case of random allocation) of the buyer n is:
σn(b,v; b
∗
n, v
∗
n) , Qn(b,v)1{b∗n⊆bn}v
∗
n −Mn(b,v). (3.3)
The mechanism (pi,M) and the payoff functions [σn]n∈N induce a game of
incomplete information among the buyers. The seller’s goal is to design an
auction mechanism (pi,M) to maximize his expected revenue at a Bayes-
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Nash equilibrium (BNE) of the induced game. Again, as in Section 2.2.1,
we impose incentive compatibility (IC) and individual rationality (IR) as
constraints. In addition, the auction mechanism that the seller uses must
always produce feasible allocations; i.e., for any bid vector, the set of winners
must have disjoint bundles. The seller too is assumed to have free disposal of
the items and may decide not to sell some or all items for certain bid vectors.
The idea now, as in Section 2.2.1, is to express IC, IR, and feasible allo-
cations (FA) as mathematical constraints, and formulate the revenue maxi-
mization objective as an optimization problem under these constraints. To
this end, for each n ∈ N , bn, and vn, define the following functions:
qn(bn, vn) , E [Qn(bn, vn,Y−n)] , (3.4)
mn(bn, vn) , E [Mn(bn, vn,Y−n)] . (3.5)
Here, qn(bn, vn) is the expected probability that buyer n gets his bundle
given that he reports his type as (bn, vn) while everyone else is truthful. The
expectation here is over the type of everyone else, i.e., over Y−n. Similarly,
mn(bn, vn) is the expected payment that buyer n makes to the seller. The
constraints can be expressed mathematically as follows:
1. Feasible allocation (FA): For any b and v,
A /∈ A(b)⇒ piA(b,v) = 0. (3.6)
2. Incentive compatibility (IC): For any n ∈ N , bn, t ∈ Bn, and 1 ≤ i, j ≤
Kn,
qn(bn, x
i
n)x
i
n −mn(bn, xin) ≥ qn(t, xjn)1{bn⊆t}xin −mn(t, xjn). (3.7)
Notice that, given Bn = bn, and Xn = x
i
n, the left side of (3.7) is the
payoff of buyer n from reporting his type truthfully, assuming everyone
else is also truthful, while the right side is the payoff from misreporting
his type to (t, xjn).
3. Individual rationality (IR): For any n ∈ N , bn, and 1 ≤ i ≤ Kn,
qn(bn, x
i
n)x
i
n −mn(bn, xin) ≥ 0. (3.8)
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Under the IC constraint, all buyers report their true types. Hence, the
expected revenue that the seller gets is E
[∑N
n=1 Mn(Y)
]
. The expectation
here is over the distribution of the random vector Y. Thus, the seller’s
optimization problem is given by:
Optimal auction problem (OAP)
maximize
pi,M
E
[
N∑
n=1
Mn(Y)
]
,
subject to FA (3.6), IC (3.7), and IR (3.8) constraints.
(3.9)
Instead of solving the OAP, we solve a relaxed problem obtained by relax-
ing the IC constraint. We then find a sufficient condition under which the
solution of the relaxed problem is also the solution of OAP. The relaxed IC
constraint is obtained by assuming that buyers report their bundles truth-
fully, or equivalently, the bundles that the buyers are interested in are known
to everyone. Mathematically, the relaxed IC constraint is:
qn(bn, x
i
n)x
i
n −mn(bn, xin) ≥ qn(bn, xjn)xin −mn(bn, xjn), (3.10)
for any n ∈ N , bn, and 1 ≤ i, j ≤ Kn. The relaxed optimization problem is
given by:
Relaxed optimal auction problem (ROAP)
maximize
pi,M
E
[
N∑
n=1
Mn(Y)
]
,
subject to FA (3.6), relaxed IC (3.10), and IR constraints (3.8).
(3.11)
3.2.2 Solution of the ROAP
Under the relaxed IC constraint (3.10), buyers are assumed to report their
bundles truthfully. Given b, the ROAP is an instance of revenue optimal
auction problem for single-parameter buyers where the value of each buyer n
is a realization from the probability distribution of Xn conditioned on Bn =
bn. Using the framework of Section 2.2, we first relate the expected payment
mn of a buyer n to his expected allocation probability qn.
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Define the virtual-valuation function, wn, of buyer n as:
wn(bn, x
i
n) ,
 x
i
n − (xi+1n − xin)
(∑Kn
j=i+1 p(x
j
n|bn)
)
p(xin|bn)
if 1 ≤ i ≤ Kn − 1,
xKnn if i = Kn.
(3.12)
The virtual-valuation function wn is regular if wn(bn, x
i
n) ≤ wn(bn, xi+1n ) for all
bn, and 1 ≤ i ≤ Kn− 1. Notice that compared to (2.9), the virtual-valuation
function for a single-minded buyer takes two arguments: the bundle that the
buyer is interested in and its value. Proposition 3.2.1 below, which uses this
new definition of the virtual-valuation function (3.12), is a straightforward
extension of Proposition 2.2.1.
Proposition 3.2.1. Let pi be an allocation rule and [Qn]n∈N and [qn]n∈N be
obtained from pi by (3.2) and (3.4). A payment rule satisfying the relaxed
IC constraint (3.10) and the IR constraint (3.8) exists for pi if and only if
qn(bn, x
i
n) ≤ qn(bn, xi+1n ) for all n ∈ N , bn, and 1 ≤ i ≤ Kn − 1. Given such
pi and a payment rule M satisfying the IC and IR constraints, the seller’s
revenue satisfies:
Seller’s revenue = E
[
N∑
n=1
Mn(Y)
]
≤ E
[
N∑
n=1
Qn(Y)wn(Yn)
]
.
Moreover, a payment rule M achieving this bound exists and any such M
satisfies:
mn(bn, x
i
n) =
i∑
j=1
(qn(bn, x
j
n)− qn(bn, xj−1n ))xjn,
for all n ∈ N , bn, and 1 ≤ i ≤ Kn, where we use the notational convention
qn(bn, x
0
n) , 0.
From (3.2), for all bn and vn, we have:
N∑
n=1
Qn(b,v)wn(bn, vn) =
∑
A∈2N
piA(b,v)
(∑
n∈A
wn(bn, vn)
)
. (3.13)
Proposition 3.2.1 and (3.13) suggest that a solution of the ROAP can be
found by selecting the allocation rule pi that assigns nonzero probabilities
only to the set of buyers in A(b) with the maximum total virtual valuations
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for each bid vector (b,v). If all wn’s are regular, then it can be verified that
such an allocation rule satisfies the monotonicity condition on the qn’s needed
by Proposition 3.2.1. However, if wn’s are not regular, the resulting allocation
rule would not necessarily satisfy the required monotonicity condition on the
qn’s. This problem can be remedied by transforming wn’s into monotone
virtual valuations (MVV), as in Section 2.2.2.
For all n ∈ N , bn, and 0 ≤ i ≤ Kn, define:
(gbn,in , h
bn,i
n ) ,
( i∑
j=1
p(xjn|bn),−xi+1n
( Kn∑
j=i+1
p(xjn|bn)
))
, (3.14)
where we use the notational convention of
∑0
j=1(.) , 0, xKn+1n , 0, and∑Kn
j=Kn+1
(.) , 0. Then, wn(bn, xin) is given by the slope of the line joining
the point (gbn,i−1n , h
bn,i−1
n ) to the point (g
bn,i
n , h
bn,i
n ); i.e.,
wn(bn, x
i
n) =
hbn,in − hbn,i−1n
gbn,in − gbn,i−1n
. (3.15)
Find the convex hull of the points [(gbn,in , h
bn,i
n )]0≤i≤Kn . Let h
bn,i
n be the point
on this convex hull corresponding to gbn,in . Then, wn(bn, x
i
n) is defined as the
slope of the line joining the point (gbn,i−1n , h
bn,i−1
n ) to the point (g
bn,i
n , h
bn,i
n ); i.e.,
wn(bn, x
i
n) =
h
bn,i
n − h
bn,i−1
n
gbn,in − gbn,i−1n
. (3.16)
By construction, wn(bn, x
i
n) ≤ wn(bn, xi+1n ) for all n ∈ N , bn, and 1 ≤ i ≤
Kn − 1. If wn is regular, wn is equal to wn.
Proposition 3.2.2 below is a straightforward extension of Proposition 2.2.2;
it establishes the significance of the allocation rule obtained by using wn’s.
Proposition 3.2.2. Given any allocation rule pi such that [Qn]n∈N and
[qn]n∈N , obtained from pi by (3.2) and (3.4), satisfy qn(bn, xin) ≤ qn(bn, xi+1n ),
for all n ∈ N , bn, and 1 ≤ i ≤ Kn − 1. Then,
E
[
N∑
n=1
Qn(Y)wn(Yn)
]
≤ E
[
N∑
n=1
Qn(Y)wn(Yn)
]
. (3.17)
Moreover, (3.17) holds with equality for any allocation rule that maximizes∑N
n=1Qn(b,v)wn(bn, vn) for each bid vector (b,v), subject to the FA con-
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straint.
The maximum weight algorithm (MWA) for the ROAP is described in
Algorithm 2. The set W(b,v) is the collection of all feasible subsets of
buyers with maximum total MVVs for the given bid vector (b,v). Since
A(b) is downward closed and ∅ ∈ A(b), no buyer n with wn(bn, vn) < 0
is included in the set of winners W (b,v). In step 3 of the MWA, for each
xin ≤ vn, Qn(b, xin,v−n) is computed recursively by treating (b, xin,v−n) as
the input bid vector and repeating steps 1− 2. The proof of the correctness
of the MWA follows from the correctness of Algorithm 1 for single-parameter
buyers and by noticing that the FA constrain is satisfied by the MWA because
W(b,v) ⊆ A(b).
Algorithm 2 Maximum weight algorithm (MWA)
Given a bid vector (b,v):
1. Compute wn(bn, vn) for each n ∈ N .
2. Take pi(b,v) to be any probability distribution on the collection
W(b,v) defined as:
W(b,v) , argmax
A∈A(b)
∑
n∈A
wn(bn, vn).
Obtain the set of winners W (b,v) by sampling fromW(b,v) according
to pi(b,v).
3. Collect payments given by:
Mn(b,v) =
∑
i:xin≤vn
(
Qn(b, x
i
n,v−n)−Qn(b, xi−1n ,v−n)
)
xin,
where Qn is given by (3.2), and Qn(b, x
0
n,v−n) , 0.
The MWA for single-minded buyers can be interpreted as follows. Given
a bid vector (b,v), construct a graph Gb(N , E) with a node n for each buyer
n, and an edge en,m ∈ E if bn ∩ bm 6= ∅. Thus, Gb is the conflict graph of the
buyers, where an edge denotes that buyers corresponding to its endpoints
cannot be allocated their bundles simultaneously. The collection of all inde-
pendent sets of this graph is precisely A(b). Let wn(bn, vn) be the weight of
node n. Then the set of winners W (b,v) is a maximum weight independent
set of this graph.
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In the subsequent discussion, we will be using the MWA with a determinis-
tic tie-breaking rule (henceforth, deterministic MWA) where in step 2 of the
MWA, the set of winners W (b,v) ∈ W(b,v) is selected by a deterministic
rule. For example, the set of winners W (b,v) can be the first allocation set in
W(b,v) under the lexicographic order defined over the set of all allocations
2N .
Let (pio,Mo) be the solution of ROAP given by the deterministic MWA.
Then Qon(b,v), obtained from pi
o by (3.2), is either zero or one for all n ∈ N ,
b, and v. Also, from the proof of correctness of the MWA, Qon(b,v) is
nondecreasing in vn, keeping b and v−n constant. This, along with the
payment rule in step 3 of MWA, implies that a winner pays the price that is
the minimum value he needs to report to still win, keeping his bundle and
the bids of everyone else fixed.
3.2.3 Solution of the OAP
A single-minded buyer would only (mis)report a bundle that is a superset of
his desired bundle. However, by misreporting a larger bundle, the buyer puts
himself in conflict with a larger number of other buyers, thereby decreasing
his chances of winning. Hence, it might appear that a single-minded buyer
should always report his desired bundle truthfully. If so, then the MWA
solves the OAP. We first show that the such intuition is incorrect: in the
absence of any structure on the joint probability distribution of (Bn, Xn),
the MWA need not be incentive compatible, and hence not revenue optimal.
The following example establishes this:
Example 3.2.1. Consider two buyers {1, 2} and two items {A,B}. Buyer 1
is interested in bundle {A} and has value $1 for it. Buyer 2 can be interested
in bundle {A} or bundle {A,B}, each with probability 1/2. Conditioned on
buyer 2 being interested in bundle {A}, his values can be $2 or $4, each with
probability 1/2. Conditioned on him being interested in bundle {A,B}, his
values can be $2 or $4, with probabilities 0.9 and 0.1 respectively. The MVV
function for buyer 1 is w1({A}, $1) = $1. For buyer 2, the virtual-valuation
function is w2({A}, $2) = $0, w2({A}, $4) = $4, w2({A,B}, $2) = $16/9, and
w2({A,B}, $2) = $4. Under the MWA, if buyer 2 bids ({A}, $2) he loses,
and if he bids ({A}, $4) then he gets bundle {A} at the price $4. However, if
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buyer 2 bids ({A,B}, $2) or ({A,B}, $4) then he gets bundle {A,B} at the
price $2. Thus, if the true type of buyer 2 is ({A}, $4), he will misreport it
to ({A,B}, $2) or ({A,B}, $4).
We now give a sufficient condition under which a solution of ROAP is also
the solution of OAP. To this end, define the hazard rate ordering (see [23])
on two random variables as follows:
Definition 3.2.1. A nonnegative random variable Z1 is said to be smaller
than a nonnegative random variable Z2 under the hazard rate order, denoted
by Z1 ≤h Z2, if Z1 and Z2 have the same support, and
P [Z1 > z|Z1 > zˆ] ≤ P [Z2 > z|Z2 > zˆ] , (3.18)
for all z, zˆ such that z ≥ zˆ, and z, zˆ are in the common support of Z1 and
Z2.
Notice that, if Z1 ≤h Z2, then Z1 is also smaller than Z2 under the first
order stochastic dominance (henceforth, FOSD; see [23]). In the FOSD,
(3.18) is replaced by simply P [Z1 > z] ≤ P [Z2 > z] for all z in the common
support of Z1 and Z2. Hence, the hazard rate order is stricter than the
FOSD.
It is natural to expect that if there are two bundles where one contains
the other, then the larger bundle is likely to have a higher value. This is
precisely captured by Assumption 3.2.1 below.
Assumption 3.2.1. For any s, t ∈ Bn with s ⊆ t, the conditional ran-
dom variable (Xn|Bn = s) is smaller than the conditional random variable
(Xn|Bn = t) under the hazard rate order. Equivalently, for all n ∈ N ,
s, t ∈ Bn such that s ⊆ t, and 1 ≤ j ≤ i ≤ Kn,∑Kn
l=i p(x
l
n|s)∑Kn
l=j p(x
l
n|s)
≤
∑Kn
l=i p(x
l
n|t)∑Kn
l=j p(x
l
n|t)
. (3.19)
Propositions 3.2.3 below establishes a key property of the MVV.
Proposition 3.2.3. Let s, t ∈ Bn be such that s ⊆ t. Then under Assump-
tion 3.2.1, wn(s, x
i
n) ≥ wn(t, xin) for 1 ≤ i ≤ Kn.
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Proof. Define FXn|bn(z) , P [Xn < z|Bn = bn]. Notice that this is the left
continuous cumulative distribution function (CDF) of the conditional ran-
dom variable (Xn|Bn = bn). The proof follows in multiple steps:
Step 1. For all n ∈ N and bn, wn(bn, xin) < xin for 1 ≤ i ≤ Kn − 1, and
wn(bn, x
Kn
n ) = x
Kn
n .
If wn(bn, x
i
n) = wn(bn, x
i
n), then this is trivially true. Given bn, if 0 ≤ i <
j ≤ Kn are such that hbn,in = h
bn,i
n , h
bn,k
n > h
bn,k
n for i + 1 ≤ k ≤ j − 1,
and hbn,jn = h
bn,j
n , then wn(bn, x
k
n) is constant in the interval i + 1 ≤ k ≤ j.
Hence, wn(bn, x
k
n) = wn(bn, x
i+1
n ) < wn(bn, x
i+1
n ) < x
i+1
n < x
k
n. This completes
the proof of inequality. Also, wn(bn, x
Kn
n ) = x
Kn
n > wn(bn, x
i
n), for any 1 ≤
i ≤ Kn − 1. Thus, the convex hull of points [(gbn,in , hbn,in )]1≤i≤Kn always
contains the line connecting (gbn,Kn−1n , h
bn,Kn−1
n ) to (g
bn,Kn
n , h
bn,Kn
n ) (recall the
construction of wn in Section 3.2.2). Hence, wn(bn, x
Kn
n ) = wn(bn, x
Kn
n ) =
xKnn , completing Step 1.
Step 2. For all n ∈ N , bn, and 1 ≤ i ≤ Kn − 1,
wn(bn, x
i
n) = argmin
c<xin
max
z∈[x1n,xKnn ]
(z − c)(1− FXn|bn(z))
xin − c
, (3.20)
with the convention that if more than one value of c minimizes the maximum,
then the largest such c is selected.
From (3.14), for any 1 ≤ i ≤ Kn,
(gbn,i−1n , h
bn,i−1
n ) =
(
FXn|bn(x
i
n),−xin(1− FXn|bn(xin)
)
. (3.21)
Let I(z) ,
(
FXn|bn(z),−z(1−FXn|bn(z)
)
for z ∈ [x1n, xKnn ]. Consider the plot
of points I(z)’s. The convex hull of the points [I(z)]z∈[x1n,xKnn ] is same as that
of the points [(gbn,in , h
bn,i
n )]0≤i≤Kn−1. Note that, from the proof of Step 1, the
convex hulls of the points [(gbn,in , h
bn,i
n )]0≤i≤Kn−1 and [(g
bn,i
n , h
bn,i
n )]0≤i≤Kn differ
from each other by just the line segment connecting (gbn,Kn−1n , h
bn,Kn−1
n ) to
(gbn,Knn , h
bn,Kn
n ). Hence, wn(bn, x
i
n)’s for 1 ≤ i ≤ Kn − 1 are obtained as the
slopes of the convex hull of points I(z)’s. Fix xin for some 1 ≤ i ≤ Kn − 1.
Call the line from (0,−xin) to (1, 0) the line for xin. Given z and c < xin,
consider the line through the point I(z) with slope c, and let J be the point of
intersection of this line with the line for xin. Then, (z−c)(1−FXn|bn(z))/(xin−
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c) is the horizontal distance of J from the vertical line at (1, 0). Taking the
maximum over z corresponds to the point Jc which is the intersection of the
line of slope c that is tangent to the plot, and the line for xin. Then the
minimizing c is the slope of the tangent at the point J∗ where the convex
hull of I(z) intersects the line for xin, and hence, same as wn(bn, x
i
n). If there
is more than one intersection point, the largest is selected. From Step 1, the
minimum is achieved by c < xin. This completes Step 2.
For c < xKnn , define:
ΦXn|bn(c) , max
z∈[x1n,xKnn ]
(z − c)(1− FXn|bn(z)).
Notice that ΦXn|bn(c) is nonincreasing in c.
Step 3. Let s, t ∈ Bn be such that s ⊆ t. Then under Assumption 3.2.1,
ΦXn|s(c)/ΦXn|t(c) is nonincreasing in c.
Fix c1 < c2 < x
Kn
n . We need to prove that:
ΦXn|s(c1)
ΦXn|t(c1)
≤ ΦXn|s(c2)
ΦXn|t(c2)
.
Under Assumption 3.2.1, (1− FXn|s(z))/(1− FXn|t(z)) is nonincreasing in z.
Let zt1 and z
s
2 denote the values of z achieving the maximum in the definition
of ΦXn|t(c1) and ΦXn|s(c2) respectively. Clearly, z
t
1 > c1 and z
s
2 > c2. If
zt1 ≤ zs2,
ΦXn|s(c1)
ΦXn|t(c1)
≥ (z
t
1 − c1)(1− FXn|s(zt1))
(zt1 − c1)(1− FXn|t(zt1))
=
1− FXn|s(zt1)
1− FXn|t(zt1)
≥ 1− FXn|s(z
s
2)
1− FXn|t(zs2)
=
(zs2 − c2)(1− FXn|s(zs2))
(zs2 − c2)(1− FXn|t(zs2))
≥ ΦXn|s(c2)
ΦXn|t(c2)
,
On the other hand, if zt1 ≥ zs2,
ΦXn|s(c1)
ΦXn|t(c1)
≥ (z
s
2 − c1)(1− FXn|s(zs2))
(zt1 − c1)(1− FXn|t(zt1))
≥ (z
s
2 − c2)(1− FXn|s(zs2))
(zt1 − c2)(1− FXn|t(zt1))
≥ ΦXn|s(c2)
ΦXn|t(c2)
.
In either case, the required inequality is proved, completing Step 3.
Step 4. Completing the proof.
59
Combining Steps 2 and 3, for any c ≤ wn(t, xin), and 1 ≤ i ≤ Kn − 1,
ΦXn|s(c)
xin − c
≥ ΦXn|t(c)ΦXn|s(wn(t, x
i
n))
(xin − c)ΦXn|t(wn(t, xin))
≥ ΦXn|t(w(t, x
i
n))ΦXn|s(w(t, x
i
n))
(xin − w(t, xin))ΦXn|t(w(t, xin))
=
ΦXn|s(w(t, x
i
n))
xin − w(t, xin)
,
where the first inequality is by Step 3, and the second is because ΦXn|bn(c) is
nonincreasing in c. Hence, from Step 2, it follows that wn(s, x
i
n) ≥ wn(t, xin)
for 1 ≤ i ≤ Kn − 1. Also wn(s, xKnn ) = wn(t, xKnn ) = xKnn . This completes
the proof of Proposition 3.2.3.
The next proposition characterizes a revenue optimal auction for single-
minded buyers.
Proposition 3.2.4. A deterministic MWA gives a solution of the OAP
under Assumption 3.2.1.
Proof. Notice that OAP and MOAP differ only in their constraints, and the
relaxed IC constraint (3.10) is a subset of the IC constraint (3.7). Hence,
we only need to verify that the solution given by the deterministic MWA
satisfies the IC constraint. We show that, under the deterministic MWA,
the truthful declaration of the types is a weakly dominant strategy for the
buyers.
Let the bid vector be (b,v). Based on the reported bundles b, the conflict
graph Gb is constructed. The weights of the nodes of Gb are the MVVs for
the bid vector (b,v). Consider a buyer n. Let his true type be (b∗n, v
∗
n).
Since buyers are single minded, it can be assumed that bn ⊇ b∗n, otherwise
the payoff from misreporting a bundle can be at most zero, which is less than
or equal to the payoff from reporting the bundle truthfully. Also, if buyer n
does not get his bundle by bidding (bn, vn) (and hence payoff equal to zero)
then truthful bidding (payoff at least zero) cannot be worse. Hence, we only
need to analyze the case where buyer n wins by bidding (bn, vn) such that
bn ⊇ b∗n. Since buyer n is a winner, there is a maximum weight independent
set (henceforth MWIS) in Gb that contains node n. Because of a deterministic
tie-breaking rule, buyer n pays the minimum value he needs to report to
win. This is his value xin at which the value of the MWIS containing node n
exceeds the value of all MWIS not containing node n. Now, if instead buyer n
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reports b∗n, it can result in deletion of some edges incident on node n in Gb,
but cannot add any new edge. At the same time, from Proposition 3.2.3, the
weight of node n (or the MVV of buyer n) can possibly increase but cannot
decrease. Hence, the value of the MWIS containing node n can possibly go
up but cannot decrease, while the value of the MWIS not containing node n
does not change. Buyer n still wins and the payment if he declares (b∗n, vn)
cannot be more than what he pays when he declares (bn, vn). Thus, truthful
reporting of the bundle is a weakly dominant strategy.
We can now assume that buyer n reports his bundle b∗n truthfully. Since
the price that he pays only depends on his reported bundle and the bids of
everyone else, but not on his reported value, truthful reporting of the value
is a weakly dominant strategy. This completes the proof.
3.3 Discussion
In this section, we highlight some of the important properties of the optimal
auction characterized in Section 3.2.
(a) Implementation complexity: The optimal allocation rule for auc-
tions with single-minded buyers requires finding a maximum weight in-
dependent set in the conflict graph. This problem is NP-hard. However,
similar to [20], a greedy scheme can be obtained that is easy to imple-
ment, and achieves
√
S approximation of the revenue generated by the
deterministic MWA.2 The greedy scheme allocates the bundles to the
buyers according to the order induced by the normalized virtual valua-
tions wn(bn, vn)/
√|bn|. The price charged to a buyer who gets his desired
bundle is the minimum value he needs to report to still win, keeping his
bundle and the bids of everyone else fixed.
(b) Some special cases: A special case of interest is when the bundle that
a buyer is interested in is known to everyone. This is equivalent to Bn
containing only one bundle. Here, OAP and ROAP are identical. More
generally, if Bn is such that no bundle in Bn is a superset of another
bundle in Bn, then a buyer will report his bundle truthfully, and hence
2Any approximation better than
√
S is again NP-hard.
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OAP and ROAP are identical. If Bn and Xn are independent then As-
sumption 3.2.1 trivially holds true. In all these cases, an optimal auction
is given by the deterministic MWA.
Auctions with identical items can be thought of as single-minded buyers
with substitutes and are closely related to the case with known bundles.
Here, the seller has κ identical items for sale. A buyer is interested in
any one of the κ items. The analysis of Section 3.2 is easily extended to
this case by simply defining the collection of feasible allocations as:
Aκ , {A : A ⊆ N , |A| ≤ κ}.
This is the collection of all subsets of N with cardinality less than or
equal to κ. The optimal auction is given by the MWA withA(b) replaced
by Aκ.
(c) Continuous OAP: The results of this chapter easily extend to the con-
tinuous version of the OAP where buyers’ valuation sets are continuous.
Here, Xn is a nonnegative interval of R, and the random variable Xn
is specified by the probability density function (pdf) fXn(x) > 0 for all
x ∈ Xn. Let FXn(x) be the corresponding cumulative distribution (CDF)
function. Denote the conditional pdf and conditional CDF of Xn, given
Bn = bn, by fXn|bn(x) and FXn|bn(x) respectively. Then the MWA again
gives the solution of the continuous OAP after the following modifica-
tions:
wn(bn, vn) = vn − 1− FXn|bn(vn)
fXn|bn(vn)
,
Mn(b,v) = Qn(b,v)vn −
∫ vn
0
Qn(b, x,v−n)dx.
The continuous OAP, however, has one key difference from the discrete
OAP. In the continuous case, given an allocation rule pi, under the IC
and relaxed IR constraints, the expected payment that a buyer makes is
determined up to an additive constant (the revenue equivalence principle
of [10]); i.e., mn(bn, vn)−mn(bn, 0) is a known function of vn. However,
in the discrete case, mn(bn, x
i
n)−mn(bn, 0) is fixed to within an interval
of values. The expected revenue is maximized by taking the upper value
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of this interval, and the optimal auction in Section 3.2 is characterized
this way.
3.4 Chapter Summary
This chapter characterized a Bayesian revenue optimal, multiple-items auc-
tion with single-minded buyers under a partial hazard rate order assumption
on the conditional distribution of any buyer’s valuation. This assumption is
intuitive for single-minded buyers and implies that the larger bundle is likely
to have higher value. The resulting auction has a simple structure: the set of
winners are the maximum weight independent set of the conflict graph of the
buyers, and the payment made by a winner is the minimum value he needs to
report to win. Single-minded buyers have two-dimensional private informa-
tion. The contributions here provide a step towards understanding optimal
auction problems where buyers’ private information is multidimensional.
An immediate direction for future research is to investigate the conse-
quences of relaxing the Hazard rate order assumption (Assumption 3.2.1).
Can it be shown that the revenue optimal auction for single-minded buyers
lacks a simple structure in the absence of Assumption 3.2.1?
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Chapter 4
Pricing Cloud Services
Cloud computing provides on-demand and scalable access to computing re-
sources. Public clouds, such as Windows Azure and Amazon EC2, treat in-
frastructure computing as a service that can be purchased and delivered over
the Internet. A user purchases units of computing time on virtual machines
(referred to as instances). A key question is: How should cloud computing
services be priced? This chapter uses the theory of revenue optimal auctions
developed in Chapters 2 and 3 to analyze two simple pricing schemes for
selling cloud instances.
The most commonly used pricing mechanism for selling cloud instances is
pay as you go (PAYG), where a user is charged a fixed price per unit time per
instance. However, given stochastic demand, such fixed pricing may result
in unused resources. To adapt better to stochastic demand, the provider
could operate a spot market, selling a part of the resources at a reduced price
via using auction to users willing to tolerate delays and interruptions. For
example, Windows Azure uses PAYG while Amazon EC2 uses both PAYG
and the spot market.
We examine the tradeoffs for a provider deliberating whether or not to
operate a spot market. On one hand, operating a spot market can create
price discrimination, as users with low values and low waiting costs compete
for spot instances, thereby extracting payments from the users who would
balk if PAYG were the only option. On the other hand, the spot market
provides a cheaper alternative to users with high value but low waiting cost,
causing a loss of revenue from the users who would have paid a higher PAYG
price if PAYG were the only option. In consequence, it is not obvious if
operating PAYG and the spot market simultaneously provides any net gain
in the expected revenue to the cloud service provider.
To quantify the trade-offs we construct a simple model of a cloud comput-
ing service with users who are heterogeneous both in their value for service
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and in their waiting cost. We first analyze PAYG and a spot market in
isolation and use the resulting insights to analyze what happens when they
operate simultaneously. Our analysis is not tied to any particular pricing rule
for the spot market. Instead, we use a characterization similar to the revenue
equivalence theorem for auctions [10] (see Section 3.3, point(c)) to compute
the expected payment made by a user in any equilibrium of any pricing rule.
Moreover, while the analysis of the queuing system with multiple priority
classes and multiple servers is complex (see, e.g., [24], [25]), an application
of the revelation principle [10] (see Section 2.2) allows us to circumvent this
complexity. We describe a general queuing system for the spot market purely
in terms of a waiting time function and exploit its properties for our analysis.
The main contributions of this chapter are:
(i) We model a cloud computing service as a queuing system described by a
waiting time function and apply techniques from the theory of revenue
optimal auctions to analyze it.
(ii) We show that, in equilibrium, users have a waiting cost threshold that
determines whether they participate in the spot market or PAYG. More-
over, the expected payments by the users in the spot market are inde-
pendent of their value for service and increasing in their waiting cost.1
(iii) Using this equilibrium characterization, we provide theoretical and sim-
ulation evidence suggesting that operating PAYG in isolation provides
a higher expected revenue to the cloud service provider than operating
PAYG and a spot market simultaneously.
Our work is at the nexus of queuing theory and game theory. Hassin and
Haviv [26] provide a survey of this area. For observable M/M/1 queues with
identical customers, Balachandran [27] derives a full information equilibrium
strategy. Hassin [28] and Lui [29] consider unobservable M/M/1 queues
where customers with heterogeneous waiting cost bid for preemptive priority
using the first price auction. They characterize an equilibrium where bids
are increasing in the waiting cost. Afe`che and Mendelson [30] extend this to
a more general waiting cost function. Dube and Jain [31] consider a different
problem with competing GI/GI/1 priority queues; arriving jobs decide which
1Throughout this chapter, “increasing” means “strictly increasing.”
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queue to join. They find conditions for the existence of the Nash equilibrium.
Perhaps the closest to our work are papers that apply the theory of revenue
optimal auction design to optimize pricing and service policies in queuing
system. Afe`che [32] shows that delaying jobs or choosing orderings that
increase processing time can increase revenue. Yahalom et al. [33] generalize
[32] by relaxing the distributional assumptions on valuation and working
with convex delay cost. Katta and Sethuraman [34] design a pricing scheme
that, under some assumptions, is optimal for an M/M/1 queuing system
and certain generalizations of it. Cui et al. [35] move beyond admission
control through priority pricing. Instead, they consider the problem of joint
pricing, scheduling, and admission control policy for revenue maximization
for M/M/1 queue and find solutions for some special cases. Compared to
previous work in this literature, the distinguishing aspects of our work are:
(i) we allow for an arbitrary queuing system with multiple servers and arrival
process which need not be memoryless; (ii) our analysis is not tied to a specific
auction mechanism for the spot market; (iii) we allow PAYG and the spot
market to operate simultaneously and are not limited to analyzing a system
in isolation.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.1 describes our
basic model. Section 4.2 analyzes PAYG and the spot market, character-
izes the equilibrium, and investigates the revenue consequences of operating
PAYG and the spot market simultaneously. Section 4.3 presents simulation
results supporting the claims made in Section 4.2. Section 4.4 provides some
discussion and an outline for the future work. Section 4.5 summarizes the
chapter. Proofs of some propositions and intermediate lemmas appear in
Section 4.6.
4.1 Model
Consider a cloud computing system where jobs arrive sequentially according
to a stationary stochastic process with independent interarrival time. Each
job demands one instance and is associated with a distinct user. We will
use the terms “users” and “jobs” interchangeably. The service time for each
job is independently drawn according to an arbitrary distribution with the
expected time of 1/µ. Jobs differ in their values for service and the waiting
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costs. There are two classes of jobs. Each job from class i has the same
value vi for job completion. Assume v1 > v2. The total arrival rate of
potential jobs is λ1 + λ2. Each job is independently assigned class i with
probability λi/(λ1 + λ2), hence the total arrival rate of potential jobs from
class i in λi. Each job from class i incurs a waiting cost per unit time
which is an i.i.d. realization of a random variable Ci with the cumulative
distribution function (CDF) Fi(c). The exact waiting cost of a job is its
private information; however, the probability distributions Fi’s are common
knowledge. The random variables Ci’s are independent of each other. If
a job from class i with waiting cost c pays a total price m for using the
instance and spends the total time w in the system (the sum of the queuing
time and the service time, referred to as the waiting time) then its payoff
is vi − cw − m. A job wants to maximize its expected payoff from using
an instance and competes to acquire an instance only if its expected payoff
is nonnegative. Let fi(c) be the corresponding probability density function
(pdf) of Fi(c); fi(c) is assumed to be strictly positive for c ∈ [0, µvi]2. Each
job is infinitesimally small and cannot affect the system dynamics on its own.
Modeling PAYG: PAYG is modeled as a GI/GI/∞ system with service
rate µ. A job arriving to PAYG joins immediately and is served until com-
pletion. Each job is charged a price p > 0 per unit time for using a PAYG
instance. The price p is known to everyone a priori. The expected payoff of
a job from class i with the waiting cost c from using a PAYG instance is thus
vi − (c+ p)/µ. If c > µvi − p, the job does not participate in PAYG.
Modeling the spot market: The spot market is modeled as a GI/GI/k
system with preemption where jobs bid for priority. We will be mostly work-
ing with auctions where a job with a higher bid is given priority over a job
with a lower bid and can preempt the lowest priority job under service if
needed; Section 4.2.1 provides further details on the assumptions we make
on the relationship between bids and priorities. A job which is preempted
goes back to the queue and waits to resume from the point it left. The
queue state (i.e., the bid vector in the spot market) is unobservable to the
arriving jobs. Jobs are not allowed to renege or change their bids. A job
is charged based on its own bid and the bids of others according to some
spot pricing mechanism. Examples include the first price auction where jobs
2Since the expected service time of a job is 1/µ, jobs from class i with waiting cost
greater than µvi will always balk, hence we restrict attention to range [0, µvi].
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with k highest bids are served and each pays its bid, and the (k + 1)th price
auction where the jobs with k highest bids are served and each job pays the
(k + 1)th highest bid. We do not explicitly assume any specific spot pricing
mechanism and abstract away from it by considering the expected payment
by a job in a Bayes-Nash equilibrium (BNE) using the revenue equivalence
theorem for auctions [10].
4.2 PAYG and Spot Market Analysis
This section analyzes PAYG and the spot market, characterizes a unique
BNE, and investigates the revenue consequences of operating PAYG and the
spot market simultaneously.
4.2.1 Strategy, waiting time, and spot pricing
When a spot market is operating, either alone or in conjunction with PAYG,
a job that decides to join it participates in an auction and must decide how
much to bid based on the payment rules of the auction. The optimal bid
may depend in a complicated way on the job’s private information (value
for service and cost of waiting). However, we show in this section that this
complexity is inessential. Regardless of the auction mechanism, jobs that
enter the spot market with higher waiting costs pay more and wait less time
and these values are (essentially) independent of the job’s class. The job’s
class does matter in determining whether the job participates in the spot
market, but this takes the form of a simple cutoff with jobs with waiting
costs below the cutoff participating and those with costs above not.
By the revelation principle for BNE [10], it suffices to restrict our con-
sideration to truthful direct revelation mechanisms: mechanisms where jobs
report their private information and it is an equilibrium for them to do so
truthfully. Any implementable outcome is implementable by such a mecha-
nism. Thus, a job reports a type (v, c); if it participates in the spot market,
it has an expected waiting time w˜(v, c) and expected payment m˜(v, c). In
principle, these could depend on the value v of the job’s class; however, we
argue below that it is essentially without loss of generality to assume they
do not.
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Lemma 4.2.1. For all truthful direct revelation mechanisms for the spot
market and all equilibria, there exists an equilibrium with the same expected
utility where expected waiting time and payments are independent of class for
all values of c where both classes participate in the spot market.
Proof. A job of class i with waiting cost c that participates in the spot market
chooses a report (v′, c′) to minimizing the expected total cost cw˜(v′, c′) +
m˜(v′, c′). Thus, when both classes participate, the set of optimal reports is
class-independent; in particular, both (v1, c) and (v2, c) belong to the set of
optimal reports. Let s1 and s2 be the (randomized) equilibrium strategies
for class 1 and class 2 with cost c. Now, suppose that the job of class
i with waiting cost c uses strategy s1 with probability λ1f1(c)/(λ1f1(c) +
λ2f2(c)) and strategy s2 otherwise. Then the arrival process for the strategies
s1 and s2 remains identical to the original process, hence the waiting time
and the expected payment remain unchanged. This new class-independent
randomized strategy is also an equilibrium for both classes.
Since jobs can undo any tie-breaking the mechanism does on the basis
of class, we assume for the remainder of the chapter that mechanisms have
a class-independent expected waiting time w˜(c) and expected waiting cost
m˜(c). As we are interested in what outcomes are implementable, again by the
revelation principle it is without loss of generality to assume that jobs report
truthfully and we do so for the remainder of the chapter. We now show that
jobs with higher waiting costs pay more and spend less time waiting.
Lemma 4.2.2. In (the truthful) equilibrium, w˜(c) is nonincreasing in c and
m˜(c) is nondecreasing in c for values of c that participate in the spot market
for some class.
Proof. Consider ĉ > c. The optimality of truthful reporting implies:
ĉw˜(ĉ) + m˜(ĉ) ≤ ĉw˜(c) + m˜(c), (4.1)
cw˜(c) + m˜(c) ≤ cw˜(ĉ) + m˜(ĉ). (4.2)
Adding (4.1) and (4.2) implies w˜(ĉ) ≤ w˜(c). Using this and (4.2), we get
m˜(ĉ) ≥ m˜(c).
Thus far, our assumptions have been without loss of generality. We now
make two assumptions that are not. First, we assume that jobs with no
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waiting cost are served for free in the spot market, hence m(0) = 0. Second,
we assume that, in equilibrium in the spot market, jobs with higher waiting
costs always have strictly higher priority than jobs with lower waiting costs.
Note that this is a stronger condition than assuming that w˜(c) is decreasing.
Since w˜ is the expected waiting time, if priorities are assigned randomly it
is possible to have a strictly lower expected waiting time but in some cases
a lower priority. All mechanisms that assign a strictly higher priority to the
jobs with higher bids in the spot market, admit an equilibrium where the
spot market bids are increasing in the waiting cost, and have no reserve price
satisfy these restrictions. For example, we show later in this section that the
first price auction satisfies these properties. We discuss the implications of
these restrictions on our results in Section 4.4.
We now characterize the participation decision facing jobs.
Lemma 4.2.3. For each class i there is a cutoff ci below which jobs partici-
pate in the spot market and above which they do not.
Proof. A job participates in the spot market if the payoff is better than its
alternative (0 if the spot market is operated in isolation or max{0, vi − (p+
c)/µ} if PAYG with price p is available). The payoff from participation is
vi−cw˜(c)−m˜(c). Let c be any type that participates. Taking the case of the
spot market in isolation first, if vi−cw˜(c)−m˜(c) ≥ 0 then vi−ĉw˜(c)−m˜(c) > 0
for all ĉ < c. Thus, if a job of class i with cost c participates, all lower cost
jobs do as well. This argument also implies that if a job with waiting cost
c does not participate, then neither does any job with waiting cost ĉ > c.
Thus, there is some threshold ci below which jobs participate and above
which they do not. The argument with PAYG as an option is essentially the
same because the minimum possible value of w˜(c) is 1/µ, the same as the
waiting time under PAYG.
In order to characterize an equilibrium where jobs use cutoffs (c1, c2), we
need to analyze the expected waiting time for a job with waiting cost c in the
spot market with cutoffs (c1, c2). It suffices to characterize some properties of
the waiting times for arbitrary choices of cutoffs. Given a queuing system for
the spot market, define the waiting time function w(c; c1, c2) as the expected
waiting time of a job with cost c when jobs of class i use cutoff ci. Note
that we are defining w for arbitrary cutoffs, not just equilibrium ones. The
following lemma gives the relevant properties of w.
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Lemma 4.2.4. The waiting-time function w(c; c1, c2) is well defined when-
ever (
∑
i=1,2 λiFi(ci))/(kµ) < 1. Moreover, it is an increasing function of∑
i=1,2 λi [Fi(ci)− Fi(c)]+. In particular, this implies:
(i) w(c; c1, c2) is decreasing in c for c ∈ [0, c1 ∨ c2]3, w(c; c1, c2) > 1/µ if
c < c1 ∨ c2, and w(c; c1, c2) = 1/µ if c ≥ c1 ∨ c2.
(ii) w(c; c1, c2) is increasing in c1 and c2 for ci ∈ [0, µvi].
(iii) For any c1 > ĉ2 > c2 and t ∈ [ĉ2, c1], w(t; c1, c2) = w(t; c1, ĉ2).
Proof. The condition (
∑
i=1,2 λiFi(ci))/(kµ) < 1 ensures the queue is stable
so that the expected waiting time is finite. This must be true in equilibrium.
Since priority is given to the job with a higher waiting cost, the expected
waiting time of a job with waiting cost c depends on the total arrival rate
of the jobs with waiting cost higher than c, and the expected waiting time
increases as this total arrival rate increases. The total arrival rate of the jobs
with waiting cost higher than c is equal to
∑
i=1,2 λi [Fi(ci)− Fi(c)]+. The
job with waiting cost greater than or equal to c1∨c2 gets the highest priority
and is served immediately with no interruptions. Hence, the expected time
spent by it in the system is 1/µ. The enumerated properties follow easily.
Next, we use a characterization similar to the revenue equivalence theorem
for auctions [10] and show that the expected payment by any job with waiting
cost c is uniquely determined by the waiting time function w; in particular,
it is the same for any spot pricing mechanism.
Suppose that the truthful reporting with cutoffs (c1, c2) constitutes a BNE
for the given spot pricing mechanism. Let m(c) be the expected payment
made by a job with waiting cost c (the expected payment is independent of its
class). For a BNE to exist, the following incentive compatibility (henceforth,
IC) constraint must hold: for any ĉ, c ≤ c1 ∨ c2, and any i,
vi − cw(c; c1, c2)−m(c) ≥ vi − cw(ĉ; c1, c2)−m(ĉ). (4.3)
By analogy with [10], we can relate the expected payment with the waiting
time function w, as follows:
3Here, a ∨ b = max{a, b}.
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Lemma 4.2.5. A necessary condition for (4.3) to hold is:
m(c) =
∫ c
0
w(t; c1, c2)dt− cw(c; c1, c2). (4.4)
Hence, the expected payment by a job with waiting cost c is uniquely deter-
mined by the function w and is same for all spot pricing mechanisms that
satisfy our assumption that m(0) = 0.
Proof. (Outline) Let pi(ĉ, c) , (vi − cw(ĉ; c1, c2)−m(ĉ)). Then maxĉ pi(ĉ, c)
is convex in c and the maximum must be achieved at ĉ = c for the IC
constraint to hold. A convex function is differential almost everywhere and
the (right) derivative of maxĉ pi(ĉ, c) with respect of c is −w(c; c1, c2). Finally,
notice that m(0) = 0; the job with zero waiting cost won’t pay anything in
the spot market because waiting is costless for it.
The next lemma shows that the properties of the waiting time function
along with the expected payment given by (4.4) ensure that the IC constraint
(4.3) is satisfied.
Lemma 4.2.6. Lemma 4.2.4 and (4.4) together satisfy the IC constraint
(4.3).
Proof. (Outline) Suppose that the waiting cost of a job in class i is c and it
instead misreports some ĉ 6= c. The expected payoff under truthful reporting
is pi(c, c) , vi−cw(c; c1, c2)−m(c) and the expected payoff in case of misreport
is pi(ĉ, c) , vi − cw(ĉ; c1, c2) −m(ĉ). Considering the cases ĉ < c and ĉ > c
separately, using the property that w(t; c1, c2) is decreasing in t, and using
(4.4), we can show that pi(c, c)− pi(ĉ, c) > 0.
Since w(c; c1, c2) is decreasing in c for c ∈ [0, c1 ∨ c2], the proof of Lemma
4.2.2 can be used to establish a stronger monotonicity of the expected pay-
ment m.
Lemma 4.2.7. Given cutoffs (c1, c2), the expected payment m(c) is increas-
ing in c for c ∈ [0, c1 ∨ c2].
4.2.2 Revenue and equilibria for isolated markets
First consider PAYG in isolation. If PAYG price is p, a job from class i with
waiting cost c obtains an expected payoff vi − (p + c)/µ by using a PAYG
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instance. A job will participate in PAYG if this payoff is nonnegative. Thus,
a job from class i participates in PAYG if its waiting cost c ≤ µvi − p. The
effective arrival rate of class i jobs is then λiFi(µvi−p) where Fi(µvi−p) = 0
if p ≥ µvi. Each such job uses a PAYG instance for an expected duration
of 1/µ and pays p per unit time. Hence, the expected revenue to the cloud
service provider per unit time, denoted by Rpayg(p), is:
Rpayg(p) , p
µ
(∑
i=1,2
λiFi(µvi − p)
)
, (4.5)
and the optimum expected revenue per unit time is obtained by taking the
maximum over p.
Next, consider the spot market in isolation. Given the cutoffs (c1, c2), the
expected payment by a job with waiting cost c in any BNE is given by (4.4).
Thus, we need to compute the cutoff for each class i when the spot market
is operated in isolation; denote the cutoffs in this case by cs , (cs1, cs2).
From (4.4), the expected payoff of a job from class i with waiting cost c is
vi −
∫ c
0
w(t; cs)dt. A job will participate in the spot market as long as its
expected payoff is nonnegative. Hence, the cutoff vector cs must satisfy:
vi −
∫ c
0
w(t; cs)dt
{
≥ 0 if c < csi ,
= 0 if c = csi .
(4.6)
Proposition 4.2.1 below shows that there is an unique cutoff vector cs
satisfying (4.6) and uses it to characterize the BNE for the spot market in
isolation. The proof appears in Section 4.6.1.
Proposition 4.2.1. The following holds:
(i) There is a unique solution to the following system of equations in (x1, x2):∫ x1
0
w(t;x1, x2)dt = v1,∫ x2
0
w(t;x1, x2)dt = v2.
(4.7)
(ii) Choose the cutoff vector cs as the unique solution of (4.7). Then cs sat-
isfies (4.6), cs1 ≥ c, and cs2 ≤ c. Here c uniquely satisfies
∫ c
0
w(t; c, c)dt =
v2.
(iii) In all BNE, a job from class i with waiting cost c participates in the
spot market if and only if c ≤ csi .
73
To highlight the explicit dependence of the expected payment on the cutoffs
vector cs, we use m(c; cs); i.e,
m(c; cs) =
∫ c
0
w(t; cs)dt− cw(c; cs). (4.8)
Using Proposition 4.2.1, the expected revenue to the cloud service provider
per unit time when the spot market is operated in isolation, denoted by Rs,
is:
Rs ,
∑
i=1,2
λi
∫ csi
0
m(t; cs)fi(t)dt. (4.9)
4.2.3 Revenue and equilibria in the hybrid market
We now leverage the insights gained from analyzing PAYG and the spot
market each in isolation and move to analyzing the hybrid system where
both are operated simultaneously. As mentioned in Section 4.2.1, for a given
PAYG price p, we look for a cutoff vector c(p) , (c1(p), c2(p)) such that a job
from class i with waiting cost c joins the spot market if and only if c < ci(p),
and if so, it reports its waiting cost truthfully; otherwise it joins PAYG as
long as c ≤ µvi − p (the cutoff for class i if PAYG is operating in isolation).
A job from class i with waiting cost c gets the expected payoff vi −∫ c
0
w(t; c(p))dt from using a spot instance and reporting its waiting cost truth-
fully, while its expected payoff from using a PAYG instance is vi− (p+ c)/µ.
It will pick the one which offers a higher expected payoff. If the PAYG price
is too high for a class, then no jobs from that class goes to PAYG. Proposition
4.2.2 below finds the unique cutoff vector c(p) and uses it to characterizes
the BNE of the hybrid system. The proof appears in Section 4.6.2.
Proposition 4.2.2. Let c and cs be as given by Proposition 4.2.1 and p be
a PAYG price. Choose the cutoff vector c(p) as follows:
(i) If p ∈ (0, µv2−c], then there is a unique x ∈ [0, c] satisfying (p+x)/µ =∫ x
0
w(t;x, x)dt. Choose c1(p) = c2(p) = x. Each ci(p) ∈ (0, c] and is
increasing in p.
(ii) If p ∈ (µv2−c, µv1−cs1], then there is a unique (x1, x2) such that x1 ≥ x2
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that satisfies the following system of equations:∫ x1
0
w(t;x1, x2)dt =
p+x1
µ
,∫ x2
0
w(t;x1, x2)dt = v2.
(4.10)
Choose c1(p) = x1 and c2(p) = x2. c1(p) ∈ (c, cs1] and is increasing
in p, c2(p) ∈ [cs2, c) and is decreasing in p, and
∑
i=1,2 λiFi(ci(p)) is
increasing in p.
(iii) If p > µv1 − cs1, choose c1(p) = cs1 and c2(p) = cs2.
Then in any BNE, a job from class i with waiting cost c participates in the
spot market if and only if c < ci(p), it participates in PAYG if ci(p) ≤ c ≤
µvi − p. If µvi − p < ci(p) then no class i job participates in PAYG4.
Our analysis so far characterizes a truthful BNE for the system where
PAYG and the spot market are operating simultaneously. This equilibrium
can be implemented by assigning higher priority to the jobs with the higher
waiting cost and collecting the payment according to (4.4). In the first price
auction the bid is same as the payment; a byproduct of our analysis is that
the payment rule (4.4) and cutoffs given by Proposition 4.2.2 characterize
the bidding strategy if the first price auction is used for the spot market.
The expected revenue to the cloud service provider per unit time is the
sum of expected revenue from the spot market and PAYG. From (4.5), (4.9),
and Proposition 4.2.2, given a PAYG price p, the expected revenue per unit
time for the hybrid system, denoted by Rh(p), is:
Rh(p) ,
∑
i=1,2
λi
(
p
µ
[Fi(µvi − p)− Fi(ci(p))]+ +
∫ ci(p)
0
m(t; c(p))fi(t)dt
)
,
(4.11)
and the optimum expected revenue per unit time is obtained by taking the
maximum over p.
The next proposition provides theoretical evidence suggesting that PAYG
in isolation can provide a higher expected revenue to the cloud service provider
than operating PAYG and the spot market simultaneously.
4We assume that if a job is indifferent between the spot market and PAYG, it choses
PAYG. This is reasonable as PAYG provides better delay guarantees.
75
Proposition 4.2.3. Suppose the optimal price ph of the hybrid system is
such that ph ≤ µv2 − c, i.e., case (i) of Proposition 4.2.2 holds. Then the
optimum expected revenue per unit time from PAYG in isolation is higher
than the optimum expected revenue per unit time from the hybrid system;
i.e., maxpR
h(p) = Rh(ph) < maxpR
payg(p).
Proof. Since maxpR
payg(p) ≥ Rpayg(ph), it suffices to show that
Rpayg(ph) > Rh(ph). (4.12)
If ph ≤ µv2 − c, then c1(ph) = c2(ph) ≤ c, implying µvi − ph ≥ c ≥ ci(ph).
Then from (4.5) and (4.11),
Rpayg(ph)− Rh(ph) =
∑
i=1,2
λi
(
ph
µ
Fi(ci(p
h))−
∫ ci(ph)
0
m(t; c(ph))fi(t)dt
)
.
(4.13)
At c = ci(p
h), a job is indifferent between PAYG and the spot market. Hence,
ci(p
h)w(ci(p
h); c(ph)) +m(ci(p
h); c(ph)) =
ci(p
h) + ph
µ
.
Since c1(p
h) = c2(p
h), w(ci(p
h); c(ph)) = 1/µ. Hence, m(ci(p
h); c(ph)) =
ph/µ. From Lemma 4.2.7, m(t; c(ph)) is increasing in t for t ∈ [0, ci(p)]. This
and (4.13) imply:
Rpayg(ph)−Rh(ph) >
∑
i=1,2
λi
(
ph
µ
Fi(ci(p
h))−
∫ ci(p)
0
ph
µ
fi(t)dt
)
= 0. (4.14)
This establishes (4.12) and the proof is complete.
4.3 Simulations
The revenue ranking result of Proposition 4.2.3 is for the case when the
optimal price ph of the hybrid system is such that ph ≤ µv2 − c. However,
we conjecture that the revenue ranking result holds in general and present
simulation evidence.
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We model the spot market as k parallel M/M/1 queues. Jobs bid for pre-
emptive priorities using the first price auction. An arriving job is randomly
and uniformly sent to one of the k queues where it is served according to its
priority order, determined by its bid, in that queue. We extend the results
from [29] to compute the waiting time function:
w(c; c1, c2) =
1
µ
(
1−
∑
i=1,2
ρi [Fi(ci)− Fi(c)]+
)2 , (4.15)
where ρi , λi/(kµ). Recall that the payment rule (4.4) and cutoffs given by
Proposition 4.2.2 characterize the bidding strategy for the first price auction
for the spot market. The proof of Proposition 4.2.2 provides a recipe for
numerically computing the cutoff vector c(p) as a function of PAYG price p.
Simulations are carried out by randomly generating the values of vi’s, λi’s,
and k. The service rate µ is kept constant at one and Fi is uniform in the
interval [0, µvi]. We generate over a hundred random configurations (vi’s,
λi’s, and k). For each realized configuration, we observe that the optimal
revenue from PAYG in isolation is always higher than the optimal revenue
from the hybrid system where PAYG and the spot market are operating
simultaneously, even for the case where the optimal price ph of the hybrid
system is greater than µv2− c. An example plot where ph > µv2− c is shown
in Figure 4.1. Observe that if PAYG price is low, most of the jobs in the
hybrid system use PAYG and pay a small price, leading to a small expected
revenue. As PAYG price increases, jobs move to the spot market, reaching
a point where all jobs use the spot market. At p = µv2, the entire class 2
jobs balk from PAYG leading to a kink in the plot for PAYG in isolation.
Simulations with exponentially distributed waiting costs are also consistent
the revenue ranking that we conjecture.
4.4 Discussion and Future Work
Our analysis in Section 4.2 characterizes a truthful BNE for the system where
PAYG and the spot market are operating simultaneously. Our theoretical
results show that in many cases the revenue raised by a PAYG system in
isolation with a well chosen price p dominates that of this hybrid system.
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Figure 4.1: Expected revenue from PAYG in isolation, the spot market in
isolation, and the hybrid system as a function of PAYG price.
Simulations suggest that this may be true in general. However, this analysis
was based on a number of assumptions. We conclude by discussing how
relaxing them affects our results, which points to several areas for future
work.
• We assumed that the PAYG system has infinite capacity, which we
believe is reasonable given that capacity is endogenous and PAYG jobs
are more profitable than spot market jobs. However, it would also be
good to understand what happens in situations where this is not the
case. In cases with excess demand for PAYG instances, jobs with high
value and high delay cost can compete for the spot instances, possibly
paying a price higher than the PAYG price. However, this can populate
the spot instances and increase the waiting time, possibly causing some
low value jobs to balk all together.
• We assumed that the arrival process is independent of job type. This
may not be true if both arrival pattern and value depend on underly-
ing characteristics of the job. In this case, it is possible that there are
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equilibria where jobs of different classes but the same cost have differ-
ent outcomes. However, as both classes have the same set of optimal
outcomes, this requires an amount of coordination on tiebreaking that
may be unreasonable in practice.
• Because jobs can get interrupted in the spot market, programmers may
need to write more robust code and interruption may be unsuitable for
tasks that require high availability. This can be modeled as an upfront
cost of participating in the spot market. Are there reasonable scenarios
where this makes a hybrid system optimal?
• We assumed that m(0) = 0. Choosing a larger value amounts to setting
a reserve price. The equilibrium structure would be similar, although
the cutoffs would change and there are additional cases. Our theoretical
revenue analysis still holds despite a reserve price.
• We assumed that the higher priority is given to the jobs with higher
waiting cost to derive some of the properties of the waiting time func-
tion w given by Lemma 4.2.4. This excludes systems where, in equi-
librium, a variety of types pay the same expected price and receive the
same expected waiting time (PAYG could be viewed as an example of
this). While this would require a more general equilibrium characteri-
zation, our theoretical revenue analysis still applies.
• Our analysis is about revenue optimization by a monopolistic provider.
Perhaps competitive pressures make operating a spot market more at-
tractive.
4.5 Chapter Summary
This chapter compared two simple pricing schemes for selling cloud instances
and studied the trade-off between them. We characterize the equilibrium
for the hybrid system where arriving jobs can choose between fixed or the
market based pricing. We provide theoretical and simulation based evidence
suggesting that fixed price generates a higher expected revenue than the
hybrid system.
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4.6 Proofs of Some Propositions
4.6.1 Proof of Proposition 4.2.1
The proof follows in multiple steps:
Step 1. Showing that there is a unique c satisfying:∫ c
0
w(t; c, c)dt = v2. (4.16)
Notice that
∫ x2
0
w(t;x1, x2)dt is increasing and continuous in x1 and x2,∫ x2
0
w(t;x1, x2)dt = 0 for x2 = 0, and
∫ x2
0
w(t;x1, x2)dt > v2 for x2 = µv2
(w(t;x1, x2) > 1/µ for t < x2). Hence there is a unique c satisfying (4.16).
Step 2. Showing that there is a unique solution of the system of equations
(4.7).
If (4.7) has a solution (x˜1, x˜2) then x˜1 ≥ c and x˜2 ≤ c. To see this, first
notice that if x˜1 < x˜2, then (x˜1, x˜2) cannot be a solution of (4.7) (v1 > v2).
Hence, x˜1 ≥ x˜2. Next, if x˜2 ≤ x˜1 < c, then w(t; x˜1, x˜2) < w(t; c, c). Then
from (4.16),
∫ x˜2
0
w(t; x˜1, x˜2) < v2, contradicting that (x˜1, x˜2) is a solution of
(4.7). Hence, x˜1 ≥ c. Finally, x˜2 > c can be contradicted on the similar lines
as above.
Given any x1 ∈ [c, µv1], there is a unique x2 satisfying
∫ x2
0
w(t;x1, x2)dt =
v2; denote it by y(x1). Next we show that φ(x1) ,
∫ x1
0
w(t;x1, y(x1))dt is
increasing in x1 for x1 ∈ [c, µv1]. Since
∫ x2
0
w(t;x1, x2)dt is increasing in x1
and x2, y(x1) is decreasing in x1. Consider x̂1 > x1. Then, [y(x1), x1] ⊂
[y(x̂1), x̂1], and∫ x̂1
0
w(t; x̂1, y(x̂1))dt−
∫ x1
0
w(t;x1, y(x1))dt
=
∫
t∈[y(x̂1),x̂1]\[y(x1),x1]
w(t; x̂1, y(x̂1))dt
+
∫ x1
y(x1)
(w(t; x̂1, y(x̂1))− w(t;x1, y(x1))) dt
>
∫ x1
y(x1)
(w(t; x̂1, y(x̂1))− w(t;x1, y(x1))) dt > 0,
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where the last inequality follows from Lemma 4.2.4. Hence, φ(x1) is increas-
ing in x1 for x1 ∈ [c, µv1].
Since φ(x1) = v2 for x1 = c, φ(x1) > v1 for x1 = µv1, and φ(x1) is increasing
and continuous in x1, there is a unique x1 ∈ [c, µv1] solving φ(x1) = v1.
This establishes the second part of the claim. Finally, the arguments above
automatically imply that if (cs1, c
s
2) is the unique solution of (4.7), then (4.6)
holds true.
Steps 1 and 2 together establish the first two claims of Proposition 4.2.1.
Step 3. Establishing the third claim of Proposition 4.2.1.
Given cs, the expected payoff of a job from class i with waiting cost c ≤ csi
form participating in the spot market is vi −
∫ c
0
w(t; cs)dt. Since cs satisfies
(4.6), the expected payoff is nonnegative. The pricing rule (4.4) ensures
incentive compatibility for c ≤ csi . We only need to show that if c > csi ,
the job does not participates in the spot market. Since w(t; cs) = 1/µ for
t ≥ cs1, reporting a waiting cost larger than cs1 does not improve the waiting
time of the job, and the expected payment is at least m(cs1). Hence, if a
job with waiting cost c > csi decides to participate in the spot market, it
will (mis)report a waiting cost ĉ ∈ [0, cs1]. The expected payoff of the job is
vi − cw(ĉ; cs1, cs2)−m(ĉ). Then,
vi − cw(ĉ; cs1, cs2)−m(ĉ)
= vi − csiw(ĉ; cs1, cs2)−m(ĉ)− (c− csi )w(ĉ; cs1, cs2)
≤ vi − csiw(csi ; cs1, cs2)−m(csi )− (c− csi )w(ĉ; cs1, cs2)
= −(c− csi )w(ĉ; cs1, cs2) < 0.
The first inequality is from the IC constraint (2.5) and then last equality is
because the cutoffs (cs1, c
s
2) are the solutions of (4.7). Hence the expected
payoff of a job with waiting cost c > ci from participating in the spot market
is negative and it will not participate.
Steps 1-3 complete the proof of Proposition 4.2.1.
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4.6.2 Proof of Proposition 4.2.2
The cutoff vector c(p) must satisfy the following constraints:
vi −
∫ c
0
w(t; c(p))dt ≥ 0 and
vi −
∫ c
0
w(t; c(p))dt > vi − p+cµ , for c < ci(p).
(4.17)
Hence either,
{
vi −
∫ ci(p)
0
w(t; c(p))dt = 0,
vi − p+cµ < 0 for c ∈ [ci(p), µvi − p],
or,

vi −
∫ ci(p)
0
w(t; c(p))dt = vi − p+ci(p)µ ,
vi − p+cµ ≥ vi −
∫ ci(p)
0
w(t; c(p))dt and
vi − p+cµ ≥ 0 for c ∈ [ci(p), µvi − p].
(4.18)
Constraint (4.17) says that the jobs with waiting cost below the cutoff get
nonnegative expected payoff from participating in the spot market. More-
over, this expected payoff is strictly higher than that from participating in
PAYG. Constraint (4.18) says that either no jobs from a class i participate
in PAYG, or jobs split between the spot market and PAYG with those above
the cutoff weakly preferring PAYG.
We next show that the choice of the cutoff vector c(p) in Proposition 4.2.2
uniquely satisfies (4.17) and (4.18). For notational convenience, define
φ(x1, x2, p) ,
p+ x1
µ
−
∫ x1
0
w(t;x1, x2)dt. (4.19)
The function φ(x1, x2, p) is continuous, decreasing in x1, decreasing in x2,
and increasing in p. Continuity, increasing in p, and decreasing in x2 are
immediate. By considering x̂1 > x1, and using w(t; x̂1, x2) > w(t;x1, x2) and
w(t; x̂1, x2) > 1/µ for t < x̂1, we can show that φ(x̂1, x2, p) > φ(x1, x2, p).
Case 1. p ∈ (0, µv2 − c].
Step 1.a. Existence of the solution to the equations governing the choice of
c(p).
We equivalently need to show that there is a unique x such that φ(x, x, p) =
0. The argument above implies that φ(x, x, p) is decreasing in x. Notice that
φ(0, 0, p) > 0 and
φ(c, c, p) =
p+ c
µ
−
∫ c
0
w(t; c, c)dt =
p+ c
µ
− v2 ≤ 0.
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Hence, there is unique x ∈ (0, c] such that φ(x, x, p) = 0; denote it by x(p).
Since φ(x, x, p) is increasing in p, x(p) is increasing in p. x(p)→ 0 as p→ 0
and x(p) = c for p = µv2 − c. Set c1(p) = c2(p) = x(p).
Step 1.b. c(p) satisfies the constraints (4.17) and (4.18).
Since c1(p) = c2(p) ≤ c, vi−
∫ c
0
w(t; c(p))dt > 0 for any c ≤ ci(p). Also from
the above argument, for any c ≤ ci(p), vi −
∫ c
0
w(t; c(p))dt ≥ vi − (p + c)/µ,
where the equality holds only at c = ci(p). For c > ci(p), w(c; c(p)) = 1/µ,
hence vi −
∫ c
0
w(t; c(p))dt = vi − (p+ c)/µ. Moreover, vi − (p+ c)/µ ≥ 0 for
c ∈ [ci(p), µvi − p].
Step 1.c. Characterizing equilibrium.
This follows immediately from Steps 1a and 1b. A job from class i with
waiting cost c participates in the spot market if and only if c ≤ ci(p); it
participates in PAYG if ci(p) ≤ c ≤ µvi − p.
Case 2. p ∈ (µv2 − c, µv1 − cs1].
Step 2.a. Existence of the solution to the equations governing the choice of
c(p).
If (x1, x2) is a solution of (4.10) such that x1 ≥ x2 then x1 ≥ c and x2 ≤ c;
otherwise
∫ x2
0
w(t;x1, x2)dt = v2 cannot hold. Let y(x1) be as defined in
Section 4.6.1 for x1 ∈ [c, µv1].
We show that the function φ(x1, y(x1), p) is decreasing in x1 for x1 ∈
[c, µv1]. To see this, consider x̂1 > x1. Since y(x1) is decreasing in x1,
[y(x1), x1] ⊂ [y(x̂1), x̂1]. Then,
φ(x̂1, y(x̂1), p)− φ(x1, y(x1), p)
=
x̂1 − x1
µ
−
∫
t∈[y(x̂1),x̂1]\[y(x1),x1]
w(t; x̂1, y(x̂1))dt
+
∫ x1
y(x1)
(w(t;x1, y(x1))− w(t; x̂1, y(x̂1))) dt
<
∫ x1
y(x1)
(w(t;x1, y(x1))− w(t; x̂1, y(x̂1))) dt < 0,
where the first inequality is because w(t; x̂1, y(x̂1)) > 1/µ for t < x̂1, and the
last inequality is from Lemma 4.2.4.
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Next, notice that
φ(c, y(c), p) = φ(c, c, p) =
p+ c
µ
− v2 > 0,
φ(cs1, y(c
s
1), p) = φ(c
s
1, c
s
2, p) =
p+ cs1
µ
− v1 ≤ 0.
Hence there is unique x1 ∈ (c, cs1] satisfying φ(x1, y(x1), p) = 0; denote it by
x1(p). Since φ(x1, y(x1), p) is increasing in p, x1(p) is increasing in p, implying
that y(x1(p)) is decreasing in p. It can be verified that (x1(p), y(x1(p))) =
(c, c) for p = µv2 − c, and (x1(p), y(x1(p))) = (cs1, cs2) for p = µv1 − cs1. Set
c1(p) = x1(p) and c2(p) = y(x1(p)).
Step 2.b.
∑
i=1,2 λiFi(ci(p)) is increasing in p.
Consider p̂ > p, implying c2(p̂) < c2(p). Suppose∑
i=1,2
λiFi(ci(p̂)) ≤
∑
i=1,2
λiFi(ci(p)).
Then from Lemma 4.2.4, w(t; c(p̂)) ≤ w(t; c(p)) for any t ≤ c2(p̂). Hence,
∫ c2(p̂)
0
w(t; c(p̂))dt ≤
∫ c2(p̂)
0
w(t; c(p))dt <
∫ c2(p)
0
w(t; c(p))dt = v2,
which is a contradiction.
Step 2.c. c(p) satisfies the constraints (4.17) and (4.18).
Here, v2 =
∫ c2(p)
0
w(t; c(p))dt, and (p+ c1(p))/µ =
∫ c1(p)
0
w(t; c(p))dt.
First, focus on class 2. Clearly, v2 −
∫ c
0
w(t; c(p))dt ≥ 0 for any c ≤ c2(p),
where the equality holds only for c = c2(p). Since (p+ c)/µ−
∫ c
0
w(t; c(p))dt
is decreasing in c, for c ≤ c2(p) < c1(p), we must have v2 −
∫ c
0
w(t; c(p))dt >
v2 − (p + c)/µ; for c > c2(p), we have v2 −
∫ c
0
w(t; c(p))dt < 0, implying
v2 − (p+ c)/µ < 0.
Next, focus on class 1. The argument above easily implies that v1 −∫ c
0
w(t; c(p))dt ≥ v1 − (p + c)/µ for any c ≤ c1(p) where the equality holds
only for c = c1(p). Also, for c ≤ c1(p) ≤ cs1, (p + c)/µ >
∫ c
0
w(t; c(p))dt,
implying
v1 −
∫ c
0
w(t; c(p))dt ≥ v1 − p+ c
µ
≥ v1 − p+ c
s
1
µ
≥ 0.
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Also, for any c > c1(p), w(c; c(p)) = 1/µ. Hence, v1 −
∫ c
0
w(t; c(p))dt =
v1−(p+c)/µ because equality holds for c = c1(p). Moreover, v1−(p+c)/µ ≥ 0
for c ∈ [c1(p), µv1 − p].
Step 2.d. Characterizing equilibrium.
This follows immediately from Steps 2a-2c. A job from class 1 with waiting
cost c participates in the spot market if and only if c ≤ c1(p); it participates
in PAYG if c1(p) ≤ c ≤ µv1 − p. A job from class 2 with waiting cost c
participates in the spot market if and only if c ≤ c2(p); it never participates
in PAYG.
Case 3. p > µv1 − cs1.
The only thing to prove here is equilibrium characterization which in turn
is implied if we show that c(p) satisfies the constraints (4.17) and (4.18).
Here, c1(p) = c
s
1, c2(p) = c
s
2, and vi =
∫ ci(p)
0
w(t; c(p))dt. Then, it imme-
diately follows that vi −
∫ c
0
w(t; c(p))dt ≥ 0 for c ≤ ci(p), where the equality
holds only at c = ci(p). Since (p+ c1(p))/µ−
∫ c1(p)
0
w(t; cs1, c
s
2)dt > 0 and (p+
c)/µ− ∫ c
0
w(t; c(p))dt is decreasing in c, we must have vi −
∫ c
0
w(t; c(p))dt >
vi − (p+ c)/µ for c ≤ ci(p). Moreover, for c > ci(p), vi −
∫ c
0
w(t; c(p))dt < 0,
hence, we must have vi − (p+ c)/µ < 0.
Thus, a job from class i with waiting cost c participates in the spot market
if and only if c ≤ ci(p); it never participates in PAYG.
This completes the proof of Proposition 4.2.2.
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Chapter 5
Profit Sharing Contracts
This chapter investigates how markets should be designed for selling resources
such as licenses to use a particular wireless spectrum bandwidth or oil and
gas drilling rights in a tract of land. A commonly used method is an auc-
tion.1 The auction of a resource is different from the auction of an item for
consumption. A resource in turn can be developed by the winning buyer to
generate profit. Once a buyer develops the resource, the profit may become
known to both the buyer and the seller through observable elements such
as sales data, quality of the resource, market condition, etc. This raises the
possibility of the seller selecting ex-ante as part of his auction a contract that
specifies how the net profit will be split ex-post between the winning buyer
and the seller.
We compare in this chapter the following two forms of payment: (i) the
seller either charges the winning buyer a one-time payment at the end of the
auction stage; or (ii) the seller receives an initial payment from the winning
buyer at the end of the auction stage followed by a profit-sharing contract
(PSC) in which he additionally receives a prespecified share of the realized
profit from the resource. This is motivated by a current example: the FCC
spectrum auctions (e.g., auction 73) are of the first type, while the 3G spec-
trum auctions in India require that a winning buyer pay a spectrum usage
charge equal to a percentage of his profit in addition to the spectrum acqui-
sition fees.2 We investigate whether or not there are economic reasons for
the seller to prefer auctions with a PSC over auctions with only a one-time
payment. The solution to this problem is nontrivial because strategic buyers
adjust their bids in the auction stage in response to the payment they are
required to make according to the PSC.
1See [36] and [37] for reviews of the FCC spectrum auctions, and [38] and [39] for
reviews of oil rights auctions.
2See [40] and [41] for details.
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The model used in this chapter takes a significant departure from those in
the previous chapters. The revenue optimal auctions described in previous
chapters define transfers between the seller and the buyers in terms of the
probability distribution of their types. The focus here is on commonly used
auctions such as the second price auction or the English auction. These auc-
tions are detail-free (see [42]): the allocation and the transfer in the auction
can be specified without requiring the knowledge of the probability distribu-
tion of types of the buyers. Furthermore, unlike the previous chapters, we
work with the symmetric interdependent values model of Milgrom and Weber
[43] which is better suited for the auction of a resource. This model includes
two extremes as special cases – the independent private value model and the
pure common value model – as well as a continuum of interdependent value
models between these two extremes. The value of the resource to a buyer
is not known to him before it is developed. However, each buyer has some
information about the resource, known only to him. This information may
be informative to other buyers as it can refine their respective estimates.
The value of the resource to the winning buyer is publicly observable once
it is developed by him. Finally, unlike the previous chapters, we allow for
risk averse buyers. The seller however is still assumed to be risk neutral; the
seller of the resource is usually a large organization (e.g., the government of a
country) with large cash reserves and possibly owns multiple such resources.
Our prime focus is on two simple PSCs. First is a profit only sharing con-
tract (henceforth, POSC) where the seller takes a fixed fraction α ∈ (0, 1)
of the positive profit from the winning buyer but does not take any negative
profit (loss) from him. Second is a profit and loss sharing contract (hence-
forth, PLSC) where the seller takes a fraction α ∈ (0, 1) of both positive and
negative profit from the winning buyer. For the second price and the English
auctions, we show that:
(i) The seller’s expected total revenue from the auction with a POSC or a
PLSC is nondecreasing in the share fraction α ∈ (0, 1), and in partic-
ular, is higher than the expected revenue from the auction with only a
one-time payment (i.e., α = 0). Hence, there are economic reasons to
prefer a POSC or a PLSC over only a one-time payment.
(ii) For the same share fraction α ∈ (0, 1), the auction with a PLSC gener-
ates higher expected total revenue than the auction with a POSC. We
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show that the revenue superiority of the PLSC for a given α over the
corresponding POSC primarily stems from the joint effect of positive
dependence between the values and the signals that is assumed in this
chapter, and the nature of PLSC and POSC; the effect of risk aversion
is aligned with these factors. This revenue superiority is shown to hold
strictly in an example in Section 5.2.3 with risk neutral buyers.
(iii) We leverage the intuition gained from the analysis of the POSC and
PLSC to move beyond simple PSCs and show that the auction with a
PSC from a very general class generates higher expected total revenue
than the auction with only a one-time payment. Moreover, the PLSC
with the share fraction α is revenue optimal over the general class of
PSCs for which the seller’s marginal share is bounded by α. The seller
can therefore accomplish all of his goals in revenue enhancement using
linear sharing contracts.
An obvious question is: “If the value of the resource ultimately becomes
known to the seller, then why not simply tax ex-post the entire profit from
the resource, subject only to participation constraints on the buyers?” This
scenario in fact results by letting the share fraction α in the POCS or PLSC
approach one.3 There are several reasons why it is worthwhile to consider a
share fraction α less than one and other nontrivial PSCs between the seller
and the winning buyer, some of which are enumerated in Section 5.4. A
primary reason is that development of the resource requires effort or expertise
from the winning buyer; otherwise, the seller might not need to sell the
resource. Section 5.6 models the relationship between the winning buyer and
the seller using a principal-agent model. We show through an example that
the revenue maximizing share fraction α in either a POSC or a PLSC can be
strictly less than one because of the necessity of providing proper incentives
to the winning buyer to develop the resource. However, a one-time payment
is never revenue optimal: we show that in our principal-agent model, the
auction with a PLSC and a suitably small share fraction α generates higher
expected total revenue than the auction with only a one-time payment.4
3The case of α = 1 is mathematically degenerate in our model. Since the seller takes
the entire profit ex-post from the winning buyer, a buyer will either decline to participate
or place any bid that gives him zero profit. The dependence of a buyer’s bid upon his
signal in our analysis of the case of α < 1 therefore does not apply for α = 1.
4As explained in Section 5.6, it is difficult to analyze more general PSCs or even the
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The advantages of the PSCs thus carry over to the case in which seller must
provide the winning buyer with incentives to develop the resource.
Related work: There are a number of approaches in the literature to
increase the seller’s revenue, either by exploiting the informational structure
or by making payments contingent on the ex-post realization of the values.
The distinguishing aspects of our work are: allowing for risk aversion among
buyers; a substantially more general informational environment;5 considera-
tion of very general transfers ex-post; analysis for the second price and the
English auctions; and consideration of the incentives of the winning buyer to
develop the resource.
There are two sets of papers especially relevant to our work. The first
set of papers use a mechanism design approach to maximize revenue for the
seller. For the cases of statistically dependent private values, a common
value model in which the types of the buyers are independent conditional on
the common value, and interdependent values with statistically dependent
types, the seller can extract the full surplus from the buyers using one-time
payments.6 The Wilson critique of mechanism design [42] is useful for dis-
tinguishing our approach from the papers on full surplus extraction. While
these papers define transfers between the seller and the buyers in terms of
the probability distribution of their types, our approach instead uses two
common auctions that are defined without reference to the buyers’ beliefs.7
Along with a fractional sharing contract, these auctions are the sort of simple
and familiar trading procedures that Wilson advocates.
Mezzetti [49] considers a model in which the value of the item to any risk
POSC in a principal-agent relationship. A numerical example in Section 5.6 suggests,
however, that: (i) as with the PLSC, a POSC with sufficiently small share fraction α
produces more expected revenue for the seller than a one-time payment; (ii) for fixed α,
a POSC causes the winning buyer to choose a larger effort than the corresponding PLSC
and may thereby produce a larger expected revenue for the seller. The generality of these
two observations remains to be explored.
5While most of the revenue ranking results in auction theory are through applications
of the linkage principle (see [44]) and assume various smoothness conditions, our proofs
rely entirely on the properties of concave functions and stochastic ordering with no or only
mild assumptions of smoothness.
6See [45, 46], [47], and [48] for details.
7Except in the special case of independent private values, however, the two auctions that
we consider require that the buyers have common knowledge of their beliefs in formulating
their bids. The work on full surplus extraction made honest reporting into a Bayesian-
Nash equilibrium; while making an honest report does not require that common knowledge
of beliefs among buyers, this common knowledge is required if a buyer is to verify that
honest reporting is incentive compatible.
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neutral buyer is a function of his type and the types of the other buyers;
a buyer who receives the item realizes its value ex-post. Mezzetti proposes
a two-stage reporting procedure in which all buyers first report their types
followed by a subsequent report by the winning buyer of the item’s realized
value. All losing buyers are compelled to pay a large fine ex-post if the
reported value of the winning buyer is inconsistent with the earlier reports by
the losing buyers. This insures honest reporting by all buyers and allows full
surplus extraction. Practically, however, one must question the willingness
of buyers to participate in a mechanism in which they may be required to
pay a large fine ex-post depending upon: (i) the reports of the other buyers
in the first stage; (ii) the ex-post report of the winning buyer who, while
having no incentive to lie, also has no incentive to be honest.
The second set of papers use ex-post transfers to enhance the revenue of
the seller. Hansen [50] constructs examples of an oil tract sale and the sale
of a firm to other firms. It is shown in each example that the seller benefits
by retaining a share of the profit from the future enterprise. The examples
are restricted to the cases of independent private values with risk neutral
buyers. Riley [51] shows in a symmetric interdependent values model that
if the value of a resource is observed ex-post, even if imperfectly, then the
seller can increase his expected revenue in a first price auction by either
requiring a winning buyer to pay a predetermined royalty or by having the
buyer establish a royalty rate through bidding. Along with using an auction
mechanism different from what we use, Riley’s analysis is restricted to risk-
neutral buyers and linear ex-post transfers.
Ex-post information is also used by McAfee and McMillan [52] and Laffont
and Tirole [53] to analyze procurement auctions in which the winning bidder
privately exerts effort to reduce his costs. This raises the principal-agent
issue that is mentioned above. These papers demonstrate that the auctioneer
can profit from contracting a cost-sharing arrangement with the winning
bidder. Both papers, however, are limited to the case of independent private
values, which is ill-suited to modeling the sale of resources such as spectrum
bandwidth or mineral rights. Moreover, each paper assumes specific utility
functions for the bidder.8 McAfee and McMillan’s cost sharing contract is
8McAfee and McMillan [52] assumes that each bidder either has the same constant
absolute risk aversion (CARA) function as his utility of money or each bidder is risk
neutral, while Laffont and Tirole [53] assumes risk neutrality.
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closely related to the PLSC, though they consider the first price auction.
Our analysis of the PLSC in a principal-agent relationship is for the second
price auction and the English auction.
DeMarzo et al. [1] consider the first and the second price auctions in which
bids are selected from a completely ordered family of securities whose ulti-
mate values are tied to the resource being auctioned. DeMarzo et al. define
a partial ordering based on the notion of steepness and show that the steeper
family of securities provides higher expected revenue to the seller. The two-
stage payment rules that we consider can be viewed as securities and our
revenue ranking of different PSCs is consistent with their idea of steepness.
Our work is more general in allowing for risk aversion among buyers and in
its substantially less restrictive informational assumptions. The generality of
our informational model is significant for more than mathematical reasons:
Chapter 6 shows that the revenue ranking of [1] does not necessarily hold if
its informational environment is relaxed. Thus, while our results are consis-
tent with theirs, they do not follow from their results. We also complement
their work by analyzing the English auction.
Outline of this chapter: The rest of this chapter is organized as follows.
Section 5.1 outlines the symmetric interdependent model, our notation, and
definitions. Section 5.2 analyzes the second price auction with a POSC and
with a PLSC, obtains an equilibrium strategy of the buyers, and establishes
the revenue consequences of these two PSCs. Section 5.3 extends the results
of Section 5.2 to the English auction. Section 5.4 provides comments and
extensions of our model. Section 5.5 studies the revenue consequences of
general PSCs. Section 5.6 analyzes auctions with PSCs in a principal-agent
relationship. We summarize the chapter in Section 5.7. Proofs of some
propositions and intermediate lemmas appear in Section 5.8.
5.1 The Symmetric Interdependent Values Model
Consider N buyers competing for a resource that a seller wants to sell. The
value xn of the resource to a buyer n is a realization of a random variable Xn,
unknown to him. This is the profit to buyer n from developing the resource
in the absence of any payments to the seller, but after taking into account
the variable costs. The Xn’s can take negative values, with the interpretation
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as loss incurred from developing the resource. Buyer n privately observes a
signal yn through a realization of a random variable Yn that is correlated
with (X1, X2, . . . , XN). The joint cumulative distribution function (CDF) of
the random variables Xn’s and Yn’s is common knowledge.
Let x , (x1, x2, . . . , xN) denote a vector of values; denote the random
vector (X1, X2, . . . , XN) by X. A vector of signals y and the random vector
Y are defined similarly. We use the standard game theoretic notation of
x−n , (x1, . . . , xn−1, xn+1, . . . , xN). Similar interpretations are used for X−n,
y−n, and Y−n. Let FX,Y(x,y) denote the joint CDF of (X,Y). It is assumed
to have the following symmetry property:
Assumption 5.1.1. The joint CDF of (Xn, Yn,Y−n), FXn,Yn,Y−n(xn, yn,y−n),
is identical for each n and is symmetric in the last N − 1 components y−n.
Assumption 5.1.1 allows for a special dependence between the value of the
resource to a buyer and his own signal, while the identities of other buyers are
irrelevant to him. The model reduces to the independent private values model
if (Xn, Yn) is independent of (X−n,Y−n) for all n, to the pure common value
model if X1 = X2 = . . . = XN , and includes a continuum of interdependent
value models between these two extremes. Because of Assumption 5.1.1,
the subsequent assumptions and the analysis in the chapter is given from
buyer 1’s viewpoint.
The set of possible values that each random variable Yn can take is assumed
to be an interval IY ⊂ R. Assume that the joint probability density function
(pdf) of the random vector Y, denoted by fY(y), exists and is positive for all
y ∈ INY . Notice that fY(y) is symmetric in its N arguments. The random
variables (Xn, Yn,Y−n) are not required to have a joint pdf. In particular,
this allows Xn to take discrete values or to be a deterministic function of
(Yn,Y−n).
Let larger numerical values of the signals correspond to more favorable
estimates of the value of the resource. Mathematically, we assume the fol-
lowing form of positive dependence between the value of the resource and
the buyers’ signals:
Assumption 5.1.2. For any increasing function h : R 7→ R, an’s, and bn’s
such that an, bn ∈ IY and an ≤ bn for all n, the conditional expectation
E [h(X1)|Y1 ∈ [a1, b1], Y2 ∈ [a2, b2], . . . , YN ∈ [aN , bN ]] is increasing in a1 and
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b1, and nondecreasing in a−1 and b−1 whenever it exists.9
Assumption 5.1.2 trivially implies that the random variable X1 conditioned
on Y = y is increasing in y1 and nondecreasing in y−1 in the sense of first
order stochastic dominance (henceforth, FOSD). Assumption 5.1.2 provides
a common sufficient condition for the existence of a pure strategy equilibrium
in both the second price and the English auctions; it actually can be relaxed
into two weaker conditions based on FOSD, one for the analysis of the second
price auction (Lemma 5.2.1) and one for the English auction (Lemma 5.3.1).10
An auction with a PSC has two stages:
(i) The auction stage: The first stage is an auction to decide who should
get the resource and to determine the initial payment to the seller. We
focus on the second price sealed bid auction (henceforth, just the second
price auction) and the English auction.11 In a second price auction,
the buyer with the highest bid wins and pays the amount equal to the
second highest bid. An English auction is an ascending price auction
with a continuously increasing price. At each price level, a buyer decides
whether to drop out or not. The price level and the number of active
buyers are publicly known at any time. The auction ends when the
second to last buyer drops out and the winner pays the price at which
this happens.
(ii) The profit sharing stage: The second stage is a PSC. We use the
term preliminary profit to denote the net obtained after subtracting the
auction stage payment made by the winning buyer from the value of
the resource. The seller takes a fixed fraction of the preliminary profit
(or loss) from the winning buyer.12 We assume that the preliminary
profit is observed by both the seller and the winning buyer.
9Throughout this chapter, “increasing” means “strictly increasing” and “decreasing”
means “strictly decreasing”. While the results of the chapter extend to the case in which
the conditional expectation in Assumption 5.1.2 is nondecreasing in the an’s and bn’s, the
analysis is more complicated.
10Assumption 5.1.2 is weaker than affiliation, which is commonly assumed in the auction
literature.
11There are many variants of the English auction. We work with the one used [43].
12For simplicity, we only consider at this point single period profit realization with no
discounting. Profit realization over multiple time periods with discounting is discussed in
Section 5.4.
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A POSC and a PLSC are each specified by a share fraction α ∈ [0, 1),
known to the buyers in the auction stage. If the winning buyer makes a
payment b at the end of the auction stage and the value of the resource
is revealed to be x, then the payment he makes in the second stage in
the POSC is α [x− b]+ (here, [a]+ , max{0, a}), while the payment in
the PLSC is α(x−b). Notice that α = 0 corresponds to having no profit
sharing stage, i.e., the winning buyer makes only a one-time payment
at the end of the auction stage.
The buyers are assumed to be risk averse or risk neutral. Each buyer has
the same von Neumann-Morgenstern utility of money, denoted by u : R→ R,
which is concave (possibly linear, as in the case of risk neutrality), increasing,
and normalized so that u(0) = 0. Henceforth, we use the term weakly risk
averse to refer to risk averse or risk neutral behavior. The utility function u
is over the total profit from the two stages. The seller is assumed to be risk
neutral.
In what follows, we assume that all expectations and conditional expec-
tations of interest exist and are finite. Moreover, conditioned on any signal
vector y ∈ INY , the expected utility of a buyer from developing the resource
without any payments is assumed to be positive; i.e., E [u(X1)|Y = y] > 0.
Thus, the buyers who are competing for the resource expect to make a posi-
tive profit from developing it and therefore willing to participate.
Finally, define the random variables Z1, Z2, . . . , ZN−1 to be the largest, sec-
ond largest, . . ., smallest among Y2, Y3, . . . , YN . Let Z , (Z1, Z2, . . . , ZN−1)
and denote a realization of Z by z. Henceforth, in any further usage, x1,
ym, and zn are always in the support of random variables X1, Ym, and Zn,
respectively, for 1 ≤ m ≤ N and 1 ≤ n ≤ N − 1; y and z are always in the
support of the random vectors Y and Z, respectively.
5.2 The Second Price Auction with a Profit Sharing
Contract
This section characterizes the equilibrium bidding strategies in the second
price auction with a POSC and a PLSC, and then evaluates the revenue
consequences for the seller. We look for a symmetric equilibrium.
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The following lemma is a consequence of Assumption 5.1.2 and is used
extensively in this section.
Lemma 5.2.1. E [h(X1)|Y1 = y1, Z1 = z1] is increasing in y1 and nonde-
creasing in z1 for any increasing function h : R 7→ R for which the expectation
exists.
Proof. From the definition of Z1, Z1 = z1 if and only if at least one of the
Yn’s, 2 ≤ n ≤ N , is equal to z1. Since fY(y) exists and is positive everywhere,
conditioned on Z1 = z1, the probability that two or more Yn’s are equal to
z1 is zero. Hence, the event Z1 = z1 can be thought of as the union of
N − 1 disjoint events, one for each n, 2 ≤ n ≤ N , such that Yn = z1. By
Assumption 5.1.1, conditioned on Z1 = z1, each of these events occur with
equal probability. Therefore,
E [h(X1)|Y1 = y1, Z1 = z1] = E [h(X1)|Y1 = y1, Y2 = z1, Y3 < z1, . . . , YN < z1]
= E [h(X1)|Y1 = y1, Y2 = z1, Y3 ≤ z1, . . . , YN ≤ z1] .
The result then immediately follows from Assumption 5.1.2.
5.2.1 Profit only sharing contract (POSC)
In a POSC, the winning buyer pays a fraction of any preliminary positive
profit to the seller. However, the seller does not bear any share of a loss.
We start by defining a function s : [0, 1) × I2Y 7→ R that will be used to
characterize the bidding strategies of the buyers:
s(α, y1, z1) ,
{
b : E
[
u(X1 − b− α [X1 − b]+)|Y1 = y1, Z1 = z1
]
= 0
}
. (5.1)
Since u(X1 − b − α [X1 − b]+) is decreasing and continuous in b, there is a
unique b that makes the expectation in (5.1) equal to zero. The function
s(α, y1, z1) is therefore well-defined. It can be interpreted as follows. If buyer
1 makes a payment b in the auction stage, his payment in the POSC stage
will be α [X1 − b]+ and his total profit will be X1 − b − α [X1 − b]+. Thus,
s(α, y1, z1) is the payment in the auction stage at which the overall expected
utility of buyer 1 is zero, conditioned on his signal being y1, and the highest
signal of other buyers being z1.
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The next lemma characterizes some important properties of s(α, y1, z1).
Lemma 5.2.2. The function s(α, y1, z1) is increasing in y1, nondecreasing
in z1, decreasing in α, and positive for small values of α. Moreover, for all
y1, z1, and α ∈ [0, 1),
s(α, y1, z1) ≤ E [X1|Y1 = y1, Z1 = z1] , (5.2)
and the inequality is strict everywhere unless α = 0 and u is linear.
Proof. Since X1 − b − α [X1 − b]+ is increasing in X1 and u is increasing,
Lemma 5.2.1 implies that E
[
u(X1 − b− α [X1 − b]+)|Y1 = y1, Z1 = z1
]
is in-
creasing in y1 and nondecreasing in z1. It immediately follows from (5.1)
that s(α, y1, z1) is increasing in y1 and nondecreasing in z1. Again, since
X1− b−α [X1 − b]+ is decreasing in α for X1 > b and nonincreasing in α for
X1 ≤ b, (5.1) implies that s(α, y1, z1) is decreasing in α.
We assumed in Section 5.1 that E [u(X1)|Y = y] > 0, and so
E [u(X1)|Y1 = y1, Z1 = z1] = E [E [u(X1)|Y = y] |Y1 = y1, Z1 = z1] > 0.
It follows from (5.1) that s(0, y1, z1) > 0. It is easy to see that s is continuous
with respect to α. Hence, s(α, y1, z1) is positive for small values of α.
Finally, (5.1) and an application of Jensen’s inequality gives
E
[
u
(
X1 − s(α, y1, z1)− α [X1 − s(α, y1, z1)]+
) |Y1 = y1, Z1 = z1] = 0,
⇒u (E [X1 − s(α, y1, z1)− α [X1 − s(α, y1, z1)]+ |Y1 = y1, Z1 = z1]) ≥ 0,
⇒E [X1 − s(α, y1, z1)− α [X1 − s(α, y1, z1)]+ |Y1 = y1, Z1 = z1] ≥ 0,
⇒s(α, y1, z1) ≤ E [X1|Y1 = y1, Z1 = z1] ,
where the first inequality is strict if u is strictly concave and the last inequality
is strict if a > 0.
The results of Lemma 5.2.2 can be interpreted as follows. Larger values of
y1 and z1 imply that X1 is likely to take larger values. Hence, the maximum
payment that buyer 1 is willing to make in the auction stage, assuming he
also knows z1, is increasing in y1 and nondecreasing in z1. A larger value of α
corresponds to the seller taking a larger fraction of any preliminary positive
profit from the winning buyer. Buyer 1 compensates for this in the auction
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stage by lowering the maximum amount he is willing to pay; i.e., s(α, y1, z1)
is decreasing in α. Finally, inequality (5.2) states that the maximum amount
that buyer 1 is willing to pay for the resource given y1 and z1 is no more than
the expected value of the resource given y1 and z1, with equality holding only
in the case of risk neutrality and no profit sharing in the second stage.
The strategy of a buyer is a mapping from his signal to his bid. Let buyer
n use strategy βn : IY 7→ R for 1 ≤ n ≤ N . The next lemma characterizes
an equilibrium bidding strategy for the second price auction with a POSC.
The construction here is similar to the derivation in [43].
Lemma 5.2.3. Let the strategies β1, β2, . . . , βN be identical and defined by
βn(yn) , s(α, yn, yn) for all n. Then the strategy vector (β1, β2, . . . , βN) is a
symmetric Bayes-Nash equilibrium (BNE) of the second price auction with
the POSC determined by α. This is the unique symmetric equilibrium with
an increasing and differentiable strategy.
Proof. Assume that each buyer n > 1 uses the strategy βn(yn) = s(α, yn, yn).
We will show that the best response for buyer 1 is to also use the strategy
β1(y1) = s(α, y1, y1).
Given y1, let buyer 1 bid b. If b ≥ max{s(α, yn, yn) : 2 ≤ n ≤ N} then
buyer 1 wins.13 From Lemma 5.2.2, max{s(α, yn, yn) : 2 ≤ n ≤ N} =
s(α, z1, z1), where z1 = max{y2, y3, . . . , yN}. Thus, the expected utility of
buyer 1 is:
E
[
u
(
X1 − s(α,Z1, Z1)− α [X1 − s(α,Z1, Z1)]+
)
1{b≥s(α,Z1,Z1)}|Y1 = y1
]
= E
[
E
[
u
(
X1 − s(α,Z1, Z1)− α [X1 − s(α,Z1, Z1)]+
)
|Y1 = y1, Z1] 1{b≥s(α,Z1,Z1)}|Y1 = y1
]
.
From (5.1) and Lemma 5.2.2,
E
[
u
(
X1 − s(α,Z1, Z1)− α [X1 − s(α,Z1, Z1)]+
) |Y1 = y1, Z1]
is positive for Z1 < y1 and negative for Z1 > y1. Thus, the expected utility
is uniquely maximized by setting b = s(α, y1, y1).
To establish uniqueness, consider an arbitrary symmetric equilibrium strat-
egy vector (β̂, β̂, . . . , β̂) such that β̂(b) is increasing and differentiable in b.
13Since the probability of a tie is zero, we ignore the issue of tie breaking without any
effect on the analysis.
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We show that s(α, y1, y1) uniquely solves buyer 1’s first order condition for
maximizing his expected utility given the use of β̂ by all other buyers. Con-
sequently, β̂ (yn) = s(α, yn, yn) is the unique symmetric equilibrium. Define
a function ψ(y1, z1) as:
ψ(y1, z1) , E
[
u
(
X1 − β̂(Z1)− α
[
X1 − β̂(Z1)
]+) | Y1 = y1, Z1 = z1] . (5.3)
Denote the conditional pdf of Z1 given Y1 = y1 by fZ1|Y1=y1(z1). Given y1,
let buyer 1 bid b. The expected utility of buyer 1 is:
E
[
ψ(Y1, Z1)1{b≥β̂(Z1)}|Y1 = y1
]
=
∫ β̂−1(b)
−∞
ψ(y1, z1)fZ1|Y1=y1(t)dt.
The first order condition for an optimal bid b gives
ψ(y1, β̂
−1(b))fZ1|Y1=y1(β̂
−1(b))
dβ̂−1(b)
db
= 0,
⇒ψ(y1, β̂−1(b)) = 0,
⇒E
[
u
(
X1 − b− α [X1 − b]+ |Y1 = y1, Z1 = β̂−1(b)
)]
= 0,
⇒b = s(α, y1, β̂−1(b)). (5.4)
The second line holds because fZ1|Y1=y1(t) is positive for all t in the support
of Z1, and β̂
−1(b) is increasing in b because β̂(b) is increasing in b. The third
line is from (5.3) and the last line is from (5.1). The proof is completed
by noticing that b = β̂(y1) is an optimal bid because the strategy vector
(β̂, β̂, . . . , β̂) constitutes a symmetric BNE.
It is clear from (5.1) that s(α, y1, y1) may be negative for larger values
of α. This corresponds to the case where buyer 1 with signal y1 finds the
expected net gain from developing the resource after accounting for the part
of the positive profit to be paid to the seller, too small to compensate for the
potential loss associated with developing the resource. In such a case, buyer
1 will not participate in the auction unless the seller pays him upon winning
the auction.14 The seller, however, expects to gain from the profit sharing
stage. He may thus allow the buyers to submit negative bids and make
negative payments upon winning, as long as the seller’s expected revenue
14We thus require that the auction be interim individually rational.
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is positive. In a second price auction with negative bids allowed, if the
second highest bid is negative, by charging the winning buyer an amount
equal to the second highest bid, the seller effectively pays the winning buyer
in the auction stage. We show in Proposition 5.2.1 that with our model
assumptions, the seller’s expected total revenue is always positive under this
scheme. Hence, we eliminate the issue of buyers dropping out by allowing
the buyers to submit negative bids.
By symmetry, the seller’s expected revenues from the auction stage and
from the POSC stage are the same as the expected payments made by buyer
1 in the auction stage and in the POSC stage, respectively, conditioned on
him winning the auction. In the symmetric equilibrium given by Lemma
5.2.3, buyer 1 wins if his signal is highest among all the buyers. Thus, the
seller’s expected revenue from the auction stage is E [s(α,Z1, Z1)|Y1 > Z1], his
expected revenue from the POSC stage is E
[
α [X1 − s(α,Z1, Z1)]+ |Y1 > Z1
]
,
and his expected total revenue from both stages, denoted by Rposcsp (α), is:
Rposcsp (α) , E
[
s(α,Z1, Z1) + α [X1 − s(α,Z1, Z1)]+ |Y1 > Z1
]
. (5.5)
Taking α = 0 corresponds to no POSC stage, i.e., the second price auction
with only a one-time payment.
Proposition 5.2.1 below summarizes the revenue consequences of the second
price auction with a POSC.
Proposition 5.2.1. The following statements hold for the second price auc-
tion with a POSC and weakly risk averse buyers:
(i) The seller’s expected revenue from the auction stage (possibly negative)
is decreasing in the share fraction α, while the expected revenue from
the POSC stage is positive and increasing in the share fraction α.
(ii) The seller’s expected total revenue from the two stages is positive and
is nondecreasing in the share fraction α; i.e., for any 0 ≤ α < α̂ < 1,
Rposcsp (α̂) ≥ Rposcsp (α) > 0. (5.6)
In particular, the expected total revenue from the two stages is higher
than the expected revenue from the second price auction with only a
one-time payment (i.e., Rposcsp (0)).
99
Proof. The proof uses the following result by Ohlin [54]:
Lemma 5.2.4 (from [54]). Let W be a real random variable taking values in
some interval J1, and let gi : J1 7→ J2 for i = 1, 2 be nondecreasing functions
with values in some interval J2. Suppose −∞ < E [g1(W )] = E [g2(W )] <∞.
Let h be a concave function such that E [h(gi(W ))] is well-defined for i = 1, 2.
If there exists w0 such that g1(w) ≥ g2(w) for w < w0 and g1(w) ≤ g2(w)
for w > w0, then E [h(g1(W ))] ≥ E [h(g2(W ))]. If h is strictly concave and
P [g1(W ) 6= g2(W )] > 0, then the inequality is strict.
Step 1. For any given y1 and z1,
s(α, y1, z1) + αE
[
[X1 − s(α, y1, z1)]+ | Y1 = y1, Z1 = z1
]
is nondecreasing in α, where s(α, y1, z1) is defined by (5.1).
Consider α̂ > α, α̂ ∈ (0, 1). To simplify the notation, define a random
variable V whose probability distribution is identical to the conditional dis-
tribution of X1 given Y1 = y1 and Z1 = z1. Let b̂ , s(α̂, y1, z1).
Since b+α[V − b]+ is increasing in b, b+αE [[V − b]+] is in turn increasing
in b. There is a unique b˜ that satisfies:
b˜+ αE
[
[V − b˜]+] = b̂+ α̂E[[V − b̂]+]. (5.7)
To establish Step 1, it suffices to show that s(α, y1, z1) ≤ b˜. From (5.1), this
holds if and only if
E
[
u(V − b˜− α[V − b˜]+)] ≤ 0. (5.8)
If b˜ < b̂, then
b˜+ αE
[
[V − b˜]+] < b̂+ αE[[V − b̂]+] ≤ b̂+ α̂E[[V − b̂]+],
which contradicts (5.7). Hence b˜ ≥ b̂.
From (5.7),
E
[
V − b˜− α[V − b˜]+] = E[V − b̂− α̂[V − b̂]+].
100
Moreover,
V − b˜− α[V − b˜]+ − (V − b̂− α̂[V − b̂]+) = b̂− b˜+ α̂[V − b̂]+ − α[V − b˜]+.
Since α̂ > α and b˜ ≥ b̂, the right-hand side of the above equation is nonneg-
ative for large positive values of V , nonpositive for large negative values of
V , and changes sign at most once. Lemma 5.2.4 then implies
E
[
u(V − b˜− α[V − b˜]+)] ≤ E[u(V − b̂− α̂[V − b̂]+)] = 0,
where the last equality follows from the definition of b̂. This establishes (5.8)
and Step 1 is complete.
Step 2. Completing the proof.
We can now prove part (ii) of Proposition 5.2.1. From Step 1, for any
y1 > z1 and 0 ≤ α < α̂ < 1,
s(α, z1, z1)− s(α̂, z1, z1)
≤ E [α̂ [X1 − s(α̂, z1, z1)]+ − α [X1 − s(α, z1, z1)]+ |Y1 = z1, Z1 = z1]
≤ E [α̂ [X1 − s(α̂, z1, z1)]+ − α [X1 − s(α, z1, z1)]+ |Y1 = y1, Z1 = z1] .
(5.9)
The expectation in the second line is conditioned on Y1 = y1 and not Y1 = z1.
Lemma 5.2.2 implies s(α̂, z1, z1) < s(α, z1, z1) for α̂ > α, from which it follows
that α̂ [X1 − s(α̂, z1, z1)]+−α [X1 − s(α, z1, z1)]+ is nondecreasing in X1. The
inequality (5.9) then applies Lemma 5.2.1. Now,
Rposcsp (α̂) = E
[
s(α̂, Z1, Z1) + α̂ [X1 − s(α̂, Z1, Z1)]+ |Y1 > Z1
]
= E
[
E
[
s(α̂, Z1, Z1) + α̂ [X1 − s(α̂, Z1, Z1)]+ |Y1, Z1
] |Y1 > Z1]
≥ E [E [s(α,Z1, Z1) + α [X1 − s(α,Z1, Z1)]+ |Y1, Z1] |Y1 > Z1]
= E
[
s(α,Z1, Z1) + α [X1 − s(α,Z1, Z1)]+ |Y1 > Z1
]
= Rposcsp (α),
where the inequality is from (5.9). From Lemma 5.2.2, s(0, z1, z1) > 0. Hence,
Rposcsp (0) > 0 and R
posc
sp (α) ≥ Rposcsp (0) > 0. This completes the proof.
Inequality (5.6) holds even for values of α close to one. At these values,
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the second highest bid can be negative and the seller might have to pay
the winning buyer in the auction stage. However, the seller extracts a large
expected revenue from the POSC stage and his expected total revenue is still
positive.
5.2.2 Profit and loss sharing contract (PLSC)
Next, we consider the case where the seller takes a fraction of both any
preliminary positive profit as well as any preliminary loss from the winning
buyer. As in Section 5.2.1, we define a function t : [0, 1)× I2Y → R that will
be used to characterize the bidding strategies of the buyers:
t(α, y1, z1) , {b : E [u ((1− α)(X1 − b)) |Y1 = y1, Z1 = z1] = 0} . (5.10)
Since u((1−α)(X1−b)) is decreasing and continuous in b, there is a unique b
that makes the expectation in (5.10) equal to zero. The function t(α, y1, z1)
is therefore well-defined. It can be interpreted as follows. If buyer 1 makes
a payment b in the auction stage, his payment in the PLSC stage will be
α(X1− b), and his total profit will be X1− b−α(X1− b) = (1−α)(X1− b).
Thus, t(α, y1, z1) is the payment in the auction stage at which the overall
expected utility of buyer 1 is zero, conditioned on his signal being y1, and
the highest signal of other buyers being z1.
The next lemma characterizes some important properties of t(α, y1, z1).
Lemma 5.2.5. The function t(α, y1, z1) is increasing in y1, nondecreasing
in z1, nondecreasing in α (increasing if u is strictly concave), and positive
everywhere. Moreover, for all y1, z1, and α ∈ [0, 1),
s(α, y1, z1) ≤ t(α, y1, z1) ≤ E [X1|Y1 = y1, Z1 = z1] , (5.11)
where s(α, y1, z1) is defined by (5.1). The left inequality above is strict ev-
erywhere except for α = 0, and the right inequality is strict if u is strictly
concave.
Proof. From Lemma 5.2.1, E [u((1− α)(X1 − b))|Y1 = y1, Z1 = z1] is increas-
ing in y1 and nondecreasing in z1. Then (5.10) implies that t(α, y1, z1) is
increasing in y1 and nondecreasing in z1. Next, let α and α̂ be such that
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0 ≤ α < α̂ < 1. Since u is concave,
u((1− α̂)(X1 − t(α, y1, z1)))
= u
((
1− α̂
1− α
)
(1− α)(X1 − t(α, y1, z1))
)
≥
(
1− α̂
1− α
)
u ((1− α)(X1 − t(α, y1, z1))) +
(
1− 1− α̂
1− α
)
u(0)
=
(
1− α̂
1− α
)
u ((1− α)(X1 − t(α, y1, z1))) , (5.12)
where the inequality is strict if u is strictly concave. From (5.10) and (5.12),
E [u((1− α̂)(X1 − t(α, y1, z1)))|Y1 = y1, Z1 = z1]
≥
(
1− α̂
1− α
)
E [u((1− α)(X1 − t(α, y1, z1)))|Y1 = y1, Z1 = z1] = 0.
E [u((1− α)(X1 − b))|Y1 = y1, Z1 = z1] is a decreasing function of b. Then
from (5.10), we must have t(α̂, y1, z1) ≥ t(α, y1, z1). This shows that t(α, y1, z1)
is nondecreasing in α (increasing in α if u is strictly concave).
From (5.1) and (5.10), s(0, y1, z1) = t(0, y1, z1). Since s is decreasing in α
while t is nondecreasing in α, we get
t(α, y1, z1) ≥ t(0, y1, z1) = s(0, y1, z1) > 0.
Hence, t(α, y1, z1) is positive everywhere. Moreover, t(α, y1, z1) ≥ s(α, y1, z1),
where the equality holds only at α = 0. Finally, Jensen’s inequality and (5.10)
imply
u((1− α)(E [X1|Y1 = y1, Z1 = z1]− t(α, y1, z1)))
≥ E [u((1− α)(X1 − t(α, y1, z1)))|Y1 = y1, Z1 = z1] = 0,
which establishes the second inequality (strict inequality if u is strictly con-
cave).
Recall from Lemma 5.2.2 that the payment s(α, y1, z1) that makes buyer
1 indifferent to winning in a POSC given y1 and z1 is nonincreasing in the
share fraction α; buyer 1 can only be willing to pay less as the seller takes a
larger share in the POSC stage. The corresponding payment t(α, y1, z1) in the
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PLSC, however, can only remain constant or increase as the share fraction
α increases. This is because a larger α not only reduces his preliminary
positive profits but also shields him from preliminary losses. If buyers are
strictly risk averse, then a larger α allows buyer 1 to make a strictly larger
payment, reflecting the additional benefit that he receives from transferring
risk to the seller.
As in Section 5.2.1, let βn denote the strategy of buyer n, for each n. The
next lemma characterizes an equilibrium bidding strategy for the second price
auction with a PLSC.
Lemma 5.2.6. Let the strategy of a buyer n be βn(yn) = t(α, yn, yn). Then
the strategy vector (β1, β2, . . . , βN) is a symmetric BNE of the second price
auction with the PLSC determined by α. This equilibrium is the unique
symmetric equilibrium with an increasing and differentiable strategy.
Proof. The proof is similar to that of Lemma 5.2.3 and is obtained by using
the function t(α, y1, z1) instead of the function s(α, y1, z1).
The equilibrium bid t(α, yn, yn) in a PLSC is always positive. Unlike a
POSC, the issue of buyers either dropping out or the seller allowing the
buyers to submit negative bids does not arise here.
Again, by symmetry, the seller’s expected revenues from the auction stage
and from the PLSC stage are the same as the expected payments made by
buyer 1 in the auction stage and in the PLSC stage, respectively, conditioned
on him winning the auction. In the symmetric equilibrium given by Lemma
5.2.6, buyer 1 wins if his signal is highest among all the buyers. Thus, the
seller’s expected revenue from the auction stage is E [t(α,Z1, Z1)|Y1 > Z1], his
expected revenue from the PLSC stage is E [α(X1 − t(α,Z1, Z1))|Y1 > Z1],
and his expected total revenue from both stages, denoted by Rplscsp (α), is:
Rplscsp (α) , E [αX1 + (1− α)t(α,Z1, Z1)|Y1 > Z1] . (5.13)
Again, α = 0 corresponds to the second price auction with only a one-time
payment, and so Rplscsp (0) = R
posc
sp (0).
Proposition 5.2.2 below summarizes the revenue consequences of the second
price auction with a PLSC.
Proposition 5.2.2. The following statements hold for the second price auc-
tion with a PLSC and weakly risk averse buyers:
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(i) The seller’s expected revenue from the auction stage is positive and is
nondecreasing in the share fraction α. The expected revenue from the
PLSC stage is also positive.
(ii) The seller’s expected total revenue from the two stages is positive and
is increasing in the share fraction α; i.e., for any 0 ≤ α < α̂ < 1,
Rplscsp (α̂) > R
plsc
sp (α). (5.14)
In particular, the expected total revenue from the two stages is higher
than the expected revenue from the second price auction with only a
one-time payment (i.e., Rplscsp (0)).
Proof. Part (i) follows trivially from Lemma 5.2.5. Turning to part (ii), the
seller’s expected revenue from the PLSC stage is:
E [α(X1 − t(α,Z1, Z1))|Y1 > Z1]
= E [E [α(X1 − t(α,Z1, Z1))|Y1, Z1] |Y1 > Z1]
= E [α(E [X1|Y1, Z1]− t(α,Z1, Z1))|Y1 > Z1] .
For Y1 > Z1, Lemma 5.2.5 implies E [X1|Y1, Z1] ≥ t(α, Y1, Z1) > t(α,Z1, Z1).
The expected revenue from this stage is therefore positive.
The seller’s expected total revenue is given by:
Rplscsp (α) = E [t(α,Z1, Z1) + α(X1 − t(α,Z1, Z1))|Y1 > Z1]
= E [E [αX1 + (1− α)t(α,Z1, Z1)|Y1, Z1] |Y1 > Z1]
= E [αE [X1|Y1, Z1] + (1− α)t(α,Z1, Z1)|Y1 > Z1] . (5.15)
Consider 0 ≤ α < α̂ < 1. Since E [X1|Y1, Z1] > t(α,Z1, Z1) for all α ∈ [0, 1)
and t(α,Z1, Z1) is nondecreasing in α, we get
αE [X1|Y1, Z1] + (1− α)t(α,Z1, Z1) < α̂E [X1|Y1, Z1] + (1− α̂)t(α,Z1, Z1)
≤ α̂E [X1|Y1, Z1] + (1− α̂)t(α̂, Z1, Z1).
Hence, αE [X1|Y1, Z1]+(1−α)t(α,Z1, Z1) is increasing in α. This along with
(5.15) imply that the seller’s total revenue Rplscsp (α) is increasing in α. This
completes the proof.
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A natural question now is: How does the second price auction with a PLSC
compare with the second price auction with a POSC in terms of the expected
total revenue they generate for the same share fraction α? The two proce-
dures are identical at α = 0. For α ∈ (0, 1), since t(α,Z1, Z1) > s(α,Z1, Z1),
the seller’s expected revenue from the auction stage is higher in the case of a
PLSC than a POSC. However, α(X1− t(α,Z1, Z1)) < α [X1 − s(α,Z1, Z1)]+.
Thus, the seller’s expected revenue from the profit sharing stage is higher in
the case of a POSC than a PLSC. As a result, it is not immediately clear how
the expected total revenue from the two stages in the PLSC compares with
the expected total revenue from the POSC. The next proposition resolves
this issue. It shows that in the PLSC, the gain from the higher bidding in
the auction stage outweighs the loss in revenue in the PLSC stage.
Proposition 5.2.3. The second price auction with a PLSC and weakly risk
averse buyers generates higher expected total revenue than the second price
auction with a POSC and weakly risk averse buyers; i.e., for any α ∈ (0, 1),
Rplscsp (α) ≥ Rposcsp (α). (5.16)
Proof.
Step 1. For any α ∈ [0, 1), y1, and z1,
αE [X1|Y1 = y1, Z1 = z1] + (1− α)t(α, y1, z1)
≥ s(α, y1, z1) + αE
[
[X1 − s(α, y1, z1)]+ |Y1 = y1, Z1 = z1
]
, (5.17)
where s(α, y1, z1) is defined by (5.1) and t(α, y1, z1) is defined by (5.10).
From (5.10), E [u((1− α)(X1 − b))|Y1 = y1, Z1 = z1] = 0 for b = t(α, y1, z1).
Then (5.17) is true if and only if
E
[
u((1− α)(X1 − bˆ))|Y1 = y1, Z1 = z1
]
≥ 0,
for bˆ =
s(α, y1, z1) + αE
[
[X1 − s(α, y1, z1)]+ −X1|Y1 = y1, Z1 = z1
]
(1− α) .
(5.18)
Inequality (5.18) implies that t(α, y1, z1) ≥ b̂, which is equivalent to (5.17).
To simplify the notation, define a random variable V whose probability dis-
tribution is identical to the conditional distribution of X1− s(α, y1, z1) given
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Y1 = y1 and Z1 = z1. With this new notation, inequality (5.18) reduces to
E
[
u
(
(1− α)V − αE [[V ]+ − V ])] ≥ 0. (5.19)
The definition of s(α, y1, z1) implies that E
[
u(V − α [V ]+)] = 0. Also,
E
[
V − α [V ]+] = E [(1− α)V − αE [[V ]+ − V ]] .
Since E
[
[V ]+ − V ] ≥ 0, (V − α [V ]+)−((1− α)V − αE [[V ]+ − V ]) is non-
negative for positive values of V , nonpositive for large negative values of V ,
and changes sign at most once. Lemma 5.2.4 then implies
E
[
u
(
(1− α)V − αE [[V ]+ − V ])] ≥ E [u(V − α [V ]+)] = 0.
This establishes (5.19) and Step 1 is complete.
Step 2. Completing the proof.
Next, we use Step 1 to prove Proposition 5.2.3. Notice that
Rplscsp (α) = E [αX1 + (1− α)t(α,Z1, Z1)|Y1 > Z1]
= E [E [αX1 + (1− α)t(α,Z1, Z1)|Y1, Z1] |Y1 > Z1] ,
and
Rposcsp (α) = E
[
s(α,Z1, Z1) + α [X1 − s(α,Z1, Z1)]+ |Y1 > Z1
]
= E
[
E
[
s(α,Z1, Z1) + α [X1 − s(α,Z1, Z1)]+ |Y1, Z1
] |Y1 > Z1] .
It suffices to show that for any y1 > z1,
E [αX1 + (1− α)t(α, z1, z1)|Y1 = y1, Z1 = z1]
≥ E [s(α, z1, z1) + α [X1 − s(α, z1, z1)]+ |Y1 = y1, Z1 = z1] ,
or, equivalently,
αE
[
X1 − [X1 − s(α, z1, z1)]+ |Y1 = y1, Z1 = z1
]
≥ s(α, z1, z1)− (1− α)t(α, z1, z1). (5.20)
107
From Step 1,
s(α, z1, z1)− (1− α)t(α, z1, z1)
≤ αE [X1 − [X1 − s(α, z1, z1)]+ |Y1 = z1, Z1 = z1]
≤ αE [X1 − [X1 − s(α, z1, z1)]+ |Y1 = y1, Z1 = z1] .
The expectation in the second line is conditioned on Y1 = y1 not Y1 = z1. The
second inequality follows from Lemma 5.2.1. It implies (5.20) and completes
the proof.
5.2.3 Revenue ranking for risk neutral buyers
The seller is risk neutral in our model while the buyers are weakly risk averse.
The return to the winning buyer is less risky in the PLSC determined by
α > 0 than in the corresponding POSC. In the case of strictly risk averse
buyers, the PLSC thus creates more potential gains from risk sharing than
the POSC. This suggests that the ranking (5.16) reflects a successful effort by
the seller to garner a portion of these gains in the form of higher revenue by
using a PLSC. We explain below, however, why (5.16) holds even in the case
of risk neutral buyers as a consequence of the form of positive dependence
among signals and return assumed in Section 5.1, and the nature of PLSC
and POSC. This is followed by an example in which (5.16) holds strictly in
the case of risk neutral buyers. The effect of risk sharing on revenue is thus
aligned with but not the primary cause of this ranking.
Fix a share fraction α > 0 and consider y1 > z1, i.e., buyer 1 wins in both
the POSC and the PLSC. Let rposc(x1) and r
plsc(x1) be the ex-post total
revenue to the seller from the POSC and the PLSC respectively, if the value
X1 of the resource is equal to x1:
rposc(x1) , s(α, z1, z1) + α [x1 − s(α, z1, z1)]+ , (5.21)
rplsc(x1) , t(α, z1, z1) + α(x1 − t(α, z1, z1)). (5.22)
Buyer 1 in each case pays in the auction stage the bid of the buyer who
observed z1. This is equal to s(α, z1, z1) in the POSC and t(α, z1, z1) in the
PLSC. In our symmetric model with risk neutral buyer (i.e., u(x) = x),
s(α, z1, z1) and t(α, z1, z1) are the bids that would make buyer 1 indiffer-
108
ent to winning conditioned on Y1 = Z1 = z1 in the POSC and the PLSC,
respectively:
E
[
X1 − s(α, z1, z1)− α [X1 − s(α, z1, z1)]+ | Y1 = z1, Z1 = z1
]
= 0, (5.23)
E [X1 − t(α, z1, z1)− α(X1 − t(α, z1, z1)) | Y1 = z1, Z1 = z1] = 0. (5.24)
Equations (5.23) and (5.24) together imply that the difference rplsc(x1)−
rposc(x1) satisfies:
E
[
rplsc(X1)− rposc(X1) | Y1 = z1, Z1 = z1
]
= 0. (5.25)
The seller would thus expect to receive the same revenue from the PLSC
as in the POSC if the highest and the second highest signals are the same,
i.e., Y1 = Z1 = z1. The event in which he sells to buyer 1, however, is
defined by Y1 > Z1. The difference r
plsc(x1) − rposc(x1) is a line with slope
α for x1 < s(α, z1, z1) and constant for x1 ≥ s(α, z1, z1); it is therefore
nondecreasing for all x1 and increasing for x1 < s(α, z1, z1). It can then be
shown using Lemma 5.2.1 the left side of (5.25) is nondecreasing in buyer 1’s
signal Y1; i.e.,
E
[
rplsc(X1)− rposc(X1) | Y1 = y1, Z1 = z1
] ≥ 0
for y1 > z1. The PLSC with share fraction α therefore generates a higher
expected revenue than the corresponding POSC.
Example 5.2.1. Consider two risk neutral buyers. The signals Y1 and Y2
are independent and uniformly distributed in (0, 1). Given the signals of the
buyers, the values of the resource to buyer 1 and buyer 2 are Bernoulli random
variables X1 and X2 respectively, with P [X1 = 1|Y1 = y1, Y2 = y2] = (2y1 +
y2)/3 and P [X2 = 1|Y1 = y1, Y2 = y2] = (y1 + 2y2)/3. Clearly, Assumptions
5.1.1 and 5.1.2 are satisfied. Also, Z1 = Y2.
For the second price auction with the POSC determined by α, the function
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s(α, y1, z1) is obtained as follows:
s(α, y1, z1) =
{
b : E
[
X1 − b− α [X1 − b]+ |Y1 = y1, Z1 = z1
]
= 0
}
=
{
b :
2y1 + z1
3
− b− α(1− b)2y1 + z1
3
= 0
}
=
(1− α)(2y1 + z1)
3− α(2y1 + z1) .
Thus, buyer 1 bids (1 − α)y1/(1 − αy1) if his signal is y1 and buyer 2 bids
(1−α)y2/(1−αy2) if his signal is y2. The seller’s expected revenue from the
auction stage is:
E
[
(1− α) min(Y1, Y2)
1− αmin(Y1, Y2)
]
= 2(1− α)
∫ 1
0
θ(1− θ)
1− αθ dθ.
Here, we have used the fact that the pdf of min(Y1, Y2) is 2(1−θ) for θ ∈ (0, 1).
The seller’s expected revenue from the POSC stage is:
E
[
α
[
X1 − (1− α)Y2
1− αY2
]+ ∣∣∣∣Y1 > Y2
]
= 2αE
[
2Y1 + Y2
3
(
1− (1− α)Y2
1− αY2
)
1{Y1>Y2}
]
.
Since E
[
(2Y1 + Y2)1{Y1>Y2}|Y2
]
= (1−Y2)(1+2Y2), the above expression can
be further simplified to
5α
9
− 2α(1− α)
3
E
[
Y2(1− Y2)(1 + 2Y2)
1− αY2
]
=
5α
9
− 2α(1− α)
3
∫ 1
0
θ(1− θ)(1 + 2θ)
1− αθ dθ.
With some further (tedious) algebra, one can get closed form expressions for
the seller’s expected revenue from the auction stage and the seller’s revenue
from the POSC stage.
For the second price auction with the PLSC determined by α, the function
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t(α, y1, z1) is obtained as follows:
t(α, y1, z1) = {b : E [(1− α)(X1 − b)|Y1 = y1, Z1 = z1] = 0}
=
2y1 + z1
3
.
As a consequence, each buyer bids his signal. The seller’s expected revenue
from the auction stage is:
E [min(Y1, Y2)] =
1
3
.
The seller’s expected revenue from the PLSC stage is:
E [α(X1 − Y2)|Y1 > Y2] = 2αE
[(
2Y1 + Y2
3
− Y2
)
1{Y1>Y2}
]
=
2α
9
.
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Figure 5.1: Revenue from the second price auction with a POSC and a PLSC as
a function of the share fraction α.
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The results are plotted in Figure 5.1. For POSC, it can be seen that as α
increases, the expected revenue from the auction stage decreases while the
revenue from the POSC stage increases. However, the expected total revenue
is increasing in α. In particular, the expected total revenue with α > 0 is
higher than the expected total revenue with α = 0, i.e., the second price
auction with only a one-time payment. For PLSC, the expected revenue
from the auction stage and the expected total revenue are increasing in α.
The expected total revenue from the second price auction with a PLSC is
strictly higher than the expected total revenue from the second price auction
with a POSC; they agree only at α = 0, the case of only a one-time payment,
and in the limiting case of α→ 1, the case of full profit extraction.
5.3 The English Auction with a Profit Sharing
Contract
This section extends the results of Section 5.2 to the English auction. In
an English auction, the prices at which different buyers drop out provide
information to the remaining buyers. A buyer’s bidding strategy takes into
account the number of active buyers and the prices at which the other buyers
have dropped out. Again, we look for a symmetric equilibrium.
The following lemma is a consequence of Assumption 5.1.2. It plays a role
similar to that of Lemma 5.2.1 in Section 5.2.
Lemma 5.3.1. E [h(X1)|Y1 = y1,Z = z] is increasing in y1 and nondecreas-
ing in z (componentwise) for any increasing function h : R 7→ R for which
the expectation exists.
Proof. Recall the definition of Z from section 5.1. The proof follows trivially
from Assumptions 5.1.1 and 5.1.2.
We now analyze the English auction with a POSC and a PLSC. Paralleling
Section 5.2.1 and Section 5.2.2, we (re)define functions s : [0, 1) × INY → R
and t : [0, 1)×INY → R that will be used to characterize the bidding strategy
of buyer 1:
s(α, y1, z) ,
{
b : E
[
u
(
X1 − b− α [X1 − b]+
) |Y1 = y1,Z = z] = 0} . (5.26)
t(α, y1, z) , {b : E [u ((1− α)(X1 − b)) |Y1 = y1,Z = z] = 0} . (5.27)
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The functions s(α, y1, z) and t(α, y1, z) are well-defined for reasons similar
to those in Sections 5.2.1 and 5.2.2 respectively. These are the maximum
payments that buyer 1 is willing to pay in the auction stage under the POSC
and PLSC, respectively, given that his signal is y1 and the signals of everyone
else is z (the assignment of these signals to the buyers is irrelevant). The next
lemma characterizes some important properties of s(α, y1, z) and t(α, y1, z).
The results are fairly intuitive and explanations similar to those for Lemma
5.2.2 and Lemma 5.2.5 apply.
Lemma 5.3.2. The function s(α, y1, z), defined by (5.26), is increasing in
y1, nondecreasing in z, decreasing in α, and positive for small values of α.
The function t(α, y1, z), defined by (5.27), is increasing in y1, nondecreasing
in z, nondecreasing in α (increasing if u is strictly concave), and is always
positive. Moreover, for all y1, z, and α ∈ [0, 1),
s(α, y1, z) ≤ t(α, y1, z) ≤ E [X1|Y1 = y1,Z = z] , (5.28)
where the left inequality is strict everywhere except for α = 0, and the right
inequality is strict if u is strictly concave.
Proof. The properties of s(α, y1, z) follow from Lemma 5.3.1, (5.26), and
concavity of u. The sequence of arguments is similar to how Lemma 5.2.1,
(5.1), and concavity of u are used to prove Lemma 5.2.2. The properties of
t(α, y1, z) follow from Lemma 5.3.1, (5.27), and concavity of u. The sequence
of arguments is similar to how Lemma 5.2.1, (5.10), and concavity of u are
used to prove Lemma 5.2.5.
In an English auction, the price of the resource increases continuously
during the bidding stage. At each price level, a buyer decides whether to
drop out or not, depending on his signal and the prices at which other buyers
have dropped out. Let p1 ≤ p2 ≤ . . . ≤ pN−1 be the prices at which the first,
second, . . ., last drop out occurs. The strategy of a buyer n now is a vector
βn , (β2n, β3n, . . . , βNn ) of functions βkn : RN−k+1 → R, 2 ≤ k ≤ N . Here,
βkn(yn, pN−k, pN−k−1, . . . , p1) is the price at which buyer n drops out as a
function of his signal yn and the prices (pN−k, pN−k−1, . . . , p1) at which the
N−k drop outs have occurred. The next lemma characterizes an equilibrium
bidding strategy for the English auction with a POSC and a PLSC. The
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construction is similar to how an equilibrium bidding strategy for the English
auction is characterized in [43].
Lemma 5.3.3. Let p1 ≤ p2 ≤ . . . ≤ pN−1 be the prices at which buyers drop
out. Define q1 ≤ q2 ≤ . . . ≤ qN−1 recursively as follows:
q1 ,
{
b : s
(
α, b, b, . . . , b︸ ︷︷ ︸
N times
)
= p1
}
,
qk ,
{
b : s
(
α, b, b, . . . , b︸ ︷︷ ︸
N-k+1 times
, qk−1, qk2 , . . . , q1
)
= pk
}
, for 2 ≤ k ≤ N − 1.
(5.29)
Let the strategy of each buyer n be defined recursively as follows:
βNn (yn) = s
(
α, yn, yn, . . . , yn︸ ︷︷ ︸
N times
)
,
βkn(yn, pN−k, pN−k−1, . . . , p1) = s
(
α, yn, yn, . . . , yn︸ ︷︷ ︸
k times
, qN−k, qN−k−1, . . . , q1
)
for 2 ≤ k ≤ N − 1. (5.30)
Then (β1,β2, . . . ,βN) is a symmetric perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE) of
the English auction with the POSC determined by α. A symmetric PBE of
the English auction with the PLSC determined by α is characterized similarly
by defining the qk’s and the β
k
n’s using t(α, y1, z).
Proof. We only give the proof for the English auction with a POSC. The
proof for the English auction with a PLSC is similar.
Assume that each buyer n > 1 use the strategy βn. We will show that an
optimal response of buyer 1 is to use the strategy β1. Notice that the qk’s
are well-defined as s(α, y1, z) is increasing in y1 and nondecreasing in z.
Since each buyer n > 1 uses the same increasing strategy βn, if buyer
1 wins the auction, then it is straightforward to verify that qk = zN−k for
1 ≤ k ≤ N −1, where zN−k is the (N −k)th highest signal from the signals of
the buyers 2, 3, . . . , N . Thus, the qk’s are inverse mappings that compute the
signals of the buyers who drop out from the prices at which they do so. The
price that buyer 1 pays upon winning is equal to s(α, z1, z). Buyer 1 cannot
influence the price he pays if he wins the auction. From (5.26) and Lemma
5.3.2, the expected utility of buyer 1 is positive if y1 > z1 (here, s(α, y1, z) >
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s(α, z1, z)) and negative if y1 < z1 (here, s(α, y1, z) < s(α, z1, z)).
Suppose y1 > z1. Any strategy by which buyer 1 wins gives him the
same positive expected utility, while the utility is zero if he drops out. In
particular, if buyer 1 uses the strategy β1, he wins the auction. Hence, β1 is
optimal if y1 > z1. Next, if y1 < z1, then any strategy by which buyer 1 wins
gives him the same negative expected utility, while the utility is zero if he
drops out. By following the strategy β1, buyer 1 drops out; more specifically,
if his signal is the lth highest, where l ≥ 2, then buyer 1 will be (N − l)th to
drop out. Thus, β1 is optimal if y1 < z1. This completes the proof.
As in Section 5.2.1, we assume in the case of POSC that the seller allows
the buyers to submit negative bids and always charges the winning buyer the
price at which the second to last buyer drops out, even if it is negative. By
contrast, the equilibrium bids in the PLSC are always positive.
The English auction has been shown to have infinitely many symmetric
equilibria in the model of Milgrom and Weber [43]; see, e.g., [55]. However,
all these equilibria are equivalent in the sense that they result in a two-stage
procedure: the buyers with the lowest N−2 signals drop out and reveal their
signals in this process and then the last two buyers carry out the second price
auction while taking into account the lowest N − 2 signals. In particular, all
such equilibria agree on the price at which the second to last buyer drops out,
hence the seller’s revenue does not depend on the choice of the equilibrium. A
similar result, along the lines of [55], can be obtained for the English auction
with a POSC and a PLSC in our model. We omit the details here.
The seller’s expected revenues from the auction stage and from the profit
sharing stage are same as the expected payments made by buyer 1 in the
auction stage and in the profit sharing stage, respectively, conditioned on
him winning the auction. In the symmetric equilibrium given by Lemma
5.3.3, buyer 1 wins if his signal is highest among all the buyers. In a POSC
with the share fraction α, the seller’s expected revenue from the auction
stage is E [s(α,Z1,Z)|Y1 > Z1], his expected revenue from the POSC stage is
E
[
α [X1 − s(α,Z1,Z)]+ |Y1 > Z1
]
, and his expected total revenue from both
stages, denoted by Rposceng (α), is:
Rposceng (α) , E
[
s(α,Z1,Z) + α [X1 − s(α,Z1,Z)]+ |Y1 > Z1
]
, (5.31)
where s(α, y1, z) is given by (5.26). In a PLSC with the share fraction α,
115
the seller’s expected revenue from the auction stage is E [t(α,Z1,Z)|Y1 > Z1],
his expected revenue from the PLSC stage is E [α(X1 − t(α,Z1,Z))|Y1 > Z1],
and his expected total revenue from both stages, denoted by Rplsceng (α), is:
Rplsceng (α) , E [αX1 + (1− α)t(α,Z1,Z)|Y1 > Z1] , (5.32)
where t(α, y1, z) is defined by (5.27). Taking α = 0 corresponds to the English
auction with only a one-time payment, and so Rplsceng (0) = R
posc
eng (0).
Proposition 5.3.1 below extends the results of Propositions 5.2.1-5.2.3 to
the English auction.
Proposition 5.3.1. The following statements hold in an English auction
with weakly risk averse buyers:
(i) In the POSC, the seller’s expected revenue from the auction stage (possi-
bly negative) is decreasing in the share fraction α; the expected revenue
from the POSC stage is positive and increasing in the share fraction
α; and the expected total revenue from the two stages is positive and
nondecreasing in the share fraction α, i.e., for any 0 ≤ α < α̂ < 1,
Rposceng (α̂) ≥ Rposceng (α) > 0. (5.33)
(ii) In the PLSC, the seller’s expected revenue from the auction stage is
positive and increasing in the share fraction α; the expected revenue
from the PLSC stage is positive; and the expected total revenue from
the two stages is positive and increasing in the share fraction α, i.e.,
for any 0 ≤ α < α̂ < 1,
Rplsceng (α̂) > R
plsc
eng (α). (5.34)
(iii) The PLSC with a share fraction α generates higher expected total rev-
enue than the POSC with a share fraction α; i.e., for any α ∈ (0, 1),
Rplsceng (α) ≥ Rposceng (α). (5.35)
In particular, the expected total revenue from the two stages in the POSC or
PLSC is higher than the expected revenue from the English auction with only
a one-time payment.
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Proof. The proof of the first part of the claim follows a sequence of arguments
similar to that in the proof of Proposition 5.2.1. The necessary intermedi-
ate steps are now obtained by using Lemma 5.3.1, (5.26), and the concavity
of u; paralleling the use of Lemma 5.2.1, (5.1), and the concavity of u to
prove Proposition 5.2.1. The proof of the second part of the claim follows
a sequence of arguments similar to that in the proof of Proposition 5.2.2.
The necessary intermediate steps are now obtained by using Lemma 5.3.1
and (5.27), paralleling the use of Lemma 5.2.1 and (5.10) to prove Propo-
sition 5.2.2. The proof of the third part of the claim follows a sequence of
arguments similar to that in the proof of Proposition 5.2.3. The necessary
intermediate steps are now obtained by using Lemma 5.3.1, (5.26), (5.27),
and the concavity of u; paralleling the use of Lemma 5.2.1, (5.1), (5.10), and
the concavity of u to prove Proposition 5.2.3.
5.4 Discussion
This section describes some extensions of the model and results of the pre-
vious sections.
Discounting and multiperiod profit realization: Our results for POSC
and PLSC extend directly to the case in which the seller and each buyer
discount the return from the resource relative to the auction stage payment
using a common discount factor. If the return from the resource is generated
over multiple periods, then our results extend for the PLSC by substituting
the discounted sum of per period return for the variable X1 in our analysis.
A subtlety arises in the multiple period case for the POSC: Is the winning
buyer required to share a positive profit earned period by period, or is he
instead required to share only based upon the net discounted profit over all
of the periods? The distinction is simply that a positive profit in one period
may be canceled by a loss in a subsequent period. Our analysis extends in
the case of POSC if a buyer is taxed based upon discounted net profit; i.e.,
the winning buyer can apply losses in some periods to cancel profits in other
periods, as is common in tax law.15
15For 1 ≤ t ≤ T , let the random variable Xn(t) be the return from the resource to buyer
n in time period t and δ ∈ (0, 1] be the common discount factor. If buyer 1 wins the auction,
makes a payment b in the auction stage, and reports a preliminary profit X1(t) − b(t) in
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Revenue comparison for the second price and the English auctions:
Milgrom and Weber [43] show that the English auction generates at least as
much revenue as the second price auction in the symmetric interdependent
values model with affiliated signals and risk neutral buyers. This ranking
remains true for risk averse buyers as long as the utility function of each
buyer has the form of a constant absolute risk aversion (CARA) function;
i.e., u(x) = A(1 − exp(−cx)), where A > 0 and c > 0. We now show that
this ranking holds for the PLSC but not necessarily for the POSC.
For a given share fraction α, a buyer values the resource in the PLSC as
u˜(x) , u((1 − α)x); the function u˜(x) then determines his bids in both the
English and the second price auction. If u(x) is linear (as in the case of
risk neutrality) or a CARA function, then u˜(x) is also linear or a CARA
function, respectively. Let tsp(α, y1, z1) denote the strategy function defined
by (5.10) for the second price auction with the PLSC determined by α and
teng(α, y1, z) denote the strategy function defined by (5.27) for the English
auction with the PLSC determined by α. Assuming that X1, Y1, Y2, . . . , YN
are affiliated, the arguments in [43] imply that if u˜(x) is linear or a CARA
function,
tsp(α, y1, z1) ≤ E [teng(α, y1, z1,Z−1)|Y1 = y1, Z1 = z1] .
This inequality together with affiliation imply that for y1 > z1,
tsp(α, z1, z1) ≤ E [teng(α, z1, z1,Z−1)|Y1 = z1, Z1 = z1]
≤ E [teng(α, z1, z1,Z−1)|Y1 = y1, Z1 = z1] ,
⇒ E [αX1 + (1− α)tsp(α,Z1, Z1)|Y1 > Z1]
≤ E [αX1 + (1− α)teng(α,Z1,Z)|Y1 > Z1] ,
⇒ Rplscsp (α) ≤ Rplsceng (α).
The expected total revenue from the English auction with a PLSC is therefore
higher than the expected total revenue from the second price auction with
time period t, then the b(t)’s must satisfy b =
∑T
t=1 δ
tb(t). The total profit of buyer 1 from
T time periods, relative to the auction stage payment, is (1−α)(∑Tt=1 δtX1(t)− b) in the
PLSC and is
∑T
t=1 αδ
t [X1(t)− b(t)]+ in the POSC with period by period profit sharing.
The subtlety with the POSC arises because
∑T
t=1 αδ
t [X1(t)− b(t)]+ ≥ α[
∑T
t=1 δ
tX1(t)−
b]+, for T ≥ 2.
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the same PLSC.
In the POSC, however, a buyer uses the function û(x) , u(x − α [x]+)
to determine his bid which is not necessarily linear or CARA even if u(x)
has one of these properties. As a consequence, the revenue ranking of the
English auction and the second price auction depends upon the underlying
distribution of the random variables (X1,Y).
Limits on the choice of the share fraction: Both the POSC and the
PLSC share the property that the seller can obtain an arbitrarily large frac-
tion of the surplus generated by the resource by choosing the share fraction
α that is sufficiently close to one. We noted in the chapter introduction,
however, that the choice of α may be constrained by the need to provide
incentives to the winning buyer for the proper development of the resource;
Section 5.6 provides a formal analysis of PSCs along these lines. Here, we
enumerate a number of other factors that may constrain a seller in his choice
of the share fraction α.
A seller-nation, for instance, may be constrained by law or philosophy con-
cerning its proper role in private enterprise. This is related to the incentives
to the winning buyer, for a common argument against state-run businesses
concerns their long-run incentives for efficient operation. In the 3G spectrum
auction in India, for instance, the spectrum usage shares retained by the gov-
ernment are in the range of 3-8% (see [41]). It is increasingly common for
nations to retain significant ownership shares in natural resources such as oil
and minerals, e.g., in the 2005 Libyan auction, production shares retained
by the government ranged from 61.1-89.2% [39]. A buyer may also have an
outside option that bounds below the amount of profit he must expect to
earn in order to participate in the auction. Finally, we model the seller as
risk neutral; if he is instead strictly risk averse, then his optimal choice of
the share fraction α will share the risk of the venture between the seller and
the winning buyer.
An alternative perspective on our work is to interpret the share fraction
α as a tax rate. Limited taxes on corporate earnings are common, and
so a converse question must be asked: Do existing taxes on a corporation’s
earnings increase the government’s revenue despite the fact that it diminishes
the value of obtaining a resource to a corporate bidder and thereby decreases
its bid in the auction? Our work shows that the revenue from a variety of
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forms of corporate income taxes can outweigh the negative effect of taxes on
bids for government resources.16
5.5 General Profit Sharing Contracts
This section leverages the intuition gained from Section 5.2 to study the
revenue consequences of a general class of PSCs. The discussion here is
restricted to the second price auction; the results, however, easily extend to
the English auction, in the same way that Section 5.3 extends the results of
Section 5.2 to the English auction.
Consider a PSC φ : R → R. If the winning buyer makes a payment b
at the end of the auction stage and the value of the resource is revealed to
be x, then the payment he makes to the seller in the profit sharing stage is
φ(x − b). The function φ is an admissible PSC if it satisfies the following
properties:
(i) φ(w) is nondecreasing in w and w − φ(w) is increasing in w.
(ii) φ(0) = 0 and limw→∞ φ(w) =∞.
(iii) φ is continuous on R.
Property (i) says that the payment made to the seller in the profit sharing
stage is nondecreasing in the preliminary profit. Moreover, the total profit of
the winning buyer is increasing in the preliminary profit. Property (ii) says
that if the preliminary profit is zero then no payment is made to the seller,
and a large payment is made to the seller if the preliminary profit is large.
Notice that φ(w) = α [w]+ corresponds to the POSC determined by α and
φ(w) = αw corresponds to the PLSC determined by α. Both POSCs and
PLSCs are admissible PSCs for α ∈ (0, 1).
Given an admissible PSC φ, define a function s : I2Y 7→ R, similar to (5.1)
and (5.10), as follows:
s(y1, z1;φ) , {b : E [u(X1 − b− φ(X1 − b))|Y1 = y1, Z1 = z1] = 0} . (5.36)
16Unlike corporate income taxes, a PSC can be designed for a specific resource sale. It
can also be used in conjunction with existing corporate taxes. See [56] for an analysis
of the effect of income taxes upon government auction revenue in an independent private
values model with risk neutral buyers.
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Since X1−b−φ(X1−b) is decreasing and continuous in b, there is a unique b
that makes the expectation in (5.36) equal to zero. Hence s(y1, z1;φ) is well-
defined. As in the proof of Lemma 5.2.2, it can be shown that s(y1, z1;φ)
is increasing in y1 and nondecreasing in z1. Moreover, paralleling the proof
of Lemma 5.2.3, the strategy βn(yn) , s(yn, yn;φ) for all n can be shown to
constitute a symmetric BNE of the second price auction with an admissible
PSC φ. The seller’s expected total revenue from the auction stage and the
profit sharing stage combined, denoted by Rsp(φ), is:
Rsp(φ) , E [s(Z1, Z1;φ) + φ(X1 − s(Z1, Z1;φ))|Y1 > Z1] . (5.37)
Denote the revenue from the second price auction with only a one-time pay-
ment (i.e., φ(w) = 0 for all w) by Rsp(0) = E [s(Z1, Z1; 0)|Y1 > Z1].17 Also,
notice that Rsp(0) = R
posc
sp (0) = R
plsc
sp (0), where R
posc
sp is given by (5.5) and
Rplscsp is given by (5.13).
The Proposition 5.5.1 below summarizes the revenue consequences of the
second price auction with an admissible PSC. The proof is outlined in Sec-
tion 5.8.1.
Proposition 5.5.1. The following statements holds for the second price auc-
tion with an admissible PSC φ and weakly risk averse buyers:
(i) Rsp(φ) ≥ Rsp(0) > 0.
(ii) If there exists some α ∈ (0, 1) such that φ(w + δ) − φ(w) ≤ αδ for all
w and δ, then Rsp(φ) ≤ Rplscsp (α), where Rplscsp (α) is given by (5.13).
As pointed out in chapter introduction, there are many factors that can go
into choosing a PSC. However, Proposition 5.5.1 shows that for any admis-
sible PSC, the seller’s expected total revenue from the two stages is positive
and is higher than the revenue from the second price auction with only a
one-time payment. Moreover, if the payment rate to the seller in the profit
sharing stage is bounded from above by some α ∈ (0, 1) (e.g., if φ′(w) ≤ α
for all w), then the seller’s expected total revenue is bounded above by the
PLSC determined by α. This is a sense in which restricting attention to
PLSCs among admissible PSCs need not diminish the expected revenue of
the seller.
17φ(w) = 0 for all w is not an admissible PSC as it does not satisfy limw→∞ φ(w) =∞.
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5.6 Principal-Agent Relationship and PSCs
This section explores how the necessity of providing incentives to the winning
buyer for developing the resource affects the choice of the share fraction α for
the PLSC. As noted in chapter introduction, the seller may need the expertise
of the winning buyer in developing the resource. The effort of the winning
buyer may not be fully observable to the seller. The auction and subse-
quent sharing contract are then components in a principal-agent relationship
that must address the incentives provided to the winning buyer. While a
comprehensive analysis of auctions with general PSCs in a principal-agent
relationship is beyond the scope of this chapter, we focus here on analyzing
the revenue consequences of the PLSC in a principal-agent relationship. We
first show that a one-time payment (i.e., α = 0) can never be revenue opti-
mal in the principal-agent relationship: a PLSC with a small share fraction α
gives a higher expected total revenue to the seller than the auction with only
a one-time payment. Next, we show through an example that if sufficiently
large gains can be realized by the winning buyer’s effort, then the revenue
maximizing share fraction α is strictly less than one. We conclude with some
discussion on extending the analysis to the case of POSC. Again, the pre-
sentation here is restricted to the second price auction; the results, however,
easily extend to the English auction.
Following [52], assume that the winning buyer exerts an effort e ∈ E ⊂ R
to obtain an additive improvement in the realized value of the resource; i.e.,
if buyer n wins and exerts an effort e, then the value of the resource to him
is a realization of the random variable Xn + e. We use the term nominal
value to denote a realization of Xn and effort-generated value to denote a
realization of Xn + e. The seller can verify the effort-generated value but not
the effort e itself. The randomness in the nominal value conceals the winning
buyer’s effort from the seller, thereby preventing the seller from enforcing the
effort that he deems optimal.18 Let c(e) be the monetary cost to the winning
buyer of providing the effort e. The cost function c is the same for each buyer
n and is known to the seller. However, since the effort e is unverifiable, the
cost c(e) cannot be verified by the seller and hence cannot be included in
18We assume in this section that Xn is a continuous random variable. If Xn is discrete,
then the seller might infer the effort e from knowing the discrete values that Xn can take
and the realization of Xn + e.
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the PLSC; the winning buyer bears the full cost of exerting an effort. If the
winning buyer makes a payment b at the end of the auction stage, exerts an
effort e, and the nominal value of the resource to him is x, then the payment
he makes in the second stage in the PLSC with share fraction α is α(x+e−b)
and his total profit is:
x+ e− b− α(x+ e− b)− c(e) = (1− α)(x− b) + (1− α)e− c(e). (5.38)
This implies that the winning buyer’s optimum effort must maximize (1 −
α)e− c(e) and can therefore be chosen independently of his signal as well as
any other information he acquires from participating in the auction.
We make the following regularity assumptions on the cost function and
the information structure in addition to those made in Section 5.1:
Assumption 5.6.1. The set IX of possible values of the random variable
X1, the set IY of possible values of the random variable Y1, and the set E of
possible choices of effort e are closed and bounded subintervals of R.
Assumption 5.6.2. For any continuous function h : R 7→ R, an’s, and
bn’s such that an, bn ∈ IY and an ≤ bn for all n, the conditional expectation
E [h(X1)|Y1 ∈ [a1, b1], Y2 ∈ [a2, b2], . . . , YN ∈ [aN , bN ]] is continuous in the an’s
and bn’s whenever it exists.
Assumption 5.6.3. The cost function c is nonnegative, increasing, convex,
and continuously differentiable. Furthermore, the marginal cost c′(e) satisfies
infe∈E c′(e) < 1 and supe∈E c
′(e) > 1.
Assumption 5.6.1 insures that an optimum effort exists and is finite. As-
sumptions 5.6.1 and 5.6.2 allow the derivate to be moved inside the expec-
tation in the proofs in Section 5.8.2. Assumption 5.6.3 is standard for cost
functions; it also avoids the trivial scenario where the optimum effort is al-
ways an end point of E and does not depend on the share fraction α.
Because of Assumptions 5.6.1 and 5.6.3, there exists for each α ∈ [0, 1) a
unique effort e(α) that maximizes (1− α)e− c(e). The optimum effort e(α)
is nonincreasing in the share fraction α; a higher share fraction α reduces the
incentive for the winning buyer to exert effort to improve the value realized
from the resource. Let κ(α) denote the net gain to the winning buyer from
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exerting the optimum effort:
κ(α) , max
e∈E
(
(1− α)e− c(e)) = (1− α)e(α)− c(e(α)). (5.39)
The total profit of the winning buyer under the optimum effort, given that
he makes a payment b at the end of the auction stage and the nominal value
of the resource is x, equals (1− α)(x− b) + κ(α).
As in Section 5.2.2, we (re)define the function t : [0, 1)×I2Y → R that will
be used to characterize the bidding strategies of the buyers:
t(α, y1, z1) , {b : E [u ((1− α)(X1 − b) + κ(α)) |Y1 = y1, Z1 = z1] = 0} .
(5.40)
The function t(α, y1, z1) is well-defined. It is continuous in y1 and z1 by As-
sumption 5.6.2, increasing in y1, and nondecreasing in z1. Paralleling the
proof of Lemma 5.2.6, the strategy βn(yn) , t(α, yn, yn) for all n can be
shown to constitute a symmetric BNE of the second price auction with the
PLSC given by α and the above principal-agent relationship. The seller’s ex-
pected revenue from the auction stage is E [t(α,Z1, Z1)|Y1 > Z1], his expected
revenue from the PLSC stage is E [α(X1 + e(α)− t(α,Z1, Z1))|Y1 > Z1], and
his expected total revenue from both stages under the principal-agent rela-
tionship, denoted by Rplscsp−pa(α), is:
Rplscsp−pa(α) , E [αX1 + αe(α) + (1− α)t(α,Z1, Z1)|Y1 > Z1] , (5.41)
where t(α, y1, z1) is given by (5.40).
Proposition 5.6.1 below shows that the expected total revenue Rplscsp−pa(α) is
strictly increasing in α for α near zero. Even with the necessity of providing
incentives for effort to the winning buyer, it is therefore always the case that a
PLSC with a small positive share fraction α produces a greater expected total
revenue for the seller than a second-price auction with a one-time payment.
The proof is in Section 5.8.2.
Proposition 5.6.1. The following inequality holds for the second price auc-
tion with a PLSC and weakly risk averse buyers in the presence of the principal-
agent relationship:
dRplscsp−pa(α)
dα
∣∣
α=0
> 0.
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The following example provides insight into the expected revenueRplscsp−pa(α)
as a function of the share fraction α.
Example 5.6.1. Consider two risk neutral buyers. The random variables
Y1 and Y2, denoting the signals of the buyers, are independent and uniformly
distributed in [0, 1]. Given the signals (y1, y2), the random variables X1 and
X2, denoting the nominal value of the resource to the buyers, are independent
and uniformly distributed in [0, y1 + y2]. By definition, Z1 = Y2. The cost
function c(e) equals γe2 for some γ > 0.
It is straightforward to verify that
e(α) =
1− α
2γ
, κ(α) =
(1− α)2
4γ
, t(α, y1, z1) =
y1 + z1
2
+
1− α
4γ
. (5.42)
Thus, buyer 1 bids y1 + (1 − α)/(4γ) if his signal is y1 and buyer 2 bids
y2 + (1 − α)/(4γ) if his signal is y2. The seller’s expected revenue from the
auction stage is:
E [min(Y1, Y2)] +
1− α
4γ
=
1
3
+
1− α
4γ
.
The seller’s expected revenue from the PLSC stage is:
E
[
α
(
X1 + e(α)− Y2 − 1− α
4γ
) ∣∣∣∣Y1 > Y2]
= 2αE
[(
X1 − Y2 + 1− α
4γ
)
1{Y1>Y2}
]
.
Since E
[
X11{Y1>Y2}|Y1, Y2
]
= (Y1 + Y2)1{Y1>Y2}/2, the above expression can
be further simplified to
α(1− α)
4γ
+ αE
[
(Y1 − Y2)1{Y1>Y2}
]
=
α(1− α)
4γ
+ α
∫ 1
0
∫ 1
y2
(y1 − y2)dy1dy2 = α(1− α)
4γ
+
α
6
.
The seller’s expected total revenue is:
Rplscsp−pa(α) =
1
3
+
1− α
4γ
+
α(1− α)
4γ
+
α
6
=
1
3
+
1
4γ
+
α
6
− α
2
4γ
. (5.43)
The right-hand side of (5.43) is maximized at α = γ/3.
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We make the following observations concerning this example:
(i) If the cost parameter γ is sufficiently small (i.e., γ < 3), then the share
fraction α = γ/3 that maximizes the seller’s expected total revenue is
strictly less than one. From (5.42), the optimum effort e(α) increases
as γ decreases. A small value of γ models the case in which output per
monetary cost of effort is relatively high. This results in a large effort-
generated value of the resource and in turn higher bids in the auction
stage. The seller in this case prefers to provide a greater incentive to
develop the resource by choosing a small share fraction α and reaps the
benefits through a higher auction stage revenue together with a larger
expected effort-generated value.
(ii) If the cost parameter γ is large (i.e., γ ≥ 3), then the seller’s expected
total revenue is increasing in the share fraction α for α ∈ [0, 1). In this
case, the gain from exerting effort is small and the dependence of the
revenue on the share fraction α is on the lines of the results of Section
5.2.2.
(iii) The expected total revenue is strictly increasing in α for α ∈ [0,min(γ/3, 1)).
As shown more generally in Proposition 5.6.1, the share fraction α = 0
is never revenue optimal for γ > 0.
A complication arises in analyzing the auction with a POSC in the presence
of the principal-agent relationship. A key simplification in the case of PLSC
is that the optimum effort of the winning buyer depends on the share fraction
α and the cost function but not on the signals or values of the buyers. The
winning buyer therefore does not need to draw any inference from the auction
stage in order to select his effort. In contrast to (5.38), the winning buyer’s
total profit in a POSC is:
x+ e− b− α [x+ e− b]+ − c(e). (5.44)
Because the sign of x+ e− b depends on the nominal value x, the optimum
effort e may depend upon x or the winning buyer’s beliefs about x.
We consider two alternative stages in the POSC at which the winning buyer
chooses his effort. It is perhaps most plausible to assume that he chooses
his effort after winning the auction but before the realization of the nominal
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value. His choice of effort in this case depends upon his beliefs about the
nominal value, which may be influenced by any inference that he can draw
from the price that he pays in the auction stage. Assuming that all buyers use
the same symmetric increasing bidding strategy, the winning buyer can infer
the second highest signal from the price. His choice of effort therefore depends
upon the equilibrium bidding strategy, and the equilibrium bidding strategy
depends upon the expected profit that will be generated when effort is chosen
optimally. The bidding strategy and the subsequent choice of the optimum
effort are in this way tightly coupled and must be derived simultaneously,
which is difficult.
Alternatively, consider the case in which the winning buyer observes the
realization of his nominal value before choosing his effort. While this case
is admittedly restrictive as a model of a principal and an agent, it retains
the essential features of the hidden action and consequent moral hazard that
distinguishes this relationship; we explore this special case in the hope that
its results may generalize to richer models. The nominal value observed by
the winning buyer outweighs any information that can be inferred from bids
and the optimum effort again becomes independent of the bidding strategy.
Under the assumption that the winning buyer observes the nominal value of
the resource before choosing his effort, the equilibrium characterization of the
second price auction with a POSC and the principal-agent relationship can be
carried out for our general model with weakly risk averse buyers and a convex
cost function. We restrict attention here to the setting of Example 5.6.1 to
numerically compute the revenue in the case of POSC and for simplicity of
the presentation.
The winning buyer’s total profit in the case of POSC is given by (5.44).
Let e(α, x − b) denote his optimum effort, given the share fraction α, the
nominal value of the resource x, and the payment b in the auction stage. A
case by case analysis can be used to solve for e(α, x− b),19 resulting in:
e(α, x− b) =

1
2γ
if x− b ≤ − 1
2γ
,
b− x if x− b ∈
(
− 1
2γ
,−1−α
2γ
)
,
1−α
2γ
if x− b ≥ −1−α
2γ
.
(5.45)
19It is helpful in this derivation to notice that e − γe2 is increasing for e ≤ 1/(2γ)
and decreasing otherwise; and (1 − α)e − γe2 is increasing in e for e ≤ (1 − α)/(2γ) and
decreasing otherwise.
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By contrast, the optimum effort in the case of PLSC is always equal to
(1−α)/(2γ), which is smaller than the optimum effort e(α, x− b) in the case
of POSC.
Let pi(α, x − b) denote the corresponding maximum total profit of the
winning buyer,
pi(α, x− b) , max
e≥0
[x+ e− b− α [x+ e− b]+ − γe2]
= x+ e(α, x− b)− b− α [x+ e(α, x− b)− b]+ − γ(e(α, x− b))2.
(5.46)
Since x + e − b − α [x+ e− b]+ − γe2 is increasing in x − b, pi(α, x − b) is
increasing in x− b.
Paralleling (5.40), we (re)define the function s : [0, 1)× I2Y → R that will
be used to characterize the bidding strategies of the buyers in the case of
POSC:
s(α, y1, y2) , {b : E [pi(α,X1 − b)|Y1 = y1, Y2 = y2] = 0} . (5.47)
As in the proof of Lemma 5.2.3, the strategy βn(yn) , s(α, yn, yn) for all n
can be shown to constitute a symmetric BNE of the second price auction with
a POSC given by α. The seller’s expected total revenue from both stages,
denoted by Rposcsp−pa(α), is:
Rposcsp−pa(α) , E [s(α, Y2, Y2)
+α
[
X1 + e
(
α,X1 − s(α, Y2, Y2)
)− s(α, Y2, Y2)]+ |Y1 > Y2] , (5.48)
where s(α, y1, y2) is given by (5.47).
Using (5.45) and (5.47), one can numerically compute Rposcsp−pa(α). Figure
5.2 plots the expected total revenue from the POSC and the PLSC for Ex-
ample 5.6.1 for different values of the cost parameter γ. Three observations
can be made concerning this example:
(i) Numerical computations demonstrate that a POSC with a suitably
small share fraction α generates a higher expected revenue for the seller
than a one-time payment. This example therefore suggests that Propo-
sition 5.6.1 extends to the case of the POSC. The calculations also
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Figure 5.2: Revenue from the second price auction with a POSC and a PLSC as
a function of the share fraction α under the principal-agent relationship.
demonstrate that the revenue-maximizing share fraction α for the seller
is strictly less than one for sufficiently small values of the cost parame-
ter γ.
(ii) The difference between the winning buyer’s total profit in the POSC
and the PLSC for the same share fraction α and effort e is min{0, α(x+
e − b)}, which is the fraction of the loss that the seller absorbs in the
PLSC if the winning buyer suffers a loss. The marginal profit from
exerting effort can only be larger in the POSC than in the PLSC. As a
consequence, the winning buyer’s optimum effort can only be larger in
the POSC. A POSC is in this sense more effective for the seller than a
PLSC as a means of eliciting effort from the winning buyer.
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(iii) The larger optimum effort by the winning buyer in the POSC produces
a larger effort-generated value for the resource in comparison to the
PLSC. As a consequence, the revenue superiority of the PLSC over
the POSC can be reversed when the auction is followed by a principal-
agent relationship. The reversal of the revenue ranking is observed for
small values of γ and large values of α. For large values of the cost
parameter γ, the gain from exerting effort is small and the dependence
of the revenue on the share fraction α is on the lines of the results of
Proposition 5.2.3.
Point (i) supports this chapter’s emphasis on the advantages for the seller
of profit-sharing in comparison to a one-time payment. Point (ii) holds in
general for the POSC and the PLSC with this principal-agent model. Point
(iii) is a noteworthy point concerning the relative properties of the POSC
and the PLSC that may prove practically relevant to the seller’s design of
a PSC in the presence of the principal-agent relationship. The generality of
points (i) and (iii) beyond Example 5.6.1 and for a more richer principal-
agent model remains to be explored.
5.7 Chapter Summary
We have shown for the second price auction and the English auction that a
seller can increase his revenue from selling a resource by retaining a share
of the ex-post positive profit realized from the resource. The seller can gain
even further by committing ex-ante to share both losses and positive profits
with the winning buyer. Our analysis is conducted for a symmetric interde-
pendent values model that includes the cases of independent private values
and a pure common value as special cases, and we consider a range of differ-
ent sharing rules with which the seller retains a portion of the realized value
of the resource. The generality of the sharing rule is important both because
extraneous constraints may bind the seller in its selection and because the
sharing must provide the winning buyer with the proper incentives for devel-
oping and reporting upon the resource. While such incentives considerations
do influence the choice of the ex-post sharing rule, sharing a small fraction
of losses and positive profits with the winning buyer is always better for the
seller than no ex-post sharing.
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5.8 Proofs of Some Propositions
5.8.1 An Outline of the Proof of Proposition 5.5.1
To prove the first part of the claim, we start with the following lemma:
Lemma 5.8.1. For any admissible PSC φ,
s(y1, z1;φ) + E [φ(X1 − s(y1, z1;φ))|Y1 = y1, Z1 = z1] ≥ s(y1, z1; 0). (5.49)
Proof. The solution b to the equation E [u(X1 − b) | Y1 = y1, Z1 = z1] = 0
defines s(y1, z1; 0). Since E [u(X1 − b) | Y1 = y1, Z1 = z1] is strictly decreasing
in b, (5.49) is equivalent to
E [u(X1 − s(y1, z1;φ)− E [φ(X1 − s(y1, z1;φ))|Y1 = y1, Z1 = z1])
|Y1 = y1, Z1 = z1] ≤ 0. (5.50)
Let V be a random variable with probability distribution identical to the con-
ditional distribution of X1−s(y1, z1;φ) given Y1 = y1 and Z1 = z1. Establish-
ing inequality (5.50) is equivalent to showing that E [u(V − E [φ(V )])] ≤ 0.
The definition of s(y1, z1;φ) in (5.36) implies that E [u(V − φ(V ))] = 0. No-
tice that φ(V )− E [φ(V )] is nonnegative for large positive values of V , non-
positive for large negative values of V , and changes sign at most once. The
proof is then completed by an application of Lemma 5.2.4.
Lemma 5.8.1 and the properties of an admissible PSC can then be used to
establish the first part of the claim. The proof is similar to the use of Step 1
to prove Proposition 5.2.1 in the special case of α = 0 and α̂ ∈ (0, 1). The
following lemma is used to prove the second part of the claim:
Lemma 5.8.2. Let φ satisfy the condition of part (ii) of Proposition 5.5.1.
Then,
(1− α)t(α, y1, z1) + αE [X1|Y1 = y1, Z1 = z1] ≥
s(y1, z1;φ) + E [φ(X1 − s(y1, z1;φ))|Y1 = y1, Z1 = z1] , (5.51)
where t(α, y1, z1) is defined by (5.10).
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Proof. By the definition of t(α, y1, z1), inequality (5.51) is equivalent to
E [u((1− α)X1 − s(y1, z1;φ)− E [φ(X1 − s(y1, z1;φ))− αX1
|Y1 = y1, Z1 = z1])|Y1 = y1, Z1 = z1] ≥ 0. (5.52)
Let V be the random variable defined as in the proof of Lemma 5.8.1. Then
to establish inequality (5.52), we equivalently need to show that
E [u((1− α)V − E [φ(V )− αV ])] ≥ 0,
given E [u(V − φ(V ))] = 0. Notice that φ(V ) ≤ αV for V ≥ 0 and φ(V ) ≥
αV for V ≤ 0. The proof is then completed by an application of Lemma 5.2.4,
as in the proof of Step 1 of Proposition 5.2.3.
Notice that αX1−φ(X1− s(y1, z1;φ)) is nondecreasing in X1. The second
part of the claim is established using Lemma 5.8.2, paralleling the use of
Step 1 to prove Proposition 5.2.3.
5.8.2 Proof of Proposition 5.6.1
The proof is by explicitly computing the derivative of Rplscsp−pa(α) at α = 0.
We first verify that: the derivate with respect to α can be taken inside the
expectation in (5.41); and given any y1 and z1, the function t(α, y1, z1), define
by (5.40), is differentiable in α.
Throughout the rest of this section, we call a function differentiable on a
closed interval if it is differentiable in the interior of the interval, the right
derivative exists at the left end point of the interval, and the left derivative
exists at the right end point of the interval. By Assumption 5.6.3, there
exists  > 0 such that infe∈E c′(e) < 1 − . In rest of this section, this  is
kept fixed and α ∈ [0, ] below.
Lemma 5.8.3. Given any y1 and z1, the function t(α, y1, z1), defined by
132
(5.40), is continuously differentiable in α. Moreover,
∂t(α, y1, z1)
∂α
=
(
b− e(α)
1− α
− E [X1u
′ ((1− α)(X1 − b) + κ(α)) |Y1 = y1, Z1 = z1]
(1− α)E [u′ ((1− α)(X1 − b) + κ(α)) |Y1 = y1, Z1 = z1]
)
b=t(α,y1,z1)
.
(5.53)
Proof. For notational convenience, define a random variable V whose prob-
ability distribution is identical to the conditional distribution of X1 given
Y1 = y1 and Z1 = z1. Define a function µ(α, b) as follows:
µ(α, b) , E
[
u
(
(1− α)(V − b) + κ(α))] . (5.54)
We first show that the µ(α, b) is continuously differentiable and then use
the implicit function theorem to establish that the t(α, y1, z1) is continuously
differentiable with respect to α.
For α ∈ [0, ] the optimum effort in an interior point of E and e(α) =
(c′)−1(1−α). Hence e(α) and κ(α) are continuously differentiable in α, as is
u
(
(1− α)(V − b) + κ(α)). Given any b, define M1 as:
M1 , max
α∈[0,],v∈IX
∣∣∣∣∣∂u
(
(1− α)(v − b) + κ(α))
∂α
∣∣∣∣∣ . (5.55)
M1 is well-defined and finite as it is the maximum of a continuous function
over a compact set. From (5.54), given any b and 0 ≤ α˜ < α̂ ≤ ,∣∣∣∣µ(α̂, b)− µ(α˜, b)α̂− α˜
∣∣∣∣
≤ E
[∣∣∣∣∣u
(
(1− α̂)(V − b) + κ(α̂))− u((1− α˜)(V − b) + κ(α˜))
α̂− α˜
∣∣∣∣∣
]
. (5.56)
By the mean value theorem, for each V there is an α ∈ (α˜, α̂) such that
u
(
(1− α̂)(V − b) + κ(α̂))− u((1− α˜)(V − b) + κ(α˜))
α̂− α˜
=
∂u
(
(1− α)(V − b) + κ(α))
∂α
∣∣∣∣
α=α
. (5.57)
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Combining (5.55)-(5.57), we get∣∣∣∣µ(α̂, b)− µ(α˜, b)α̂− α˜
∣∣∣∣ ≤M1.
Then, by the dominated convergence theorem and (5.54),
∂µ(α, b)
∂α
= E
[
∂u
(
(1− α)(V − b) + κ(α))
∂α
]
= E [(b+ κ′(α)− V )u′ ((1− α)(V − b) + κ(α))] . (5.58)
A similar analysis shows that the function µ(α, b) is differentiable in b. More-
over,
∂µ(α, b)
∂b
= E
[
∂u
(
(1− α)(V − b) + κ(α))
∂b
]
= −(1− α)E [u′ ((1− α)(V − b) + κ(α))] . (5.59)
The right hand sides of (5.58) and (5.59) imply that µ(α, b) is continu-
ously differentiable and ∂µ(α, b)/∂b 6= 0. By definition, µ(α, b) = 0 for
b = t(α, y1, z1). Then, by the implicit function theorem, t(α, y1, z1) is contin-
uously differentiable in α, and
∂t(α, y1, z1)
∂α
= −
(
∂µ(α,b)
∂α
∂µ(α,b)
∂b
)
b=t(α,y1,z1)
=
(
b+ κ′(α)
1− α
− E [X1u
′ ((1− α)(X1 − b) + κ(α)) |Y1 = y1, Z1 = z1]
(1− α)E [u′ ((1− α)(X1 − b) + κ(α)) |Y1 = y1, Z1 = z1]
)
b=t(α,y1,z1)
.
(5.60)
Finally, by the envelope theorem, κ′(α) = −e(α). Substituting this in (5.60)
completes the proof.
Lemma 5.8.4. For any y1, z1, and α,
(1− α)∂t(α, y1, z1)
∂α
− t(α, y1, z1) + e(α) + E [X1|Y1 = y1, Z1 = z1] ≥ 0,
where the t(α, y1, z1) is defined by (5.40).
Proof. From [57], a single random variable is associated; hence for any pair
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of nondecreasing functions g1 and g2 and any random variable W ,
E [g1(W )g2(W )] ≥ E [g1(W )]E [g2(W )]
whenever the expectations exist. For the random variableX1, taking g1(X1) =
X1 and g2(X1) = −u′
(
(1 − α)(X1 − b) + κ(α)
)
, and noticing that −u′ is an
increasing function, we get
E [X1u′ ((1− α)(X1 − b) + κ(α)) |Y1 = y1, Z1 = z1]
E [u′ ((1− α)(X1 − b) + κ(α)) |Y1 = y1, Z1 = z1]
≤ E [X1|Y1 = y1, Z1 = z1] . (5.61)
Combining Lemma 5.8.3 with (5.61) completes the proof.
Since t(α, y1, z1) is continuously differentiable in α and continuous in y1
and z1, ∂t(α, y1, z1)/∂α is continuous in α, y1, and z1. As noted in the proof
of Lemma 5.8.3, e(α) is continuously differentiable. Hence, the function
λ(α, x1, z1) , αx1 + αe(α) + (1− α)t(α, z1, z1) is differentiable in α and the
derivate is continuous in α, x1, and z1. Using an analysis similar to the
proof of Lemma 5.8.3 allows us to change the order of expectation and the
derivative with respect to α in the right hand side of (5.40), resulting in
∂Rplscsp−pa(α)
∂α
= E
[
∂
(
αX1 + αe(α) + (1− α)t(α,Z1, Z1)
)
∂α
∣∣∣∣Y1 > Z1
]
= E
[
X1 + e(α) + αe
′(α)− t(α,Z1, Z1) + (1− α)∂t(α,Z1, Z1)
∂α
∣∣∣∣Y1 > Z1] .
(5.62)
To complete the proof of Proposition 5.6.1, it suffices to show that for y1 > z1,
E [X1|Y1 = y1, Z1 = z1] + e(0)− t(0, z1, z1) + ∂t(α, z1, z1)
∂α
∣∣∣∣
α=0
> 0. (5.63)
Using Lemma 5.8.4 with α = 0 and Y1 = z1, we get
E [X1|Y1 = y1, Z1 = z1] + e(0)− t(0, z1, z1) + ∂t(α, z1, z1)
∂α
∣∣∣∣
α=0
>
E [X1|Y1 = y1, Z1 = z1]− E [X1|Y1 = z1, Z1 = z1] . (5.64)
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Since E [X1|Y1 = y1, Z1 = z1] > E [X1|Y1 = z1, Z1 = z1] for y1 > z1, (5.63)
holds and the proof is complete.
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Chapter 6
Bidding with Securities
Chapter 5 proposed a two-stage payment rule for selling a resource. In the
first stage, buyers compete in terms of cash bids. The second stage is a
prespecified profit sharing contract where the payment is contingent on the
realized value of the resource. An alternative is to allow bids in the form of
securities whose values to the seller are tied to the eventual realized value of
the asset. For example, instead of simply soliciting cash bids for the asset,
a seller may require buyers to compete in terms of the equity share that the
seller retains of the asset’s profits. Other common securities that can be used
in bidding are debt and call options.
DeMarzo et al. [1] develops a general theory of bidding with securities in
the first price and the second price auctions. Bids are selected from a com-
pletely ordered family of securities and the paper focuses on the importance
of the design of the family of securities to the seller’s expected revenue. The
paper defines a partial ordering of families based on the notion of steepness
(to be made precise in Section 6.2) and shows that the steeper family of se-
curities provides higher expected revenue to the seller. Two assumptions are
made to prove this result: (i) buyers are risk-neutral ; (ii) the random vari-
ables through which values and signals of the buyers are realized are affiliated.
Risk neutrality is a severe restriction for a financial model. Affiliation is an
extremely restrictive form of positive dependence.1
Our objective in this chapter is to explore in the case of the second price
auction the dependence of the revenue ranking of families of securities upon
these two assumptions.2 We work with a symmetric interdependent values
1De Castro [58] shows that the set of affiliated probability density functions for two
random variables is the complement of an open and dense set in the space of continuous
probability density functions under an appropriate topology and has zero measure under
an appropriate measure.
2While we restrict to the case of the second price auction, [1] also ranks families of
securities in the case of the first price auction. An additional restriction on the set of
securities and the dependence of values and signals beyond affiliation is required in this
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model along the lines of Section 5.1 and risk averse buyers. We consider two
additional forms of positive dependence, namely, the monotone likelihood
ratio (henceforth, MLR) property, which is strictly weaker than affiliation;3
and first order stochastic dominance (henceforth, FOSD), which is strictly
weaker than the MLR property. Each of these three positive dependence
conditions has been extensively used in both auction theory and information
economics.
The main results of this chapter are the following:
(i) A steeper family of securities provides higher expected revenue to the
seller even with risk averse buyers and assuming that the values are
positively dependent on signals in the MLR sense. We in this sense
extend the result of [1] to the case of risk aversion.4
(ii) We show by an example that if the notion of positive dependence among
values and signals of buyers is relaxed further from MLR to FOSD, then
even for risk neutral buyers the revenue ranking of families of securities
of [1] no longer holds.
(iii) We present an appropriate modification of the revenue ranking of fami-
lies of securities that holds for risk averse or risk neutral buyers, and for
FOSD as the notion of positive dependence among values and signals.
This ranking is based upon a condition that we call strong steepness –
the strongly steeper family of securities provides higher expected rev-
enue to the seller.
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 6.1 outlines the model, no-
tation, and definitions used in this chapter. Section 6.2 extends the revenue
analysis (i.e., the log-supermodularity of each buyer’s expected profit, which is Assumption
C in the paper). Our interest in this chapter is in exploring the effect of relaxing the
assumption of affiliation and not restricting it further. We have not been able to carry out
the analysis for the first price auction at this level of generality.
3DeMarzo et al. [1] assumes the MLR property for the case of independent private
values and affiliation for the case of interdependent values. For independent private values,
the MLR property and affiliation are equivalent but not for interdependent values. Section
6.1 provides further details.
4It is also worth emphasizing that our proofs are more straightforward than those in
[1] and do not require its strong regularity assumption (Assumption B) on the probability
density of return conditioned on a buyers signal. We accomplish this mainly by exploiting
the properties of concave functions. Furthermore, since affiliation implies the MLR prop-
erty, a byproduct of our result is an extension of the result of [1] to a richer informational
environment.
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ranking of families of securities of [1] to risk averse buyers. Section 6.3 shows
that this ranking is not preserved under a more general form of positive de-
pendence, i.e., FOSD. A modification of the revenue ranking of families of
securities based on strong steepness is then presented. We conclude in Sec-
tion 6.4. Proofs of some propositions and intermediate lemmas appear in
Section 6.5.
6.1 Model, Notation, and Assumptions
Consider N buyers competing for a resource that a seller wants to sell. Each
buyer has a certain value for the resource that is unknown to him; however,
each buyer has some information (henceforth, signal) about the value of
the resource. The signal of a buyer is known only to him, but it may be
informative to other buyers in the sense that it may improve their respective
estimates of the value of the resource.
We model this by assuming that the value of the resource to a buyer n,
denoted by xn, is a realization of a nonnegative random variable Xn, unknown
to him. This is the profit to buyer n from developing the resource in the
absence of any payments to the seller, but after taking into account the
variable costs. A buyer n privately observes a signal yn through a realization
of a random variable Yn that is correlated with (X1, X2, . . . , XN). A winning
buyer needs to invest a fixed amount I > 0, which is the same for each buyer,
to develop the resource. As in [1], we assume that the realization of Xn is
observed ex-post by the seller and buyer n if buyer n wins and subsequently
uses the resource. The joint cumulative distribution function (CDF) of the
random variables Xn’s and Yn’s is common knowledge.
Let x , (x1, x2, . . . , xN) denote a vector of values; denote the random
vector (X1, X2, . . . , XN) by X. A vector of signals y and the random vector Y
are defined similarly. We use the standard game theoretic notation of x−n ,
(x1, . . . , xn−1, xn+1, . . . , xN). Similar interpretations are used for X−n, y−n,
and Y−n. Define the random variable Z1 as the largest among Y2, Y3, . . . , YN ;
i.e., Z1 , max(Y2, Y3, . . . , YN). Denote a realization of Z1 by z1.
Let FX,Y(x,y) denote the joint CDF of (X,Y). It is assumed to have the
following symmetry property:
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Assumption 6.1.1. The joint CDF of (Xn, Yn,Y−n), FXn,Yn,Y−n(xn, yn,y−n),
is identical for each n and is symmetric in its last N − 1 components (i.e., in
y−n).
Assumption 6.1.1 allows for a special dependence between the value of the
resource to a buyer and his own signal, while the identities of other buyers are
irrelevant to him. The model reduces to the independent private values model
if (Xn, Yn) is independent of (X−n,Y−n) for all n, to the pure common value
model if X1 = X2 = . . . = XN , and includes a continuum of interdependent
value models between these two extremes. Because of Assumption 6.1.1, the
subsequent assumptions and analysis are given from buyer 1’s viewpoint.
For each n, the set of possible values that Xn can take is assumed to be
an interval [x, x] and the set of possible values that Yn can take is assumed
to be an interval [y, y]. Assume that the joint probability density function
(pdf) of the random vector Y, denoted by fY(y), exists and is positive for all
y ∈ [y, y]N . By Assumption 6.1.1, fY(y) is symmetric in its N arguments.
Let larger numerical values of the signals correspond to more favorable
estimates of the value of the resource. There are several ways of formalizing
the idea that larger signals correspond to larger values of the resource. The
following three ways are commonly considered:
Definition 6.1.1 (Affiliation). Assume that the joint pdf of (X1,Y), denoted
by fX1,Y(x1,y), exists and is positive everywhere on [x, x] × [y, y]N . The
random variables (X1,Y) are affiliated if
fX1,Y((x1,y) ∨ (x̂1, ŷ))fX1,Y((x1,y) ∧ (x̂1, ŷ)) ≥ fX1,Y(x1,y)fX1,Y(x̂1, ŷ),
for any (x1,y) and (x̂1, ŷ) in the support of (X1,Y). Here “∨” denotes
coordinatewise maximum and “∧” denotes coordinatewise minimum.
Definition 6.1.2 (PD-MLR). Assume that for any y1 and z1, the pdf of X1
conditioned on Y1 = y1 and Z1 = z1, denoted by fX1|Y1=y1,Z1=z1(x1), exists
and is positive everywhere on [x, x]. The random variable X1 is positively
dependent (PD) on the random variables (Y1, Z1) in the maximum likelihood
ratio (MLR) sense if fX1|Y1=y1,Z1=z1(x1)/fX1|Y1=ŷn,Z1=ẑ1(x1) is nondecreasing
in x1 for any y1 ≥ ŷ1 and z1 ≥ ẑ1.
Definition 6.1.3 (PD-FOSD). The random variable X1 is positively de-
pendent (PD) on the random variables (Y1, Z1) in the first order stochastic
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dominance (FOSD) sense if for any x1, 1−FX1|Y1=y1,Z1=z1(x1) is nondecreas-
ing in y1 and z1, where FX1|Y1=y1,Z1=z1(x1) is the CDF of X1 conditioned on
Y1 = y1 and Z1 = z1.
Under Assumption 6.1.1, the following relationship between affiliation, PD-
MLR, and PD-FOSD is well known in the existing literature:5
Lemma 6.1.1. Affiliation implies PD-MLR and PD-MLR implies PD-FOSD.
Lemma 6.1.2. PD-FOSD is equivalent to E [h(X1)|Y1 = y1, Z1 = z1] being
nondecreasing in y1 and z1 for any nondecreasing function h : R 7→ R for
which the expectation exists.
Our focus is on comparing PD-MLR and PD-FOSD. Lemma 6.1.1 implies
that results obtained by assuming PD-FOSD hold if PD-MLR is assumed
instead, and results obtained by assuming PD-MLR hold if affiliation is
assumed instead.6 It is common in auction theory to justify the assump-
tion of either affiliation or the MLR property by citing the plausibility that
E [h(X1)|Y1 = y1, Z1 = z1] is nondecreasing in y1 and z1 for any nondecreas-
ing function h. However, the relationship in Lemma 6.1.1 does not go in the
reverse direction; PD-MLR is strictly stronger than PD-FOSD. Section 6.3
provides further details.
The buyers are assumed to be risk averse or risk neutral. Each buyer has
the same von Neumann-Morgenstern utility of money, denoted by u : R →
R, which is concave (possibly linear), increasing, and normalized so that
u(0) = 0. Henceforth, the term risk averse includes risk neutral behavior.
The seller is risk neutral. Conditioned on any y1 and z1, the expected utility
of the resource to buyer 1 without any payments is assumed to be positive;
i.e., E [u(X1 − I)|Y1 = y1, Z1 = z1] > 0. Thus, the buyers who compete for
the resource expect to make a positive profit from utilizing it.
As in [1], buyers bid with securities from some ordered family. Let Φ ,
{φ(·, b) | b ∈ [b, b]} be a family of securities parametrized by b. A bid b
of buyer 1 denotes his willingness to pay an amount φ(x1, b) to the seller
5Assumption 6.1.1 is used in showing that if the random variables (X1,Y) are affiliated
then so are the random variables (X1, Y1, Z1); see [43]. Lemma 6.1.1 then follows from
the known relationship between affiliation, MLR, and FOSD; see, e.g., [23]. We use the
prefix “PD-” with MLR or FOSD to indicate that positive dependence is assumed here in
reference to X1 and (Y1, Z1).
6DeMarzo et al. [1] assume a strict MLR property for the independent private values
case and strict affiliation for the interdependent values case.
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if X1 = x1. The interval [b, b] can be normalized to any arbitrary closed
interval, independently of φ, by translation and rescaling of the parameter b
in φ(·, b). The family Φ is assumed to satisfy the following conditions:
Assumption 6.1.2. For any b, φ(x1, b) is continuous and nondecreasing in
x1, and x1 − φ(x1, b) is nondecreasing and nonconstant in x1.
Assumption 6.1.2 says that the payment made to the seller is nondecreasing
in the realized value of the resource. Moreover, the profit of the winning buyer
is also nondecreasing in the realized value of the resource.
Assumption 6.1.3. For any y1 and z1,
(i) E [u(X1 − I − φ(X1, b))|Y1 = y1, Z1 = z1] is continuous and decreasing
in b, nonnegative for b = b, and nonpositive for b = b.
(ii) E [φ(X1, b)|Y1 = y1, Z1 = z1] is continuous and increasing in b.
Assumption 6.1.3 says the family of securities is completely ordered, in-
dependently of the realized signal vector. The seller prefers higher security
bids while the buyers prefer lower security bids. Assumption 6.1.3 is sat-
isfied if, e.g., for any x1, φ(x1, b) is increasing in b. The seller uses the
second price auction where the highest bidder wins and pays according to
the security bid of the second highest bidder. The boundary conditions in
Assumption 6.1.3(i) guarantee the existence of a pure strategy equilibrium
for the second price auction. Some common families of securities that satisfy
Assumptions 6.1.2 and 6.1.3 are: pure cash bid φ(x1, b) = b, b ∈ [0, x]; debt
φ(x1, b) = min(x1, b), b ∈ [0, x]; equity φ(x1, b) = bx1, b ∈ [0, 1]; and call
option φ(x1, b) = [x1 − x+ b]+ , b ∈ [0, x]. These families of securities are
shown in Figure 6.1.
Assumptions 6.1.1-6.1.3 are in place for rest of this chapter. For a compari-
son between two different families of securities, we use Ψ , {ψ(·, b) | b ∈ [b, b]}
to denote a family of securities different from Φ. All expectations and con-
ditional expectations of interest are assumed to exist and be finite. In any
further usage, x1, yn, and z1 are always in the support of random variables
X1, Yn, and Z1, respectively.
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Figure 6.1: Plot of some families of securities (pure cash bid, debt, equity,
and call option) for b
′
> b̂.
6.2 Risk Aversion
This section extends the result of [1] on revenue ranking of families of se-
curities to risk averse buyers. In a second price auction, a buyer n decides
how much to bid solely based on his signal yn. We look for a symmetric
equilibrium. We start by defining a function s(y1, z1; Φ) that will be used to
characterize the bidding strategies of the buyers:
s(y1, z1; Φ) , {b : E [u(X1 − I − φ(X1, b))|Y1 = y1, Z1 = z1] = 0}. (6.1)
The function s is well defined because of Assumption 6.1.3. If bids are
restricted to the family Φ, then s(y1, z1; Φ) is the highest bid that buyer 1 is
willing to submit conditioned on his signal being y1 and the highest signal of
other buyers being z1. Notice that the bid s(y1, z1; Φ) corresponds to buyer
1’s willingness to pay an amount φ(x1, s(y1, z1; Φ)) to the seller if X1 = x1.
The next lemma characterizes some important properties of the function s.
Lemma 6.2.1. Assuming PD-FOSD, the function s(y1, z1; Φ) is nondecreas-
ing in y1 and z1.
Proof. Since x1−I−φ(x1, b) is nondecreasing in x1 by Assumption 6.1.2 and
u is an increasing function, the claim follows immediately from Lemma 6.1.2.
To simplify the analysis in the rest of this chapter, we reinforce Lemma
6.2.1 with the following additional assumption:
Assumption 6.2.1. The family of securities and the informational environ-
ments are such that the function s(y1, z1; Φ) is increasing in y1.
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Assumption 6.2.1 greatly simplifies the analysis by ruling out the possi-
bility of ties among bids, which is therefore an event that we can ignore in
the remainder of the chapter. Assumption 6.2.1 is satisfied in most cases of
interest, e.g., if for any x1 ∈ (x, x), 1 − FX1|Y1=y1,Z1=z1(x1) is increasing in
y1. The results of this chapter hold without Assumption 6.2.1, though the
analysis is more complicated.
The next lemma characterizes an equilibrium bidding strategy for the sec-
ond price auction with bids restricted to the family Φ. The construction of
the bidding strategy is on the lines of [43].
Lemma 6.2.2. Let the strategies β1, β2, . . . , βN of the buyers be identical and
defined by βn(yn) , s(yn, yn; Φ) for all n. Assuming PD-FOSD, the strategy
vector (β1, β2, . . . , βN) is a symmetric Bayes-Nash equilibrium of the second
price auction with bids restricted to the family Φ.
Proof. Assume that each buyer n except buyer 1 uses the strategy βn(yn) =
s(yn, yn; Φ). We will show that the best response for buyer 1 is to use the
strategy β1(y1) = s(y1, y1; Φ).
Given y1, let buyer 1 bid b. Buyer 1 wins if b ≥ max{s(yn, yn; Φ) : 2 ≤ n ≤
N}. From Lemma 6.2.1, max{s(yn, yn; Φ) : 2 ≤ n ≤ N} = s(z1, z1; Φ), where
z1 = max{y2, y3, . . . , yN}. Thus, the expected utility of buyer 1 is given by:
E
[
u (X1 − I − φ(X1, s(Z1, Z1; Φ))) 1{b≥s(Z1,Z1;Φ)}|Y1 = y1
]
= E
[
E [u (X1 − I − φ(X1, s(Z1, Z1; Φ))) |Y1 = y1, Z1] 1{b≥s(Z1,Z1;Φ)}|Y1 = y1
]
.
From (6.1), E [u (X1 − I − φ(X1, s(y1, Z1; Φ))) |Y1 = y1, Z1] = 0, and from
Assumption 6.2.1, s(y1, z1; Φ) is increasing in y1. Hence, the inner expecta-
tion E [u (X1 − I − φ(X1, s(Z1, Z1; Φ))) |Y1 = y1, Z1] is positive for Z1 < y1
and negative for Z1 > y1. The expected utility of buyer 1 is uniquely maxi-
mized by setting b = s(y1, y1; Φ).
Because of symmetry, the seller’s expected revenue equals the expected
payment made by buyer 1 conditioned on him winning. In the symmetric
equilibrium given by Lemma 6.2.2, the bid of buyer 1 is the highest if and
only if his signal is the highest among all the buyers (i.e., y1 > z1). If
buyer 1 wins, his payment is determined by the second highest security bid
(i.e., s(z1, z1; Φ)). Thus, the seller’s expected revenue from the second price
auction with bids restricted to the family Φ is E [φ(X1, s(Z1, Z1; Φ))|Y1 > Z1].
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We next reformulate the definition of steepness from [1] using the concept
of quasi-monotonicity, as defined below:
Definition 6.2.1 (Quasi-monotone function). A function g(w) is quasi-
monotone if for any w and ŵ such that w > ŵ, if g(ŵ) > 0 then g(w) ≥ 0. A
quasi-monotone function therefore crosses zero at most once and from below.
Definition 6.2.2 (Steepness). A family of securities Φ is steeper than an-
other family of securities Ψ if for any b
′
, b̂ ∈ [b, b], φ(w, b′)− ψ(w, b̂) is quasi-
monotone in w.
Notice that call option is steeper than equity, which is steeper than debt,
which is steeper than cash (see Figure 6.1).7
Proposition 6.2.1 below gives a sufficient condition under which two dif-
ferent families of securities can be ranked according to the revenue they
generate. The proof is in Section 6.5.1.
Proposition 6.2.1. Let Φ and Ψ be two families of securities such that Φ
is steeper than Ψ. Assuming PD-MLR, the second price auction with bids
restricted to the family Φ generates at least as much expected revenue for the
seller as the second price auction with bids restricted to the family Ψ.
A careful review of the proof of Proposition 6.2.1 shows that we in fact
prove the stronger result that the expected revenue of the seller conditioned
on the winning buyer’s signal and the second highest signal is at least as
large in the case of the steeper family of securities Φ as with the family Ψ.
The revenue from the steeper family thus weakly dominates in this ex-post
sense, which implies that it is weakly better for the seller ex-ante as stated
in the proposition. This remark also applies to Proposition 6.3.2 in Section
6.3.
The following is an immediate consequence of Proposition 6.2.1:
Corollary 6.2.1. Assuming PD-MLR, the expected revenue from the fol-
lowing families of securities can be ranked as: pure cash bid ≤ debt ≤ equity
≤ call option.
The revenue ranking of families of securities of [1] is essentially Proposi-
tion 6.2.1 and Corollary 6.2.1 for risk neutral buyers.
7Quasi-monotonicity is not transitive and hence steepness is not transitive. Proposition
6.2.1 provides pairwise revenue ranking for any two families of securities that are ordered
under the steepness criteria. This revenue ranking, however, is transitive.
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6.3 Positive Dependence
This section addresses the role of the positive dependence assumption in the
ranking of families of securities. An example is first discussed that shows that
the ranking of Proposition 6.2.1 does not hold if PD-MLR is relaxed to PD-
FOSD.8 The pairwise ranking of the three families of securities – debt, equity,
and call options – is completely reversed in this example in comparison to the
ranking according to Corollary 6.2.1. If PD-MLR is relaxed to PD-FOSD,
the steepness condition must be strengthened in order to rank two families
of securities. This is accomplished by using the notion of strong steepness
that we define below.
Example 6.3.1. Consider two risk neutral buyers (i.e., u(w) = w) with
independent private values. Buyer n’s signal Yn is uniformly distributed in
the interval [0, 1]. Conditioned on Yn = yn, the random variable Xn, denoting
the value of buyer n, has the following conditional pdf:
fXn|Yn=yn(xn) =
{
1− yn + 6xnyn if 0 ≤ xn ≤ 13 ,
1 if 1
3
< xn ≤ 1.
(6.2)
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Figure 6.2: pdf of Xn conditioned on Yn = ŷn and conditioned on Yn = yn
for yn > ŷn.
Figure 6.2 shows the plot of fXn|Yn=yn(xn). The pair (Xn, Yn) are i.i.d.
across the buyers. Since there are only two buyers, Z1 = Y2 and FX1|Y1=y1,Z1=z1(x1)
8Interestingly, the example assumes independent private values among the buyers; it
does not rely upon interdependence of values and the problems of inference that it creates,
which is commonly the source of problems in models of trading.
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= FX1|Y1=y1(x1). The CDF FXn|Yn=yn(xn) is given by:
1− FXn|Yn=yn(xn) =
{
1− xn + yn(xn − 3x2n) if 0 ≤ xn ≤ 13 ,
1− xn if 13 < xn ≤ 1.
(6.3)
Since xn − 3x2n > 0 for xn ∈ [0, 1/3), 1 − FXn|Yn=yn(xn) is increasing in
yn for xn ∈ [0, 1/3) and is constant in yn for xn ∈ [1/3, 1]. Thus, Xn
is positively dependent on Yn in the FOSD sense and PD-FOSD is satis-
fied (in this example, X1 is independent of Z1 = Y2). However, for yn >
ŷn, fXn|Yn=yn(xn)/fXn|Yn=ŷn(xn) fails to be nondecreasing in xn; the ratio
is strictly greater than one for xn ∈ (1/6, 1/3] and is equal to one for
xn ∈ [1/3, 1]. Thus, PD-MLR is not satisfied.
Example 6.3.1 highlights the distinction between PD-MLR and PD-FOSD
in the following sense. If the random variable X1 is positively dependent on
the random variable Y1 in the MLR sense (i.e., fX1|Y1=y1(x1)/fX1|Y1=ŷ1(x1) is
nondecreasing in x1 for any y1 ≥ ŷ1), then conditioning on a larger Y1 shifts
the probability distribution of X1 towards the larger values of X1 everywhere
in the interval of possible values of X1. However, if the random variable X1
is positively dependent on Y1 in the FOSD sense (i.e., 1 − FX1|Y1=y1(x1) is
nondecreasing in y1 for any x1), then the shift of the probability distribution
towards the larger values of X1 when conditioned on a larger value of Y1 can
be localized ; in Example 6.3.1, a larger value of Y1 changes the probability
distribution of X1 only in the interval [0, 1/3], making the values in [0, 1/3]
close to 1/3 more likely than the values close to 0, while the likelihood of the
values of X1 in the interval (1/3, 1] remains unchanged. Proposition 6.3.1
below uses this difference between PD-MLR and PD-FOSD to show that
Example 6.3.1 violates the revenue ranking given by Corollary 6.2.1. The
proof is in Section 6.5.2.
Proposition 6.3.1. For Example 6.3.1, there exists an interval of choices
for investment I such that for any realization of the signal vector (Y1, Y2),
the expected revenue to the seller from the second price auction with bids
restricted to debt securities is higher than the expected revenue from bids
restricted to equity securities.
Recall that Corollary 6.2.1 ranks the revenue from four families of securities
in the case of PD-MLR as: pure cash bid ≤ debt ≤ equity ≤ call option.
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Numerical computation for Example 6.3.1 with investment I = 0.2 results
in the following values for the seller’s expected revenue: from cash bids =
0.3062; from call option = 0.3078; from equity = 0.3099; and from debt
= 0.3123.9 Thus, the ranking in Example 6.3.1 for I = 0.2 is: pure cash bid
< call option < equity < debt. Notice that (i) the cash bid is last in each
ranking, and (ii) compared to Corollary 6.2.1, the relative pairwise ranking
of debt, equity, and call option are reversed in this example. We show below
in Corollary 6.3.1 that point (i) holds generally in the case of PD-FOSD,
i.e., call option, equity and debt all produce a greater expected revenue for
the seller than cash bids in this case. The inferiority of cash bids relative to
these other securities thus generalizes from PD-MLR to PD-FOSD. Because
the distributions that satisfy PD-MLR form a subset of those that satisfy
PD-FOSD, the two rankings above show that any ranking of any pair of the
three families of securities of debt, equity and call options is possible within
the family of distributions that satisfy PD-FOSD. A general comparison of
these three families of securities thus requires restricting the dependence of
signals and values beyond PD-FOSD.
The next proposition gives a revenue ranking of families of securities that
holds under PD-FOSD with risk averse buyers. This is achieved by strength-
ening the steepness condition.
Definition 6.3.1 (Strong steepness). A family of securities Φ is strongly
steeper than another family of securities Ψ if for any b
′
, b̂ ∈ [b, b], φ(w, b′)−
ψ(w, b̂) is nondecreasing in w.
Notice that strong steepness implies steepness. Furthermore, debt, equity,
and call option are all strongly steeper than pure cash bid.
Proposition 6.3.2. Let Φ and Ψ be two families of securities such that Φ is
strongly steeper than Ψ. Assuming PD-FOSD, the second price auction with
bids restricted to the family Φ generates at least as much expected revenue
for the seller as the second price auction with bids restricted to the family Ψ.
The proof of Proposition 6.3.2 is in Section 6.5.3. The following is an
immediate consequence of Proposition 6.3.2:
9Each of these values is obtained through a straightforward numerical integration of
the expected revenue E [φ(X1, s(Z1, Z1;φ)) |Y1 > Z1 ] for each family φ of securities. We
turn to computation because of the complexity of formally calculating this value for each
of the four families of securities under consideration.
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Corollary 6.3.1. Assuming PD-FOSD, the expected revenue from debt,
equity, or call option are more than the expected revenue from pure cash
bids.
It is instructive to compare the revenue ranking of Proposition 6.3.2 to
the ranking in [1]. Recall Example 6.3.1. As noted above, PD-MLR shifts
the distribution of X1 across its support as y1 increases while PD-FOSD
may only shift this distribution locally. Steepness is fundamentally a local
condition that restricts how a security from one family crosses a security from
another family (i.e., it crosses at most once and from below). PD-MLR is a
global notion of positive dependence that allows this local comparison of two
families to determine a ranking based upon the seller’s expected revenue. In
moving from PD-MLR to PD-FOSD, however, this ranking no longer holds.
Steepness is replaced in Proposition 6.3.2 by strong steepness that compares
two families of securities across the entire support of X1. DeMarzo et al. [1]
thus apply a local condition on families of securities together with a global
condition on positive dependence in order to rank families of securities in
terms of expected revenue. When the global condition on positive dependence
PD-MLR is weakened to the condition PD-FOSD that may only bind locally,
we must strengthen the comparison of the securities to a global condition that
holds across the support of X1 in order to be able to rank the families.
We conclude with intuition on why a strongly steeper family of securities
generates a higher expected revenue for the seller for the case of risk neutral
buyers. Let Φ and Ψ denote two families of securities such that Φ is strongly
steeper than Ψ. Consider y1 > z1, i.e., buyer 1 wins regardless of whether bids
are from the family Φ or Ψ. Buyer 1 in each case pays the bid of the buyer
who observed signal z1. His ex-post payment is equal to φ(x1, s(z1, z1; Φ)) if
bids are from the family Φ and the value X1 of the resource is equal to x1, and
the corresponding payment in the case of family Ψ is ψ(x1, s(z1, z1; Ψ)). In
our symmetric model with risk neutral buyers, s(z1, z1; Φ) and s(z1, z1; Ψ) are
bids that make buyer 1 indifferent to winning conditioned on Y1 = Z1 = z1:
E [φ(X1, s(z1, z1; Φ)) | Y1 = z1, Z1 = z1] = E [X1 − I | Y1 = z1, Z1 = z1]
= E [ψ(X1, s(z1, z1; Ψ)) | Y1 = z1, Z1 = z1] . (6.4)
The seller would thus expect to receive the same revenue from the fami-
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lies Φ and Ψ if the highest and the second highest signals are the same, i.e.,
Y1 = Z1 = z1. Buyer 1 wins the auction, however, when his signal Y1 = y1
is greater than z1. His expected payment to the seller is therefore calculated
conditioned on Y1 = y1 > z1. Intuitively, PD-FOSD means that a larger
realized signal Y1 = y1 shifts the distribution of the return X1 from the re-
source towards its larger values. This shift increases the expected payment
to the seller from the strongly steeper family of securities Φ more than that
from Ψ because the ex-post payment to the seller increases more rapidly as
a function of x1 in the case of steeper security. Hence, compared to Y1 = z1
for which we have the equality (6.4), for Y1 = y1 > z1 we have
E [φ(X1, s(z1, z1; Φ)) | Y1 = y1, Z1 = z1]
≥ E [ψ(X1, s(z1, z1; Ψ)) | Y1 = y1, Z1 = z1] . (6.5)
We depict this intuition in Figure 6.3 for the case in which Φ represents
equity shares and Ψ represents cash payments. The lines represent the equi-
librium bids in these two families for a given value of z1. On the left is
the density fX1|Y1=z1,Z1=z1(x1) of X1 conditioned on Y1 = Z1 = z1. Relative
to this density, the expected value of the payments φ(X1, s(z1, z1; Φ)) and
ψ(X1, s(z1, z1; Ψ)) are equal. On the right is the density fX1|Y1=y1,Z1=z1(x1)
of X1 conditioned on Y1 = y1 and Z1 = z1 for y1 > z1. The expected value of
φ(X1, s(z1, z1; Φ)) exceeds the expected value of ψ(X1, s(z1, z1; Ψ)) relative
to this second density, reflecting both the shift of the density given the ob-
servation of the larger signal Y1 = y1 > z1 and the relative strong steepness
of the two families of securities.
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Figure 6.3: Payments from security bids as functions of X1, the pdf of X1
conditioned on Y1 = Z1 = z1 (left), and the pdf of X1 conditioned on
Y1 = y1 and Z1 = z1 for y1 > z1 (right). The family Φ represents equity
shares and the family Ψ represents cash payments.
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6.4 Chapter Summary
DeMarzo et al. [1] identify the relative steepness of two families of securities
as the critical factor in determining which of the two families generates the
highest expected revenue for the seller in the second price and the first price
auctions. For the second price auction, we first generalize this ranking to
include the case of risk averse buyers. We then demonstrate the dependence
of this ranking on the underlying positive dependence assumption among
values and signals. An example is provided in which positive dependence is
relaxed from MLR to FOSD. The pairwise revenue ranking of the common
families of securities – debt, equity, and call options – is completely reversed
in this example from the ranking of [1]. The cause of this reversal is that
positive dependence in the MLR sense globally restricts dependence while
positive dependence in the FOSD sense may only restrict it locally; while
the local condition of relative steepness is sufficient to rank families in the
case of MLR, it must be strengthened in order to obtain a ranking under
the less restrictive condition of FOSD. We achieve this by defining a notion
of strong steepness and obtaining a ranking of families of securities based
on this criterion. This result is significant because FOSD is the property
that is most commonly cited in auction theory to motivate an assumption of
positive dependence among values and signals.
6.5 Proofs of Some Propositions
6.5.1 Proof of Proposition 6.2.1
We start with the following definition:
Definition 6.5.1 (Single crossing). A function g1(w) single crosses a func-
tion g2(w) from below if there exists w0 such that g1(w) ≤ g2(w) for w ≤ w0
and g1(w) ≥ g2(w) for w ≥ w0.
Lemma 6.5.1 and Lemma 6.5.2 below provide the key steps in establishing
Proposition 6.2.1.
Lemma 6.5.1. Let W be a random variable taking values in some interval
J1, and let gi : J1 7→ J2, i = 1, 2 be nondecreasing functions with values in
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some interval J2. Let g1 single cross g2 from below and w0 be the crossing
point. Let h be a concave function. Then the following holds:
1. If E [g1(W )] = E [g2(W )], then E [h(g1(W ))] ≤ E [h(g2(W ))].
2. If E [h(g1(W ))] = E [h(g2(W ))] and h
′
(g1(w0)) > 0, then E [g1(W )] ≥
E [g2(W )].
Proof. The first claim is from [54]. We therefore turn to the second claim,
the proof of which closely follows the proof of the first claim.
Define Fi(t) , P [gi(W ) ≤ t], i = 1, 2, and let t0 = g1(w0). Clearly, F1 and
F2 are probability measures. If t < t0, the event g2(W ) ≤ t implies the event
g1(W ) ≤ t, hence F1(t) ≥ F2(t). Similarly, if t > t0, the event g1(W ) ≤ t
implies the event g2(W ) ≤ t, hence F1(t) ≤ F2(t).
Since h is concave, it is differentiable almost everywhere (in particular,
the right and the left derivatives exist everywhere). Hence, h(t) = h(t0) +∫ t
t0
h
′
(r)dr, where h
′
can be taken as the right derivative of h. For i =
1, 2, regard gi(W ) as a random variable with probability measure Fi. The
expected value of h(gi(W )) reduces as follows:
E [h(gi(W ))] =
∫ ∞
−∞
h(t)dFi(t) = h(t0) +
∫ ∞
−∞
∫ t
t0
h
′
(r)drdFi(t)
= h(t0)−
∫ t0
−∞
∫ t0
t
h
′
(r)drdFi(t) +
∫ ∞
t0
∫ t
t0
h
′
(r)drdFi(t)
= h(t0)−
∫ t0
−∞
∫ r
−∞
dFi(t)h
′
(r)dr +
∫ ∞
t0
∫ ∞
r
dFi(t)h
′
(r)dr
= h(t0)−
∫ t0
−∞
Fi(r)h
′
(r)dr +
∫ ∞
t0
(1− Fi(r))h′(r)dr
= h(t0)−
∫ ∞
−∞
Fi(r)h
′
(r)dr +
∫ ∞
t0
h
′
(r)dr.
Hence,
E [h(g1(W ))]− E [h(g2(W ))] =
∫ ∞
−∞
(F2(t)− F1(t))h′(t)dt. (6.6)
Substituting h(t) = t in (6.6) implies
E [g1(W )]− E [g2(W )] =
∫ ∞
−∞
(F2(t)− F1(t))dt. (6.7)
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Since h
′
(t) is nonincreasing in t, F2(t) − F1(t) ≤ 0 for t ≤ t0, and F2(t) −
F1(t) ≥ 0 for t ≥ t0, we have
(F2(t)− F1(t))h′(t) ≤ (F2(t)− F1(t))h′(t0), for all t. (6.8)
Combining (6.6)-(6.8) results in
E [h(g1(W ))]− E [h(g2(W ))] ≤ h′(t0) (E [g1(W )]− E [g2(W )]) . (6.9)
The result then immediately follows from (6.9).
Lemma 6.5.2. Let a function g single cross zero from below, and suppose
E [g(X1)|Y1 = ŷ1, Z1 = z1] ≥ 0 for some ŷ1 and z1. Assuming PD-MLR,
E [g(X1)|Y1 = y1, Z1 = z1] ≥ 0 for any y1 > ŷ1.
Proof. Since conditioning on Z1 = z1 plays no role in the above claim, for
notational convenience define hX1|Y1=y1(x1) , fX1|Y1=y1,Z1=z1(x1), which omits
Z1 = z1. Let w0 be the point at which g crosses zero from below. Since
hX1|Y1=y1(x1)/hX1|Y1=yˆ1(x1) is increasing in x1, g(x1) ≤ 0 for x1 ≤ w0, and
g(x1) ≥ 0 for x1 ≥ w0, we get
g(x1)
hX1|Y1=y1(x1)
hX1|Y1=yˆ1(x1)
≥ g(x1)hX1|Y1=y1(w0)
hX1|Y1=yˆ1(w0)
for all x1. (6.10)
Then,
E [g(X1)|Y1 = y1, Z1 = z1] =
∫ x
x
g(w)hX1|Y1=y1(w)dw
=
∫ x
x
g(w)
hX1|Y1=y1(w)
hX1|Y1=yˆ1(w)
hX1|Y1=yˆ1(w)dw
≥
∫ x
x
g(w)
hX1|Y1=y1(w0)
hX1|Y1=yˆ1(w0)
hX1|Y1=yˆ1(w)dw
=
hX1|Y1=y1(w0)
hX1|Y1=yˆ1(w0)
E [g(X1)|Y1 = ŷ1, Z1 = z1] ≥ 0,
where the first inequality is from (6.10). This completes the proof.
We can now prove Proposition 6.2.1. The seller’s expected revenue if bids
are restricted to the family Φ is E [φ(X1, s(Z1, Z1; Φ))|Y1 > Z1] and the ex-
pected revenue is E [ψ(X1, s(Z1, Z1; Ψ))|Y1 > Z1] if bids are restricted to the
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family Ψ. To prove Proposition 6.2.1, it suffices to show that for any y1 > z1,
E [φ(X1, s(Z1, Z1; Φ))|Y1 = y1, Z1 = z1]
≥ E [ψ(X1, s(Z1, Z1; Ψ))|Y1 = y1, Z1 = z1] . (6.11)
From (6.1), for any z1,
E [u(X1 − I − φ(X1, s(Z1, Z1; Φ)))|Y1 = z1, Z1 = z1] = 0
= E [u(X1 − I − ψ(X1, s(Z1, Z1; Ψ)))|Y1 = z1, Z1 = z1] . (6.12)
If φ(x1, s(z1, z1; Φ)) < ψ(x1, s(z1, z1; Ψ)) for all x1, then (6.12) would not
be true. Similarly, φ(x1, s(z1, z1; Φ)) > ψ(x1, s(z1, z1; Ψ)) for all x1 is not
possible. Hence, φ(x1, s(z1, z1; Φ)) and ψ(x1, s(z1, z1; Ψ)) must cross each
other as functions of x1. Since Φ is steeper than Ψ, φ(x1, s(z1, z1; Φ)) −
ψ(x1, s(z1, z1; Ψ)) single crosses zero from below. This implies that x1 −
ψ(x1, s(z1, z1; Ψ)) single crosses x1 − φ(x1, s(z1, z1; Φ)) from below. This,
along with (6.12), and u being concave and increasing, allow for an applica-
tion of the second part of Lemma 6.5.1, and results in the following inequality:
E [X1 − I − φ(X1, s(Z1, Z1; Φ))|Y1 = z1, Z1 = z1]
≤ E [X1 − I − ψ(X1, s(Z1, Z1; Ψ))|Y1 = z1, Z1 = z1] . (6.13)
Hence,
E [φ(X1, s(Z1, Z1; Φ))− ψ(X1, s(Z1, Z1; Ψ))|Y1 = z1, Z1 = z1] ≥ 0. (6.14)
Since φ(x1, s(z1, z1; Φ)) − ψ(x1, s(z1, z1; Ψ)) single crosses zero from below,
(6.14) and Lemma 6.5.2 imply
E [φ(X1, s(Z1, Z1; Φ))− ψ(X1, s(Z1, Z1; Ψ))|Y1 = y1, Z1 = z1] ≥ 0, (6.15)
for y1 > z1. This establishes (6.11) and the proof is complete.
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6.5.2 Proof of Proposition 6.3.1
We first explain how the example was devised. Recall the statement of
Lemma 6.5.2 from the preceding section. The proof of Proposition 6.2.1
is an application of Lemma 6.5.2 in which for any value of z1: (i) g(x1) =
φ(x1, s(z1, z1; Φ))−ψ(x1, s(z1, z1; Ψ)), where Φ is a steeper family than Ψ; (ii)
ŷ1 equals z1; (iii) Lemma 6.5.2 is applied to derive inequality (6.15), which
is the conclusion that the expected payment by buyer 1 in the event that he
trades is greater with the family of securities Φ than with Ψ. Example 6.3.1
is constructed with the goal of making this last step false so that the steeper
family of securities produces a lower expected payment by buyer 1. The key
observation is that while the function g(x1) is assumed by Lemma 6.5.2 to
single cross zero from below, this does not preclude g(x1) from decreasing
for values of x1 below the point at which it crosses zero. In Example 6.3.1,
a larger value of Y1 changes the probability density of X1 only in the inter-
val [0, 1/3], making the values in [0, 1/3] closer to 1/3 more likely and the
values near 0 less likely, while the probability density over [1/3, 1] remains
unaffected. If g(x1) is decreasing over [0, 1/3], then conditioning on a larger
value of Y1 can decrease the expected value of g(X1) over [0, 1] and thereby
reverse the conclusion of Proposition 6.2.1. As we show below, this in fact
occurs for a range of values of the investment I and for each realization of
the signal vector (Y1, Y2) in the case in which Φ is the equity family and Ψ
is the debt family.
We begin by choosing the investment parameter I to insure that the rele-
vant g(x1) in the case of debt and equity crosses zero at a value larger than
1/3. In the case of debt securities, the optimal bid b of buyer 1 when his
signal equals zero is determined by the equation
E [X1 − I −min(X1, b) |Y1 = 0] = 0,
⇔E [X1 − I |Y1 = 0] = E [min(X1, b) |Y1 = 0] . (6.16)
With foresight to the use of g(x1) below, we wish to insure that the optimal
bid of buyer 1 when his signal equals zero exceed 1/3. The left side of (6.16)
is decreasing in I and the right side is nondecreasing in b. At I = 0.2 and
b = 1/3, the left side strictly exceeds the right side. As a consequence, we
conclude that there is a value I > 0.2 such that for all I < I, the value of
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b that solves (6.16) strictly exceeds 1/3. We therefore fix the investment at
some value I˜ ∈ (0, I).
Consider an arbitrary realization (y˜1, y˜2) of the signal vector such that
buyer 1 wins, i.e., y˜1 > y˜2. Given y˜2, let b
d denote the bid of buyer 2 when he
bids with debt securities and be his bid when he bids with equity securities.
It is sufficient to prove that
E [beX1|Y1 = y˜1] < E
[
min(X1, b
d)|Y1 = y˜1
]
, (6.17)
where the left hand side denotes the seller’s expected revenue given (y˜1, y˜2)
in the case of equity securities and the right hand side denotes his expected
revenue in the case of debt securities. We are using here the fact that X1 is
independent of Y2 in this example.
Lemma 6.2.2 states that the bids bd and be satisfy:
E
[
X1 − I˜ − beX1|Y1 = y˜2
]
= 0 = E
[
X1 − I˜ −min(X1, bd)|Y1 = y˜2
]
,
(6.18)
⇒ E [beX1 −min(X1, bd)|Y1 = y˜2] = 0. (6.19)
We next apply (6.18) to bound the bids bd and be. Since I˜ > 0, it is straight-
forward to see that be < 1. Our foresight in choosing I˜ is now useful: because
E
[
X1 − I˜ −min(X1, bd) |Y1 = y1
]
is increasing in y1, the solution b
d to (6.18)
is at least as large as its value at y1 = 0 and so b
d > 1/3.
Define g(x1) , bex1 − min(x1, bd). The function g is decreasing in the
interval [0, bd] and thus decreasing in [0, 1/3]. From (6.19), E[g(X1)|Y1 =
y˜2] = 0. Hence,
E [g(X1)|Y1 = y˜1] = E [g(X1)|Y1 = y˜1]− E [g(X1)|Y1 = y˜2]
=
∫ 1
0
g(w)fX1|Y1=y˜1(w)dw −
∫ 1
0
g(w)fX1|Y1=y˜2(w)dw. (6.20)
From (6.2), for w ∈ (1/3, 1], fX1|Y1=y˜1(w) = fX1|Y1=y˜2(w) = 1. For w ∈
[0, 1/3], fX1|Y1=y1(w) = 1− y1 + 6wy1 and g(w) = (be− 1)w. Equation (6.20)
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therefore simplifies to:
E [g(X1)|Y1 = y˜1] =
∫ 1/3
0
g(w)
(
fX1|Y1=y˜1(w)− fX1|Y1=y˜2(w)
)
dw
=
∫ 1/3
0
(be − 1)w ((1− y˜1 + 6wy˜1)− (1− y˜2 + 6wy˜2)) dw
=
∫ 1/3
0
(be − 1)(y˜1 − y˜2)w(6w − 1)dw
= (be − 1)(y˜1 − y˜2) 1
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< 0, (6.21)
where the last inequality is because y˜1 > y˜2 and b
e < 1. This establishes
(6.17) and the proof is complete.
6.5.3 Proof of Proposition 6.3.2
The proof is almost the same as the proof of Proposition 6.2.1. The main
difference is in how the concluding inequality that ranks the expected pay-
ments of the winning buyer under different families of securities is derived
using PD-FOSD and strong steepness instead of PD-MLR and steepness.
As in the proof of Proposition 6.2.1, it suffices to show that (6.11) holds
for any y1 > z1. The argument in the proof of Proposition 6.2.1 implies that
φ(x1, s(z1, z1; Φ)) must cross ψ(x1, s(z1, z1; Ψ)) as functions of x1. Strong
steepness requires that φ(x1, s(z1, z1; Φ))−ψ(x1, s(z1, z1; Ψ)) is nondecreasing
in x1 and hence x1 − ψ(x1, s(z1, z1; Ψ)) single crosses x1 − φ(x1, s(z1, z1; Φ))
from below. Inequality (6.14) then follows by the same argument as before,
implying:
E [φ(X1, s(Z1, Z1; Φ))− ψ(X1, s(Z1, Z1; Ψ))|Y1 = z1, Z1 = z1] ≥ 0,
⇒E [φ(X1, s(Z1, Z1; Φ))− ψ(X1, s(Z1, Z1; Ψ))|Y1 = y1, Z1 = z1] ≥ 0.
The last inequality which proves the result is from an application of Lemma 6.1.2,
using the fact that φ(x1, s(z1, z1; Φ))− ψ(x1, s(z1, z1; Ψ)) is nondecreasing in
x1 (i.e., strong steepness) together with PD-FOSD.
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Chapter 7
Conclusions and Future Work
We have witnessed a proliferation of smart markets in the last decade or so.
Examples include the FCC auctions, the sponsored search auctions, markets
for clouds services, electricity markets, etc. Yet, the understanding of smart
markets is very limited and there are many challenging open problems. This
thesis provides some insights into how smart markets should be designed and
analyzed in the presence of strategic agents with privately held and dispersed
information. Our main findings are the following:
(i) The objectives of revenue maximization and social welfare maximiza-
tion – the two most commonly used design objectives in auction theory
– are not well aligned. We quantify a trade-off between them.
(ii) While we have a good understanding of social welfare maximizing com-
binatorial auctions, not much is known about revenue maximizing com-
binatorial auctions. There is a little hope of characterizing revenue
optimal combinatorial auctions with buyers having multidimensional
private information. However, some intuitive structure in the private
information of the buyers can be exploited in certain cases and a rev-
enue optimal combinatorial auction can be characterized. Our char-
acterization of a revenue optimal auction for single-minded buyers – a
benchmark class of combinatorial auction problems – is in this spirit. It
forms an initial step towards solving the general combinatorial auction
problems.
(iii) We show in the context of selling cloud services that creating price
discrimination by combining market based pricing with fixed pricing can
cause a loss of revenue for the service provide. We provide evidence in
support of using only fixed pricing for selling cloud computing instances.
(iv) We propose a two-stage payment rule for selling a resource: auction
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followed by a profit sharing contract. We establish the revenue opti-
mality of this two-stage payment rule over the one-time auction based
payment. While the issue of providing incentives for developing the
resource does influence the choice of the ex-post sharing rule, the one-
time payment is never revenue optimal; in particular, sharing a small
fraction of losses and positive profits with the winning buyer is always
better for the seller than no ex-post sharing.
(v) Finally, we show how auctions can be carried out using bids which are in
the form of securities whose values to the seller are tied to the eventual
realized value of the resource. We highlight the role of the exact nature
of positive dependence between the values and the signals of the buyers
in establishing the pairwise revenue ranking of two families of securities.
Below we provide some possible directions for future research:
(i) The implementation complexity of combinatorial auctions can be re-
duced by using simple mechanisms that have small strategy space and
small message space. For example, buyers can be asked to bid only on
a small numbers of bundles of items. However, such simple mechanisms
can cause a loss in the realized welfare or revenue. What revenue or
welfare guarantees can such simple mechanisms provide? How do we
design simple mechanisms with optimal guarantees?
(ii) Buyers decide how much to bid in an auction based on their informa-
tion. However, information acquisition can be expensive, especially for
an auction of a resource. By using better experiment methods or by
taking multiple measurements, buyers can refine their estimates about
the value of the resource. Better information comes at higher cost. Two
questions of interest are: (i) How does a profit sharing contract affect
incentives to acquire better but costly information? (ii) What is the
net effect of profit sharing contracts on seller’s revenue if information
acquisition is costly?
(iii) As discussed in Chapter 5, the seller may need the expertise of the
winning buyer in exploiting the resource. The auction and subsequent
sharing contract are then components in a principal-agent relationship
that must address the incentives provided to the winning buyer. Our
159
work investigated the effect of the profit and loss sharing contract in
the presence of the principal-agent relationship. An open question is:
How do we analyze auctions with general profit sharing contracts in the
presence of the principal-agent relationship?
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